Africa
Development, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, 2010, pp. 47 – 70
© Council
for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2010
(ISSN 0850-3907)
Repression
of Press Freedom in Nigerian Democratic Dispensations
Akeem Ayofe Akinwale*
Abstract
The Nigerian
socio-political environment influences press freedom with adverse implications
for education, information, entertainment and surveillance. A theoretical
recognition of the press as the “fourth estate” connotes the capacity of the
press to monitor the tiers of government (the legislature, the executive and
the judiciary). However, the state monitors the press in Nigeria in a manner
that negates the principle of the fourth estate. This article examines the
repression of press freedom in Nigerian democratic dispensations. Using
questionnaires and indepth interviews, data were drawn from 440 members of
staff of selected print and electronic press organisations in Lagos and Oyo
states of Nigeria. Results showed that although the press facilitated the
development of democracy, challenges to press freedom were frequent.
Respondents largely confirmed that the press kept the public informed,
entertained and enlightened, and it set standards and established values for
public conduct. The findings showed that the proposed Freedom of Information
Bill (FIB) would empower the press and promote democracy in Nigeria if passed
into law and implemented. Therefore, it was recommended that press
organisations should pursue their professionalism and the ethics of journalism
rather than succumb to socio-political forces influencing the quantity and
quality of information made available to the public. Political leaders in
Nigeria should accommodate public opinion and press reports on necessities for
socioeconomic development before making any public interest decision.
Keywords: media movement, press freedom,
public opinion, democracy, development.
*
Department of Sociology, Landmark University, Omu Aran, Kwara State. E-mail:
akimascholar@yahoo.com
48
Résumé
L’environnement
sociopolitique nigérian influence la liberté de la presse avec des implications
adverses pour l’éducation, l’information, le divertissement et la surveillance.
Une reconnaissance théorique de la presse comme le « quatrième pouvoir » connote
la capacité de celle-ci à surveiller les niveaux de gouvernement (le pouvoir
législatif, le pouvoir exécutif et le pouvoir judiciaire). Cependant, l’État au
Nigeria surveille la presse d’une manière qui nie le principe de quatrième
pouvoir. Cette étude examine la répression de la liberté de la presse dans les
dispensations démocratiques nigérianes. Utilisant des questionnaires et des
entretiens approfondis, des données ont été obtenues auprès de 440 membres du
personnel d’organismes choisis de presse écrite et de presse électronique dans
les États de Lagos et d’Oyo au Nigeria. Les résultats ont montré que bien que
la presse ait facilité le développement de la démocratie, la liberté de la
presse était fréquemment confrontée à des défis. Les répondants ont largement
confirmé que la presse continuait d’informer, de divertir et d’éclairer le
public, et elle fixait des normes et établissait des valeurs pour le
comportement du public. Les résultats ont montré que le Projet de loi sur la
liberté d’information – Freedom of
Information Bill (FIB) – proposé habiliterait la presse et promouvrait la
démocratie au Nigeria s’il est adopté et mis en œuvre. Par conséquent, il a été
recommandé que les organismes de presse poursuivent leur professionnalisme et
l’éthique du journalisme au lieu de succomber aux forces sociopolitiques qui
influencent la quantité et la qualité de l’information fournie au public. Les
dirigeants politiques au Nigeria devraient prendre en compte l’opinion publique
et les articles de presse sur les besoins de développement socioéconomique,
avant de prendre toute décision d’intérêt public.
Introduction
Press organisations are vibrant and restive
institutions which provide platforms for power negotiations in the public
space. They set the stage for public discourse on popular issues and enjoy wide
readership. The principal features of press organisations include critical
independence, democratic constructiveness and commercial viability (Bruns 2008;
Oyeleye 2004; Kuper and Kuper 2001). The state’s fear of the power of press
organisations and their immense contributions to the defence of fundamental
human rights often serves as justification for censorship. To what extent have
press organisations taken public interest into consideration and what are their
contributions to the development of democracy in Nigeria? How has the
suspension of the Freedom of Information Bill (FIB) affected press freedom in
Nigeria? What are the measures needed to make the FIB become the Freedom of
Information Law (FIL) in Nigeria?
49
This study addresses the above questions using primary and
secondary data. Primary data were gathered through questionnaires and in-depth
interviews conducted among 440 members of sixteen press organisations selected
from print and electronic media in Lagos and Oyo states respectively. Secondary
data were generated from peer-reviewed articles and official documents. This
study is pertinent given the importance of a free press in the development of
democracy, and the long history of the repression of press freedom in Nigeria.
Several attacks, acts of intimidation and arrests of journalists have been
reported in Nigeria, a country with probably the most animated media
environment in Africa (Tettey 2008). The historical role of the press in
Nigeria has oscillated between one of staunch support for national unity and
a democratic culture and one of being a vehicle for the propagation
of ethnic, religious and sectional interests (Oyeleye 2004).
The press remains a cornerstone of democracy and popular
participation worldwide. In his statement on World Press Freedom Day, President George Bush (2008) mentioned that press freedom was enshrined in the first amendment to the United States
Constitution, recognising freedom of
speech as a necessity for a free
society. Similarly, Nigerian governments have made constitutional provision for
press freedom. Section 24 (1) of Nigeria’s 1960 Constitution states that: ‘every person shall be entitled to freedom of
expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas
and information without interference’ (Akinola 1998). Also, Section 39 of
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution states the right to freedom of expression and of
the press (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).
The notion that the press is an important factor in the
democratic environment (Merrill 1974) has been reflected in the play between
the different cultural and ideological forces affecting press freedom in
Nigeria. Abati (1998) finds that the prevailing political system in Nigeria
determines the scope of press freedom. Conversely, democracy has opened up
spaces for the survival of press organisations across the world.
In Africa, the media landscape has shown significant shifts
and a tremendous expansion in the number of press organisations as democratic
dispensations have replaced dictatorial regimes (Karikari 2004). After the fall
of the Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, there was remarkable growth in
the number and diversity of press organisations in Iraq. Based on in-depth
interviews with 22 Iraqi journalists working in the country, Kim and HamaSaeed
(2008) found that prior to the Western invasion, press organisations in Iraq
had been operating under various government constraints as well as pressures
from political parties and religious groups. They also found that terrorists
and militants constantly threatened Iraqi journalists. Currently, the
50
sustainability of the fledgling Iraqi press
organisations depends on the interplay of political turmoil, sectarian
violence, and foreign interventions in the country.
As in the Iraqi situation, the transition in Nigeria from
military to civilian administration in 1979-1983 and since 1999 resulted in an
increase in the number of press organisations. There were two
government-controlled television broadcasting stations, fourteen licensed
private television stations, eighty-two AM radio stations, thirty-five FM
stations and eleven short-wave stations in Nigeria as of 1999 (Hudgens and
Trillo 1999).
Symbiotically, democracy depends on effective communication
systems channelled through the press (Jacob 2002). However, press organisations
which are expected to promote democracy and be promoted by democracy, may also
be deployed to protect elite interests to the detriment of the larger society.
Against this background, this article is divided into the following sections:
the study problem; a brief literature review; an overview of the press
situation in Nigeria the study areas; methodology; results; and discussion. The
conclusion of this study includes policy implications and recommendations.
The Study Problem
Nigeria is not yet a free and open society
despite the availability of diverse viewpoints flowing from a remarkable
abundance of press organisations in the country. However, several press
organisations in Nigeria lack complete freedom due to censorship, multiple
power centres and volatile political institutions (Agbaje 1992). In spite of
the proliferation of press organisations, constitutional provisions for press
freedom have not been fully enforced. Military regimes and civilian
administrations have in turn violated constitutional rights to press freedom in
Nigeria. The sustainability of Nigerian democracy is at stake in the absence of
complete press freedom. A political scientist stated that ‘…democracy is not
just about rights. It is equally about participation, interest representation,
and contestation’ (Aiyede 2000:17). Lack of full recognition for the press is a
major political constraint and a constitutional aberration in Nigeria.
Apart from political constraints, other factors have
affected the role of the press as the fourth estate. These include
commercialization and a decline in the observance by journalists of their
professional ethics principally caused by the daily struggle for survival in a
highly competitive but limited market (Adjovi 2002; Abati 1998). The danger of repression of press freedom in
democratic dispensations is the principal concern of this study. People in a
democratic society lacking complete press freedom are at risk of falling victim
to violence. Members of the press, especially journalists and editors who
struggle against forces that seek to suppress press freedom, have been
51
brutalised.
Nigeria, China, Cuba and Eritrea were among the countries with high
prevalence of arrested and jailed journalists in 2007 (Bush 2008).
Several cases of arrested journalists were reported in
Nigeria even during democratic dispensations (The Punch 2008). Generally, state restriction of freedom of
expression and police brutality were regular threats to members of the press.
Police raided editorial offices and arrested employees of press organisations
including the Daily Independent, The News, and The Observer during the 1999-2003 democratic dispensation (The Punch 2008; Onadipe 2002). The
police action was said to be the result of press publications considered
critical of the Nigerian government. As such, the power of the press to check
governance institutions has been curtailed, with grave implications for
socio-economic development in Nigeria.
The recent government’s refusal to pass FIB into FIL is a
current case of repression of press freedom in Nigeria. The FIB sailed through
to gain legislative approval but President Olusegun Obasanjo held it up in the
period from 1999 to 2007. It was sent back to the legislature during the tenure
of President Umar Yar’Adua, (which commenced on 29 May 2007), and has not been
given legislative approval. This continued delay in passing the FIB has
affected the quality of information made available to the public and has
resulted in a decline in public trust in the information published in the
press. Scholars have shown that public trust has a tremendous effect on the
quality of public administration and a decline in that trust can result in heavy
expenditure on the political system (Fard et
al. 2007). Other results include increased violation of human rights in
Nigeria and an upsurge in rent-seeking activities. This occurs when elites are
able to discourage entrenchment of press freedom, thereby preventing the press
from reporting their illegitimate dealings which constitute an obstacle to
sustainable development in Nigeria.
Unfortunately,
elite discourses have captured much of the mediated public sphere in Nigeria.
This trend throws up some concern with regard to the marginalisation of the
majority of Nigerians. The space allotted to public opinion in the media is so
minute that very few people have the opportunity to express their views. Media
configuration and their centralization within the contexts of urbanisation and
strict gate keeping role of state agents occupied the public spaces needed for
public-government partnership (Chan 2005; Bardoes and Haenens 2004; Mitra
2001).
Elite capture of the press-driven public sphere portends
danger for democracy as it creates multiple voices that produce different
versions of various class interests and exclude the interests of the poor. The
economic imperatives behind the operations of many press organisations tend to
trump their public service role (Tettey 2008). This situation introduces a
dilemma in the understanding of press contributions to the development of
Nigerian
52
democracy. Painfully, freedom of expression
and human rights are in a state of siege in Nigeria, with journalists and their
family members routinely arrested, tortured and detained. The Nigerian
situation is among the bad cases of press repression in the world.
More journalists were killed worldwide in 2007 than in any
year since 1994 (Ellick 2007).
Specifically, sixty-four journalists reportedly died in circumstances
linked to their work in 2007. Nearly half (thirty-one) of those deaths took
place in Iraq, which was ranked as the deadliest country for journalists for
the fifth consecutive year. Most of the killings were targeted attacks, as
opposed to deaths in crossfire.
In Gambia, recent studies have shown sometimes mortal
danger for journalists and a government proclivity for press repression (Jallow 2008; Same 2008). The
soldier-turned-civilian President Yahya Jammeh, who seized power in a 1994
bloodless coup d’état, won his third presidential election on 22 September 2006
but his victory has not appreciably moved Gambia closer to a more democratic
political culture (Same 2008). In the absence of strong political opposition,
the 2006 election resulted in the consolidation of authoritarian rule under
democratic government. In light of the above, this study examines press
repression in Nigerian democratic dispensations.
Literature Review
It is broadly agreed that the spread of
democracy, advancement of human rights, and the introduction of neoliberal
reforms followed the end of the Cold War, although several countries are yet to
fully enforce the civil right to press freedom. Few countries have a good
record in terms of press freedom and members of the press in many countries
including Nigeria are still struggling for full enjoyment of this right. On the
global press freedom index, Benin shared almost the same rank as the United
Kingdom in 2005 and was ranked highest in Africa (World Bank 2006). The
prevalence of free press organisations in Benin was driven by highly motivated
local agents of cultural change. Private radio stations driven by
cross-fertilization of foreign and indigenous ideas contributed immensely
towards the entrenchment of press freedom and promotion of political innovation
at the grassroots levels in Benin (Kohnert 2006).
Similarly, community radio stations established in the
Democratic Republic of Congo contributed tremendously towards the country’s
political transition, especially by disseminating necessary information to the
public, including the relatively isolated people in conflict areas. Estimates
of the impact of private media growth in Madagascar showed that over ninety
private radio stations began operations since the late 1990s (Tettey 2008).
Private media improved political stability following the hotly contested 2001
presidential
53
elections. The significant roles of the
press in democracy include periodic civic education, election monitoring,
reporting political activities and disseminating election results. Various
studies have established the extent to which a vibrant media environment
affects citizens’ engagement with their political system (Fard et al. 2007; Karppinen 2007; Kuenzi and
Lambright 2007; Aiyede 2000). A study of African countries that have held two
consecutive multiparty elections since the early 1990s showed a significantly
positive relationship between media exposure and voter turnout (Kuenzi and
Lambright 2007). Access to vital information affects public discourses and
political participation in the society.
The contribution of press organisations to public knowledge
has been widely recognised. As a manifestation of their awareness of the East
Germans’ tactic of mass action against oppressive government, irate citizens of
Côte d’Ivoire dislodged General Robert Gueï in October 2000 after he declared
himself winner of an election he had in fact lost during the ballot count. The
protesters in Côte d’Ivoire emulated the September 2000 popular revolt in
Yugoslavia against President Slobodan Milosevic who tried to annul an election
in which he was defeated (Onishi 2000). This linkage was demonstrated by an
Ivorian student protester’s remark: ‘The mistake Gueï made was to let us watch
scenes from Belgrade’ (Bandura 2002:12). In his interpretation of the Côte
d’Ivoire situation, Bandura (2002) reasoned as follows:
These macrosocial
applications of media ingenuity in translating social cognitive principles into
social practice illustrate how a small collective effort can make a huge
difference in an urgent global problem… As nations wrestle with the loss of
control, the public expresses disillusionment and cynicism over whether their
leaders and institutions can work for them to improve their lives (Bandura
2002:13).
Schaffner (2006) demonstrated that
citizens’ ability to acquire and utilise information about electoral processes
would serve as useful instruments of accountability before, during and after
elections. Press organisations are supposed to be the most reliable public
information sources but circumstances in different countries dictate otherwise.
Scholars found that several states in the Middle East had not made significant
progress in institutionalising procedural democracy and civil liberties (Spinks
et al. 2008). However, they confirmed
the liberalisation occurring among monarchies in the region.
Undesirable threats against press freedom in Paraguay attracted global media attention. The
Paraguay Union of Journalists described 2007 as a year of struggle, setbacks
and advances for the country’s journalists, while the International Press Institute stated that journalists
who were exposing activities such as corruption also experienced intimidation
and death threats
54
(Swaffield 2008). Paraguay has been labeled as one of the most
troubled democracies in Latin America.
In Chad, six private press organisations protested against
a decree which established new infringements and imposed harsh punishments on
journalists. They planned to launch a newspaper to denounce government
resistance to press freedom (Africa Research Bulletin 2008). Many African
states have poor records with regard to civil liberties. Within the context of
post-apartheid South African experience, scholars contended that press
organisations emerged as autonomous power centres in competition with other
power centres (Kriesi 2008; Jacobs 2002). The case of Nigeria is peculiar given
its status as the most populous black nation in the world. Nigerian
constitutions are elitist as crafted and imposed on civil society by colonial
masters, by subsequent military oligarchies and their civilian counterparts (Nwabueze
1997). The elitism of Nigerian constitutions raises questions of illegitimacy
and impunity in the violation of civil rights. The next section addresses the
extant discourse on the situation of the press in Nigeria.
An Overview of the Press Freedom Situation in
Nigeria
Oyeleye (2004) explored the turbulent
relationship between the press, the political process and political
actors in the context of the complex structure of Nigerian society.
The popularity of press organisations in Nigeria began in 1859 when Henry
Townsend established the first known newspaper (Iwe Iroyin) in Abeokuta, Western Nigeria (Abati 1998). In 1863,
Robert Campbell established another newspaper (The Anglo-African), which served as a channel for promoting ‘the
interaction between Britain and Africa’ (Dare and Uyo 1996:2). Both newspapers
set the stage for the emergence of flourishing indigenous press organisations,
with the establishment in 1880 of the Lagos
Times and Gold Coast Colony
Advertiser by Richard Beale Blaize. The success of the Lagos Times inspired the emergence of several other newspapers.
Chief Remi Aboderin established The Punch
newspaper in 1973 followed by other publications including National Concord (1980), Business Concord (1982), The Guardian (1983), African Concord (1984), African Economic
Digest (1988), Hints (1989), Weekend Concord (1989), Tell (1991), Tempo (1993), The News
(1993), P.M News (1994), The Week (1994), This Day (1995), and so on (Abati 1998). The electronic media in
Nigeria started up in the 1950s with the establishment of Western Nigeria
Television, followed by a proliferation of radio and television stations across
the country.
Different press organisations have brought the deplorable
state of Nigerian society to public knowledge. They have used critical
journalism to expose issues ranging from poverty and crime to bad roads and
other shortcomings in Nigerian cities (Ukaegbu 2007). One newspaper vividly
captured the plight
55
of commuters on a federal road, stating
that the hopeless and helpless countenance of Nigerians detained uncomfortably
against their will paint a picture of a flock of sheep without a shepherd (Leba
2006). The relationship between the press and Nigerian governments has often
been largely antagonistic. It started from mild restrictions of press freedom
during the colonial era and grew into full-blown repression in the
post-colonial era.
With the establishment of state media and press censorship,
the Nigerian press became weak, partisan and ethnocentric. Successive
governments employed the press as an instrument of propaganda (Abati 1998). The
Nigerian Press Organisation attempted to effect changes in the National Mass
Media Commission (NMMC) after the 1999 general elections, but to no avail. The NMMC defines lawful information and
balanced reporting in the light of the interests of the state. Similarly, the
Newspaper Registration Decree mandates a non-refundable fee of one hundred and
fifty thousand naira (N150,000 or $2,640) for anyone who wants to start
a newspaper. In 1984, the Nigerian government published Decree 2, which
empowered the Inspector-General of Police to detain indefinitely without trial
any person considered as a risk to state security.
Ojo (2006) observed that the government used Decree 60 to
establish the Nigerian Press Council (NPC) in 1999 and charged it with the
enforcement of professional ethics. Immediately, the Nigerian Union of
Journalists (NUJ) and the Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN)
rejected the creation of the Press Council because the decree contained a
number of provisions perceived to be inimical to the operation of a free press.
The NPC was empowered to accredit and register journalists. In applying for
registration, publishers were expected to submit their mission statements and
objectives and could be denied registration if their objectives failed to
satisfy the NPC. The penalties for operating without meeting the Council’s
standard were a fine of N250,000 ($2,500) or three years’ imprisonment.
The above review drives home the significance of theory in
the discourse of press repression in Nigeria. In any democratic environment,
the press can be anchored on three basic theories of responsibility: the
libertarian theory, the social responsibility theory and development theory
(Abati, 1998). However, John Dewey’s theory of the public sphere is suitable
for this study given its support for a conceptual model that recognises
multiple publics and permeable
borders between public and private
spheres (Asen 2003). The importance of
the theory of public sphere as an
antecedent and critical resource for contemporary theorising cannot be ignored.
The basic canons of the theory include the role of communication in the formation and reformation of the public sphere.
56
A major concern in the social construction of the press
communication system is the elite capture of the press. The elites may deploy
press organisations as tools for ventilating parochial political interests
rather than as a public arena for robust democratic expression. Elite
manipulation of press organisations in Nigeria and Madagascar fit the above
description. In Madagascar, wealthy people established media organisations and
utilised them to articulate their political propaganda (Tettey 2008). In
response to elite capture of the private press, religious organisations
produced publications to contest for space in Madagascar’s public sphere. The
Nigerian situation is different in that many religious organisations in Nigeria
concentrate more on staging crusades and drawing people closer to God instead
of providing parallel media houses.
Striking a balance between competing concerns (public right
to know and the necessity of political stability or national security) is a
major challenge to press organisations in Nigeria. Similarly, recent situations
in Kenya have uncovered the enormity of the dilemma facing press organisations
in their attempt to produce balanced reporting.
Press organisations in Kenya complied with the Ministry of Information’s
directive to delay news broadcasts in view of post-election violence and the
importance of national security. As a result, these press organisations
presented to the public an incomplete picture of socio-political realities in
the country (Tettey 2008). Neglect of press freedom can also aggravate national
disaster, as demonstrated by experience in South Africa. Danso and Macdonald
(2001) asserted that the print media’s failure to check the veracity of
government statements on immigration in South Africa was partly responsible for
some of the worst examples of xenophobic behaviour in that country.
Press contributions to ethno-religious conflict and civil
strife in Nigeria cannot be ignored. Nigerians usually patronise different
press organisations, which affects their understanding of local and
international issues. Also, press organisations serve as sources of
socio-economic and other information ranging from advertisements, job
opportunities, obituaries, and public events to corporate financial statements
and activities of industries in Nigeria.
The Study Areas
The fieldwork for this study was conducted
in different press organisations in Lagos and Oyo States of Nigeria.
Specifically, this study’s sites were limited to press organisations located in
Lagos metropolis and Ibadan, the capital city of Oyo State. Lagos and Ibadan
were already large cities prior to the advent of colonial administration in
Nigeria. Ibadan emerged as a war camp in 1829 following the settlement of
migrant warriors from different locations in southwest Nigeria and became a
large empire with a city-state
57
(Falola 1984). Lagos State was created
through Decree 14 of 1967 during the restructuring of Nigeria into twelve
states. Establishment of the University of Ibadan in 1948 enhanced the
importance of Ibadan. The concentration of qualified people increased
purchasing power in Ibadan and stimulated rapid growth in commerce and in press
organisations. However, Ibadan did not succeed in attracting many big
industries (Mabogunje 1968:201) whereas Lagos is generally regarded as the
commercial capital of Nigeria.
Until 1970, Ibadan was the largest city in sub-Saharan
Africa (Lloyd et al. 1967) and Lagos
will be one of the five mega-cities in the world by 2015 (Massey 2002). Lagos
was the Nigerian Federal Capital Territory from 1967 to 1991 (Obono 2007;
Alemika and Chukuma 2005). In the 1980s, the IbadanLagos expressway generated
the greatest urban sprawl in Ibadan. Lagos is more cosmopolitan compared to
Ibadan. Lagos metropolis comprises fourteen Local Government Areas: Agege,
Ajeromi-Ifelodun, Alimosho, Apapa, Ifako-Ijaye, Ikeja, Kosofe, Lagos Island,
Lagos Mainland, Mushin, Ojo, Oshodi-Isolo, Shomolu and Surulere (Alemika and
Chukwuma 2005). A lagoon divides Lagos State into two geographical areas, the
mainland and the island. Obono (2007)
succinctly described the basic features of Lagos:
Lagos is characterised by
high volumes of immigration, high population densities, a migration induced
growth rate of 8 per cent per year, an average household size of seven,
poverty, tremendous concentrations of slums and squatter settlements, and a
high youth unemployment rate. Lagos is the financial, economic and business
capital of Nigeria and West Africa (Obono 2007: 32).
Several press organisations were
established in Lagos State while very few were set up in Ibadan. Apart from
their heterogeneous structure and relevance in Nigerian history, Lagos and
Ibadan are areas suitable for this study due to the varied availability of
press organisations.
Methodology
The study population consisted of members
of staff of print and electronic media organisations located in Lagos and Oyo
states. Four print and four electronic media organisations were chosen in the
Ibadan and Lagos metropolitan areas due to their high concentration of press
organisations. In all, sixteen press organisations (four newspapers, four
magazines, four radio stations and four television stations) were selected while 480 members of the press
(240 each from print and electronic media in Lagos and Ibadan respectively)
were chosen based on their work schedule, competence, gender, and availability.
Specifically, thirty members of the press were chosen from
each of the sixteen selected press organisations. Additionally, one in-depth
interview was
58
conducted with senior members of staff in
each of the sixteen selected press organisations. The sample was drawn from
male and female members of staff within different age categories. Participation
was restricted to adult members of staff who had spent at least close to five
years in their respective organisations. They were considered as having
sufficient experience and understanding of the intricacies of press freedom
during Nigeria’s democratic dispensations. An in-depth interview guide and
structured questionnaire were developed for this study. The in-depth interview
was structured on the basis of the outcomes of the questionnaire and basic
concepts of the theory of press freedom.
This study’s questionnaire comprised seventeen open-ended
and eighteen focused questions to accommodate different issues including
sociodemographic profiles and knowledge of press freedom and its repression
during Nigeria’s democratic dispensations. The respondents’ perception of the
emerging Freedom of Information Bill and the extent of their agreement or
disagreement with it was tested. The questions were framed with the
understanding that democracy promotes press freedom and that press freedom is
the cornerstone of democracy. Eight unpaid research assistants drawn from
members of staff in the selected press organisations facilitated questionnaire
administration to their colleagues.
The research assistants requested at least two weeks to get
the answers to the questionnaire back from their colleagues due to their busy
schedules. The researcher followed up and monitored the progress of
questionnaire administration through regular telephone conversation with
research assistants. Considerable response magnitude was obtained from members
of the press four weeks after the date the researcher consulted the research
assistants and gave them copies of the questionnaire. Only 424 copies of
questionnaire were filled and returned against 480 copies originally distributed.
Thus, an 88.3 per cent response rate was recorded for this study. All copies of
the filled questionnaires were scrutinized for completeness of response and
analysed through the application of the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS 13). Data obtained from in-depth interviews were analysed
ethnographically with the aid of the ZY Index.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 depicts the respondents’
socio-demographic profile. The table shows responsible, mature members of staff
by virtue of their marital status, age range (25-60 years) and high level of
Western education. Two-thirds (66%) of the respondents were male and over
two-thirds (68.2%) were married. At least four out of every five respondents
(83%) were Christians and 80.9 per cent had a first degree or Higher National
Diploma (HND). The majority
59
Table
1: Respondents’ Socio-Demographic Profile
Profile
|
Values
|
Frequency Percentage (%)
|
|
Marital Status
|
Not Married
|
126
|
29.7
|
Cohabitation
|
9
|
2.1
|
|
Married
|
289
|
68.2
|
|
Total
|
424
|
100
|
|
Sex
|
Female
|
144
|
34
|
Male
|
280
|
66
|
|
Total
|
424
|
100
|
|
Religion
|
Christianity
|
352
|
83
|
Islam
|
72
|
17
|
|
Total
|
424
|
100
|
|
Education
|
ND/NCE/Technical
|
18
|
4.2
|
First Degree/HND
|
343
|
80.9
|
|
Masters
|
63
|
14.9
|
|
Total
|
424
|
100
|
|
Age (Years)
|
< 30
|
63
|
14.9
|
30-39
|
180
|
42.5
|
|
40-49
|
153
|
36.1
|
|
50 +
|
28
|
66
|
|
Total
|
424
|
100
|
|
Job Status
|
Editor
|
126
|
29.7
|
Reporter
|
216
|
50.9
|
|
Journalist
|
18
|
4.2
|
|
Correspondent
|
18
|
4.2
|
|
Producer/Presenter
|
9
|
2.1
|
|
Newscaster
|
37
|
8.7
|
|
Total
|
424
|
100
|
|
Ethnicity
|
Igbo
|
36
|
8.5
|
Yoruba
|
343
|
80.9
|
|
Other
|
45
|
10.6
|
|
Total
|
424
|
100
|
|
Monthly Income (
|
< 50,000.0
|
198
|
46.7
|
050,000.00-75,999.00
|
154
|
36.3
|
|
76,000.00-100,000.00
|
54
|
12.7
|
|
>100,000.00
|
18
|
4.2
|
|
Total
|
424
|
100
|
|
Organisation
|
Newspaper
|
90
|
21.2
|
Television
|
91
|
21.5
|
|
Radio
|
135
|
31.8
|
|
Magazine
|
108
|
25.5
|
|
Total
|
100
|
424
|
|
Working Experience
|
< 5
|
162
|
38.2
|
(Years)
|
5-9
|
108
|
25.5
|
10 +
|
154
|
36.3
|
|
Total
|
424
|
100
|
|
Source:
2008 Survey on Repression of Press Freedom in Nigerian Democratic
Dispensations
60
(61.8%) had worked in the press
organisations under study for over five years whereas their monthly income was
relatively low, ranging from N 40,000 to N 76,000.00 ($340–$650)
for over 83 per cent of respondents. Over 50 per cent of them were reporters,
followed by editors (29.7%) among others including journalists, correspondents,
producers/presenters and newscasters.
Press Freedom in Nigerian Democratic
Dispensations
Table 2 presents the respondents’ knowledge
of press freedom. Three out of every five respondents (59.6%) stated that
information, education, enlightenment, entertainment and public awareness were
the top priorities of their press organisations. Very few (8.5%) said that
advertisements and profit were the top priorities of their press organisations.
These divergent views indicate the challenges facing the press with regard to
striking a balance between professionalism and public expectations on one hand
and on the other hand, keeping the press alive as a business. In their
assessment, 42.7 per cent, 34 per cent and 12.7 per cent of the respondents
respectively said that inadequate freedom, poor funding, low remuneration, lack
of professionalism and corruption were the major problems facing their press
organisations.
Over 91 per cent of the respondents confirmed that press
freedom was not fully achieved during any democratic dispensation in Nigeria.
This finding reflects several reports on harassment of members of the press and
human rights abuse in Nigeria. For instance, The Punch (2008) reported
that 22 journalists including an American were arrested and detained in Port
Harcourt, Rivers State, on the allegation of not obtaining clearance before
taking photographs and footage of some facilities at the Shell Petroleum
Development Company’s gas plant in the Niger Delta. It was recalled that in
2004, the State Security Service raided the office of Insider Weekly, seized some vital documents and arrested some journalists.
In September 2007, two German journalists and a US activist were intercepted
and detained for two weeks, while four US documentary filmmakers and their
Nigerian counterparts were detained for six days in April 2008 (The Punch 2008). Other media houses
including The News, Africa
Independent Television/ Raypower, Freedom Radio in Kano and Bayelsa
Broadcasting Corporation were recent victims of an official clampdown. The
editorial section of a popular newspaper in Nigeria observed that:
It is sad that while international standards,
which allow journalists to perform their duties without let or hindrance, are
respected even at war fronts, Nigerian journalists and media houses face
intimidation and harassment on a daily basis at home (The Punch 2008:14).
61
Several reasons advanced as evidence of the
absence of complete press freedom in Nigeria included restriction on press
activity, government refusal to endorse the FIB, censorship, the influence of
owners, and harassment of officials of press organisations. All participants in
in-depth interviews corroborated the above reasons. They mentioned that lack of
press freedom remained a major problem hindering effective contributions of the
press to development in Nigeria. More than half of the respondents (55.4%) considered
the public interest as the most important concern for any press organisation
whereas 38.2 per cent believed that both state and public interest were
paramount.
Some 72.4 per cent felt that their press organisations
protected both state and public interests, while only 14.9 per cent maintained
that their press organisations protected the public interest. This finding
sheds some light on the position of the press as an intermediary between the
state and the public. Thus, it can be deduced that press organisations in
Nigeria operate between opposite forces (the state and the public). Press
organisations face difficulties in the process of maintaining a balance between
these forces. One participant uncovered the dilemma of the press in a brief
statement: ‘the state threatens press organisations, the police harass members
of the press and the public does not appreciate the role of the press’
(In-depth interview, 18 August 2008).
In the debate concerning the relationship between democracy
and the press, an overwhelming majority (87.3%) strongly believed that the
press promoted democracy in Nigeria and 85.1 per cent stated that without the
press, the Nigerian democracy would not survive. Only a few respondents (6.4%)
agreed on the co-existence of democracy and the press in Nigeria. By the
following frequency of mention (48.8%, 21.2%, 15.1% and 14.9%), intimidation,
restriction of freedom, dangers associated with objective reporting, work
hazards and economic hardships came up clearly in the array of risks facing
members of press organisations during Nigerian democratic dispensations.
Both awareness and personal experience of hostile relations
between Nigerian governments and press organisations were very high at 93.6 per
cent respectively. Obviously, governments have succeeded in controlling press
organisations in Nigeria, given that more respondents (97.9%) felt that
government opinions were always in the news compared to those (72.4%) who felt
the opinions of ordinary people were always published. Scrutiny of the
estimates presented in Table 2 shows that state hegemony, private-public
struggles for recognition and reconstruction of press organisations within the
context of a neoliberal political economy are separate realities affecting
socio-economic development in Nigeria.
62
Table
2: Respondents’ Knowledge of Press Freedom
KnowledgeKnowledge Values Values Frequency
PercentageFrequency Percentag
TTop Priority of the
Organisation op Priority of the Education/Information/Enlightenment/
Entertainment 154 36.3
Organisation Awareness 99 23.3
News
135
31.8
Total Education/Information/Enlightenment/Adverts/Profit
36 8.5
Total 424
100
EntertainmentAwarenessNewsAdverts/ProfitMajor
Problem Facing the Press Inadequate
Freedom 1549913536424181 42.7
36.323.331.88.5100 Funding/Low Remuneration 144
34
Self
Censorship 36 8.5
Major Problem Harassment Lack of Professionalism/Corruption
54 9
2.1 12.7
Facing the PressTotal
424
100
Complete Press Freedom during No 388
91.5
TotalAny Democratic Dispensation Inadequate
FreedomFunding/Low RemunerationSelfYes 36 8.5
CensorshipHarassmentLack of
Professionalism/CorruptionTotal Reason for
Complete or Government Refusal of FIB 424109 100 25.7
18114436954424Incomplete
Press Freedom Freedom Restriction 42.7348.52.112.7100 144 34
Censorship/Owner’s
Influence 81 19.1
Complete Press Harassment/Persecution
of Press Officials Anti-Government Stories without 63 14.9
Freedom during Any Democratic
DispensationTotal Media Closure NoYes 27 6.4
38836424Total Interest Considered Most 91.58.5100 State Interest 424 27 100 6.4
Reason for Complete or Incomplete
Press FreedomTotalGovernment RefusalImportant Public
Interest Both State and Public Interest 235162
55.438.2
of FIBFreedom RestrictionCensorship/Owner’s
InfluenceHarassment/Total 424
100
Persecution of Press
OfficialsAnti-Government Stories without Media ClosureInterest
Protected by Press Organisation State Interest Public Interest 54 63
12.714.9
109144816327424 Both State and Public Interest 25.73419.114.96.4100 307 72.4
Total 424
100
Interest Considered Most Important
TotalHierarchy of Relevance between Democracy and the Press Democracy Promotes the Press The
Press Promotes Democracy State
InterestPublic 54 370 12.787.3
InterestBoth State and Public
InterestTotal 27235162424 6.455.438.2100424 100
Reason in Support of Democracy Democracy and the Press Co-Exist 27 6.4
Interest Protected by Press
Organisation Totalor the Press Without
Democracy the Press Cannot Survive State InterestPublic 36 8.5
InterestBoth State and Public
Interest Total Without the Press Democracy Cannot Survive 5463307424 12.714.972.4100361424 100 85.1
Greatest Risk Facing Members Danger of Objectivity 64 15.1
Hierarchy of Relevance between
Democracy and the PressTotalof the Press Intimidation/Insecurity
207 48.8
Democracy Promotes the PressThe
Press Promotes Democracy Freedom
Restriction 90 21.2
Hazard/Economic Hardships 63 14.9 54370424Total 12.787.3100 424 100
Awareness of Problem with Any No 27 6.4
Reason in Support of Democracy or
the PressTotalMember of the
Press Yes
Democracy and the397 93.6
Press Co-ExistWithout Democracy the
Press Cannot SurviveWithout theTotal Knowledge of
Threat if Certain No 424
27 100 6.4
Press Democracy Cannot SurviveInformation
is Made Public Yes
2736361424 6.48.585.1100397 93.6
Total 424
100
Greatest Risk Facing Members of the
PressTotalPublication of Opinion of Always
Danger of307 72.4
Ordinary People Occasionally
117
27.6
ObjectivityIntimidation/InsecurityFreedom
RestrictionHazard/EconomicTotal 424 100
HardshipsPublication
of Opinion of 642079063424Always 15.148.821.214.9100 415 97.9
Government or the Elite Occasionally 9 2.1
Awareness of Problem with Any
Member of the Press TotalTotal 424 NoYes
100
Source: 2008
Survey on Repression of Press Freedom in Nigerian Democratic27397424 6.493.6100
DispensationsKnowledge
of Threat if Certain Information is Made PublicTotal NoYes
27397424 6.493.6100
63
Public Context of FIB and Necessity for FIL in
Nigeria
Table 3 illustrates the respondents’
knowledge of the Freedom of Information Bill (FIB) in Nigeria. All the
respondents agreed that the FIB should be passed into a Freedom of Information
Law (FIL). The majority (87.3%) endorsed the FIB with highly positive remarks,
while the rest (8.5% and 4.2%) strongly believed that it would promote press
freedom and enhance the development of democracy in Nigeria. Almost half the
respondents (46.9%) believed that there would be easy access to information,
while another 34 per cent believed that there would be removal of restrictions
on press freedom and media organisations would have greater access to
information if the FIB was passed into law. However, the Nigerian government’s
refusal to steer the FIB into law can be described as a contravention of the
Nigerian Constitution, an infringement on human rights and an indictment of
President Umaru Yar’Adua, who publicly declared his intention to uphold the
rule of law.
In spite of President Yar’Adua’s claim that his administration
was anchored on the rule of law journalists faced intimidation and harassment
in the course of their legitimate duties. In September 2007, a journalist was
beaten into a stupor when he covered a prison riot in Ibadan. State Security
staff also arrested several journalists in October 2007 for criticising the
governors of Borno and Akwa Ibom states (The
Punch 2008:14). There was a high level of awareness of the reasons for the
delay of the FIB as 68.2 per cent of respondents attributed it to the state attempting
to cover up certain government activities and keep them away from public
knowledge, 19.1 per cent believed it was due to the government’s selfish
interest and concern for national security, while 6.4 per cent each claimed
that lack of governance transparency, corruption and the state’s calls for
clarification were the main reasons for the suspension of the FIB.
Apparently, the type of press organisation did not
significantly affect the press practitioners’ reactions to the FIB, which was
generally believed to be necessary for the development of the Nigerian
democracy. The press serves society in a various ways, through its political,
social, educational and religious functions. The popular reference to the press
as the ‘fourth estate’ points to the capacity of the press to perform the role
of a watchdog, monitor those in authority, expose their limitations and provide
checks and balances to the three other estates, namely the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary. The press helps to keep the public informed, it
entertains, educates and sets standards and establishes values for public
conduct.
Thus, the press is responsible to the society as an
instrument of social order construction (Abati 1998). Unfortunately, there was
a lack of consensus on the assurance of when the FIB would become the FIL.
While 48.8 per cent thought that the FIB should be passed into law soon, 38.4
per cent said
64
that it should be passed immediately and
12.7 per cent noted that it would be passed into law during the next political
dispensation. Concerning the principal effect on press organisations of the
absence of the FIL, 74.5 per cent of respondents said that its absence had
aggravated the traditional restriction of press freedom, followed by 19.1 per
cent who believed that the absence of the FIL provided motivation for further
struggle for press freedom in Nigeria. With regard to the Nigerian public, 36.1
per cent and 32.1 per cent respectively of respondents felt that the FIL would
guarantee public access to right information and easy access to information.
Table
3: The Respondents’ Knowledge of Freedom of Information Bill (FIB)
Knowledge Values
Frequency Percentage
Perception
about the FIB
Total
|
Good/Should be Passed into
Law
Essential for Democracy
It will Promote Press
Freedom
|
370
18 36 424
|
87.3
4.2
8.5
100
|
FIB Benefit
to the Press if Passed into Law
Total
|
Easy Access to Information
Removal of Restriction on
Freedom
Eradication of Speculative
News
Accountability/Transparency
|
199 144
54 27 424
|
46.9
34
12.7
6.4
100
|
Reason for
Government
Refusal of FIB
Total
|
Fear of
Being Exposed/Corruption Lack of Governance Transparency Selfish Interest/National Security
Government’s Call for
Clarification
|
289 27
81 27 424
|
68.2
6.4
19.1
6.4
100
|
Thought about
When FIB Should
Be Passed into Law
Total
|
Immediately
Very Soon
Next Political
Dispensation
|
163
207
54
424
|
38.4 48.8 12.7
100
|
Effect of Lack of
Freedom of Information Law
on the Press
Total
|
Restriction of Press
Freedom
Struggle for Press Freedom
No Serious Effect
|
316 81
27
424
|
74.5 19.1
6.4
100
|
Major Advantage
of Freedom
of Information Law to the Public
Total
|
Access to Right Information
Easy Access to Information
Accountability/Transparency Patriotism/High Trust of the Press
Publicly Seen and Heard
|
153 136 90 36
9 424
|
36.1 32.1 21.2 8.5
2.1
100
|
Source:
2008 Survey on Repression of Press Freedom in Nigerian Democratic Dispensations
65
Repression of Press Freedom in Nigeria
Table 4 shows the respondents’ knowledge of
repression of press freedom in Nigeria. There were no significant differences
in the reactions of members of staff of electronic and print media
organisations to repression of press freedom in Nigerian democratic
dispensations. Two out of every three respondents (68.2%) were aware of
specific policies that created obstacles to press freedom. Such policies
included censorship and bureaucracy (37.7%), decrees and government control of
public media (21.8% each) as well as officially secret and classified
information (18.7%). Respondents recognised the government and police as
antagonists of members of press organisations in Nigeria, with their tactics of
hindrance, intimidation, harassment and arrest. It is no longer in doubt that
the state perceives the press as threat and thus restricts press freedom. Thus,
press freedom may remain problematic for as long as the currently dominant
class remains in power in Nigeria.
Passage of the FIB into the FIL and upgrading the socioeconomic
conditions of members of press organisations received massive support from
respondents in this study.
Table
4: Respondents’ Knowledge of Repression of Press Freedom
Knowledge
|
Values
|
Frequency
Percentage
|
||
Awareness of Policy against Press Freedom Total
|
No
Yes
|
135
289
424
|
31.8
68.2
100
|
|
Specified Policy against
Press Freedom
Total
|
Decree(s)
Censorship/Bureaucracy
Official Secret/Classified Information
Government Control of Public Media
|
63 109
54
63 289
|
21.8
37.7 18.7
21.8
100
|
|
Group that Creates Greatest
Problem for the Press
Total
|
Government Police
|
370
54 424
|
87.3
12.7
100
|
|
Greatest Problem that the
Group Can Create for the
Press
Total
|
Intimidation/Harassment
Hindrance/Freedom Restriction
Arrest/Persecution
Unnecessary Bureaucracy/Secretive
Refusal of FIB
|
81 270
27
27
19 424
|
19.1
63.7 6.4
6.4
4.5
100
|
|
Experience of Warning or
Directive not to Publish
Certain Information
Total
|
Recently
Long Time
Never
|
127
144
153
424
|
30
34
36.1
100
|
|
Measure for Promoting
Press Freedom
Total
|
Passing of FIB into Law
Passing of
FIB into Law and Adequate Remuneration
Public Support of the Press
|
343
63
18 424
|
80.9
14.9
4.2
100
|
|
Source: 2008 Survey on
Repression of Press Freedom in Nigerian Democratic Dispensations
Sstitre-14 02/08/2011,
17:32
66
Conclusion
Scrutiny of the findings of this study
shows that state hegemony, privatepublic struggles for recognition and
reconstruction of press organisations within the context of a neo-liberal
political economy are separate realities demanding attention in the discourse
of public sphere in Africa. The separate realities interlock, as this study has
clearly demonstrated. Press organisations have contributed immensely towards
the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria whereas the Nigerian socio-political environment
has hindered complete press freedom. Constant intimidation and arrest of
members of the press is an indication that Nigerian governments lack the
political will to address development crises in the country.
Different stories in various media featured public outcries
over lack of government transparency and foul play in governance. This study
has confirmed that the press kept the public informed, entertained and
enlightened, and that it set standards and established values for public
conduct. Different press organisations in Nigeria kept the local and
international public informed on the remarkable socio-economic news and
political developments. Earlier studies confirmed that lack of credibility and
the unprofessional conduct of some media organisations could undermine the
power of the press (Tettey 2006; Sakr 2003). Some journalists in Africa have
been accused of unprofessional conduct such as corruption, chasing spectacular
headlines and doctoring reports to attract monetary inducements (Tettey 2008).
This phenomenon is popularly known as white or brown
envelope syndrome in Nigeria where some members of press organisations have
colluded with government officials principally due to pecuniary motives and the
institutionalisation of corruption. The
repression of press freedom has remained widespread even in democratic
dispensations and may adversely affect the investment climate in Nigeria. If
the government remains adamant on holding back the FIB, the public would be
denied access to correct information and deprived of the immense benefits that
can accrue from transparent governance. This speculation is not unfounded given
the fact that many Africans lack knowledge of political processes that affect
them due to the extensive opacity of government operations.
A study by Tettey (2008) showed that press organisations
assist the public by providing information on various dealings of the
government to ensure transparency in governance. Renewed interest in boosting
socioeconomic development will not yield positive results until press freedom
is entrenched in Nigeria. This pessimism flows from intellectual sensitivity to
the flood of current thoughts in global development debates in which the
explanatory variables of development have successively moved to institutions
67
from the long held beliefs in access to
natural resources, physical capital, the acquisition and sustainability of
technology, the human capital as well as the generation and implementation of
sound policies (Bonger 2006).
To this effect, press organisations in Nigeria require
better ways of upholding professional and journalistic ethics rather than
succumbing to adverse influences that water down the quality of information
needed for sustainable socio-economic development. The Nigerian political class
should accommodate public opinion and press reports on the necessity of
responsible governance before taking any decision that may be of public
interest. The development of Nigeria’s democracy largely depends on full
recognition of institutional responsibilities – including the role of the press
– in nation building. Therefore, practical steps should be taken towards
developing the political environment in Nigeria so that electoral malpractices
and political terrorism will be drastically reduced or totally eradicated.
Additionally, public trust is valuable and should be gained in the movement
toward constitutional amendments in Nigeria.
References
Abati,
R., 1998, ‘Press Freedom in Nigeria: 1859-1998’, in Atere, A.A. and A. Olagbemi,
eds., Communication, Language and Culture
in Society, Lagos: Bolaji and Associates.
Adjovi,
E.V., 2002, ‘Liberté de Presse et Corruption au Bénin - la Dérive du
Journalisme de Marché’, Working Paper No. 10, Mainz University: Department of
Anthropology and African Studies.
Africa
Research Bulletin, 2008, ‘Fight for Press
Freedom Political’, Social &
Cultural Series, Vol. 45, Issue
3, pp. 17463-17463.
Agbaje, A.A.B., 1992, The Nigerian Press, Hegemony, and the Social Construction of
Legitimacy: 1960-1983, Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellon Press.
Aiyede, R.,
2000, ‘The Dynamics of Civil Society and the Democratisation Process in
Nigeria’, Paper Presented during the
Fellowship at the Transregional Center for Democratic Studies (TCDS), New
School University, New York, September-December 2000.
Akinola, R., 1998, Nigerian Media and Legal Constraint: Analysis of Press Legislation in
Nigeria, Lagos: Centre for Free Speech.
Alemika,
E.E.O. and Chukwuma, I.C., 2005, Criminal
Victimization and Fear of Crime in Lagos Metropolis, Nigeria, Lagos: CLEEN
Foundation.
Asen, R., 2003, ‘The Multiple Mr. Dewey:
Multiple Publics and Permeable
Borders in John Dewey’s Theory of The Public Sphere’, Argumentation &
Advocacy, Vol. 39, Issue 3, pp. 174-189.
Ayandele,
E., 1979, The Educated Elite in the
Nigerian Society, Ibadan: University Press.
68
Bandura,
A., 2002, ‘Growing Primacy of Human Agency in Adaptation and Change in the
Electronic Era’, European Psychologist, Vol.
7, No. 1, pp. 2-16.
Bardoel,
J. and d’Haenens, L., 2004, Media Meet the Citizen: Beyond Market Mechanisms
and Government Regulations, European
Journal of
Communication, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp.172.
Bonger,
T., 2006, ‘Some Thoughts on Socio-Economic Engineering in Fragile States in
Africa: The Case of Uganda’, Ethiopian Journal of Economics, Vol. 15,
No. 2, pp. 51-73.
Bruns,
A., 2008, ‘Life Beyond the Public Sphere: Towards a Networked Model of
Political Deliberation’, Information
Polity, Vol. 13, pp. 65-79.
Bush,
G.W., 2008, ‘Statement on World Press
Freedom Day’, Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, 5 May, Vol. 44, Issue 17, pp. 636-637.
Chan,
B., 2005, ‘Imagining the Homeland: The Internet and Diasporic Discourse of
Nationalism’, Journal of Communication
Inquiry, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 336-368.
Dahlgren,
P., 2006, ‘Doing Citizenship: The Cultural Origins of Civic Agency in the
Public Sphere’, European Journal of
Cultural Studies, Vol. 9, pp. 272
Danso,
R. and McDonald, D., 2001, ‘Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the Print Media
in Post-Apartheid South Africa’, Africa
Today, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 132.
Dare,
O. and Uyo, A., 1996, Journalism in
Nigerian: Issues and Perspectives, Lagos: Nigerian Union of Journalists.
Ellick,
A.B., 2007, ‘64 Journalists Killed Worldwide in 2007, Most Since 1994’, New York
Times, 18 December, p. 6.
Falola, T.
1984, The Political Economy of a
Pre-colonial State: Ibadan, 18301900. Ile-Ife: University of Ile-Ife Press.
Fard,
H., Asghar, A. and Rostamy, A., 2007, ‘Promoting Public Trust in Public
Organizations: Explaining the Role of Public Accountability’, Public Organization Review, Vol. 7, pp.
332.
Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 1999, The
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Lagos: Daily Times
Publications.
Hudgens,
J. and Trillo, R., 1999, West Africa: The
Rough Guide, 3rd Edition, London: Rough Guides Ltd.
Jacobs,
S., 2002, ‘How Good is the South African Media for Democracy?’, African and Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No.
4, pp. 280-298.
Jallow,
A.Y., 2008, ‘Press Freedom under
Attack in Gambia & USA, New African,
Issue 473, pp. 74-75.
Karikari,
K., 2004, ‘Press Freedom in Africa’, New
Economy, Vol. 11, No. 3.
Karppinen,
K., 2007, ‘Against Naïve Pluralism in Media Politics: On the Implications of
the Radical Pluralist Approach to the Public Sphere’, Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 496.
Kim,
H.S. and Hama-Saeed, M., 2008, ‘Emerging Media in Peril’, Journalism Studies, Vol. 9, Issue 4, pp. 578-594.
69
Kohnert, D., 2006, ‘Cultures of Innovation of the African Poor: Common Roots, Shared
Traits, Joint Prospects? On the Articulation of Multiple Modernities in African
Societies and Black Diasporas in Latin America, (http://
mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3704/), 9 August 2008.
Kriesi, H., 2008, ‘Political Mobilization,
Political Participation and the Power of the Vote’, West
European Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 152.
Kuper, A. and Kuper, J., 2001,
‘Serving a New Democracy: Must the Media “Speak Softly”? Learning from South
Africa’, International Journal of Public
Opinion Research, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 355-376.
Leba,
L., 2006, ‘Ore-Benin Road: Metaphor of a Failed Social Contract’, Vanguard, Lagos, Nigeria, 23 October.
Lloyd,
P.C., Mabogunje, A.L. and Awe, B., 1967, The
City of Ibadan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mabogunje,
A.L., 1968, Urbanization in Nigeria, London: University of London Press.
Massey,
D.S., 2002, ‘A Brief History of Human Society: The Origin and Role of Emotion
in Social Life’, American Sociological
Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 1-29. Merrill, J.C., 1974, The Imperative of Freedom, New York: Hastings House.
Nwabueze,
B.O., 1997, ‘Decolonizing and Democratizing the Constitution in Africa’, Paper
presented at The Annual Lecture in Law
and Public Policy, University of Ilorin, 15th November.
Obono,
O., 2007, ‘A Lagos Thing: Rules and Realities in the Nigerian Megacity’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,
Summer/Fall, Vol. viii, No. 2, pp. 31-38.
Ojo,
E.O., 2006, ‘Human Rights and Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria (1999– 2003)’, Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 13, No.
1, pp. 15-29.
Onadipe,
A., 2002, ‘Nigeria and Democracy: Third Time Lucky?’, Contemporary Review Company Ltd., (www.findarticles.com), 30 March
2008.
Onishi,
N., 2000, ‘Popular Uprising Ends Junta’s Rule Over Ivory Coast’, The New York Times, 26 October, p. A1.
Oyeleye,
A., 2004, ‘The Mediation of Politicians and the Political Process in Nigeria’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 1,
pp. 157-168.
Sakr,
N., 2003, ‘Freedom of Expression, Accountability and Development in the Arab
Region’, Journal of Human Development,
Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 29-46.
Same,
A., 2008, ‘The Gambia’s 2006 Presidential Election; Change or Continuity?’, African Studies Review, Vol. 51, Issue
1, pp. 59-83.
Schaffner,
B., 2006, ‘The Political Geography of Campaign Advertising in U.S. House
Elections’, Political Geography, Vol.
25, pp. 776.
Spinks, B.T., Sahliyeh, E. and Calfano, B.,
2008, ‘The Status of Democracy and Human Rights in the Middle East: Does Regime
Type Make a Difference?’, Democratization,
Vol. 15 Issue 2, pp. 321-341.
Swaffield,
B.C., 2008, ‘Journalists in Paraguay
Have Tough Road Ahead’, Quill, Vol.
96, Issue 3, pp. 34-34.
70
Tettey,
W.J., 2008, ‘Media Pluralism, Democratic Discourses and Political
Accountability in Africa’, Paper presented at the Harvard World Bank Workshop,
Harvard Kennedy School, 29-31 May 2008.
Tettey,
W., 2006, ‘The Politics of Media Accountability in Africa: An Examination of
Mechanisms and Institutions’, The
International Communication Gazette, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 229-248.
The Punch
Editorial, 2008, ‘Arrest of Journalists’, The
Punch, 12 September, p.14. Ukaegbu, C.C., 2007, ‘Leadership Fatalism and
Underdevelopment in Nigeria: Imaginative Policymaking for Human Development’, Philosophia Africana, Vol. 10, No. 2,
pp.161- 182.
Walton,
D., 2007, ‘Revitalizing the Public Sphere: The Current System of Discourse and
the Need for the Participative Design of Social Action, Systemic Practice and
Action’ Research, 20, pp. 369-386.
World
Bank, 2006, World Development Report
2006: Equity and Development, Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press.
No comments:
Post a Comment