
© Council for the Development of
Social Science Research in Africa, 2012
(ISSN 0850-3907)
Challenges
for the Opposition and Democratisation in Tanzania:
A View from
the Opposition
Jonas Ewald* &
Lennart Wohlgemuth**
Abstract
In the
period after 1990, a massive return to liberalised forms of politics has taken
place and has been largely centred around the dismantling of one partyregimes,
the termination of a large number of military-led or dominated governments, the
embrace of a multiparty political framework, the introduction of an independent
media, the restoration of some basic freedoms to the people of the countries
concerned and the convening of multi-party elections. This development was so
widespread and overwhelming that it was seen by many observers as the beginning
of Africa’s second liberation (Olukoshi 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Mkandawire
2006).
Potential
gains to the peoples from the liberalisation of their national political spaces
were undermined since the 1980s by the conditions set by outside suppliers of
necessary resources, combined with internal challenges in terms of weak
institutions, civil society and media as well as lack of a tradition of
multiparty democracy and general poverty. Matters appear to have been worsened
by the fact that in many African countries the promise which the opposition
once represented as the bearer of the hopes and aspirations of the people has
substantially faded away. Several factors have contributed to weaken and, in
some cases, discredit the opposition in much of Africa’s ongoing experience
with multiparty politics.
This is a
serious development that begs for further investigation; as the development of
a healthy and vigorous opposition is a major part of a democratic framework. In
this study, we will see how the situation in Tanzania has evolved over the past
17 years of multi-party development; based on rather unique interviews with
Professor Ibrahim Lipumba, leader of one of Tanzania’s major opposition
parties.

* Peace
& Development Studies, Linné University, Sweden. Email: jonas.ewald@lnu.se
** School
of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Email:
lenart.wohlgemuth@bredband.net
64
Résumé
A partir de
1990, un retour massif à des formes libéralisées de la politique à eu lieu.
Ceci a été en grande partie centré autour du démantèlement des régimes de parti
unique, de l’élimination d’un grand nombre de gouvernements dirigés ou dominés
par des militaires, de l’adoption de cadres de politique multi-partisane, de
l’introduction d’une presse indépendante, de la restitution de certaines
libertés fondamentales aux populations des pays concernés, et de l’organisation
d’élections, multipartites. Ce développement était si répandu et impressionnant
qu’il fut perçu par de nombreux observateurs comme le début de la deuxième
libération de l’Afrique (Olukoshi 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Mkandawire 2006).
Les gains
potentiels que les populations devaient tirer de la libéralisation de leurs
espaces politiques nationaux furent sapés depuis les années 1980 par les
conditions fixées par des fournisseurs externes des ressources essentielles,
mais aussi par les défis intérieurs à l’instar de la faiblesse des
institutions, de la société civile et de la presse, ainsi qu’une absence d’une
culture de démocratie multi-partisane et d’une pauvreté généralisée. Encore
pire, la promesse que l’opposition a jadis représentée dans de nombreux pays
africains comme porteuse des espoirs et des aspirations des peuples s’est
fortement estompée. Il existe plusieurs facteurs qui ont concouru dans une
grande mesure à fragiliser et, dans certains cas, discréditer l’opposition dans
l’expérience de politique multipartisane en cours de l’Afrique.
Ceci est une
évolution de grande portée qui doit être examinée plus en profondeur, d’autant
plus que le développement d’une opposition saine et vigoureuse constitue une
partie majeure d’un cadre démocratique. Nous verrons dans cet article, comment
la situation en Tanzanie à évolué au cours des 17 dernières années d’expérience
multi-partisane à travers un entretien plutôt unique mené avec Professeur
Ibrahim Lipumba, leader d’un des plus importants partis d’opposition en
Tanzanie. .
Introduction
In the period after
1990, a massive return to liberalised forms of politics has taken place largely
centred around the dismantling of one party-regimes, the termination of a large
number of military-led or dominated governments, the embrace of a multiparty
political framework, the introduction of an independent media, the restoration
of some basic freedoms to the people of the countries concerned and the
convening of multi-party elections. This development was so widespread and
overwhelming that it was seen by many observers as the beginning of Africa’s
second liberation (Ake 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Bratton 1998;
Olukoshi 1998; Ake 2000; Bratton 2004). However this development took place at
a time of harsh economic conditions for most African countries leading to
rescue operations by the international communities, the so-called structural
adjustment programmes (SAP). These operations came only into being after
certain rigorous conditions for economic and political reform were fulfilled
often leading to situations of non-democracies (Melber 2003; Gyimah-Boadi 2004;
Villalón and VonDoepp 2005; Mkandawire 2006).
65
Potential gains to the peoples from the
liberalisation of their national political spaces were thus undermined by the
conditions set by outside suppliers of necessary resources, in combination with
all the internal challenges in terms of weak institutions, civil society and
media as well as lack of a tradition of multi-party democracy and general
poverty. Matters appear to have been worsened by the fact that in many African
countries the promise which the opposition once represented as the bearer of
the hopes and aspirations of the people has substantially faded away (Ottaway
2003; Salih 2003; Villalón and VonDoepp 2005; Mbaku and Ihonvbere 2006; Salih
and Nordlund 2007). In some African countries the democratisation process has
even been reversed in recent years, e.g., in Ivory Coast, Uganda to name a few.
In others, like Tanzania, semi-authoritarian rule under the umbrella of formal
multiparty system persists.
Today, few dispute the need for a well-functioning
multi-party system to promote democracy, even if the presence of a formal
multi-party system in itself does not guarantee a deep, broad and substantial
democracy (Abrahamsen 2000; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Ottaway 2003; Ayers 2006;
Törnquist 2006; Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler 2007; Tar 2009; Zuern 2009). There
are several factors which have acted together to weaken and, in some cases,
discredit the opposition in much of Africa’s ongoing experience with multiparty
politics. In a study of the politics of opposition based on a seven-country
case-study edited by Adebayo Olukoshi, the following explanations are given for
this deterioration:
• Incumbent
governments did only very reluctantly concede to the multiparty framework and
stopped at nothing to obstruct, weaken, harass and divide the opposition;
• As
part of the strategy employed to weaken the opposition, public sector patronage
was withdrawn from anyone that was sympathetic to or identified with the
opposition, something that was particularly important for the private business
sector representatives. This acted to weaken the financial base of the
opposition parties and limit their organisational capacity at the same time as
the incumbents freely availed themselves of state resources to finance their
bids for remaining in power;
• The
opposition did not enjoy a level-playing field with the incumbents against whom
they contested. Official, publicly-funded media organisations as well as
various state organisations, including especially the security services, were
deployed against opposition parties and their activists. Incumbents did also
take the opportunity to rig elections in spite of the presence of international
and local observers;
66
• The
electoral system operated in most African countries, namely the British
first-past-the-post, winner-take-all model worked to the detriment of the
opposition. The number of seats won was not proportional to the share of the
vote;
• In
articulating their demands for multi-party politics, many opposition parties
were too quick to allow themselves to be hurried by incumbent regimes into
elections without first insisting on the implementation of the far-reaching
constitutional changes that were necessary for governing post-electoral
political activity;
• In
several African countries, opposition political activity came to depend heavily
on donor/external support for its sustenance (Olukoshi 1998:29-33).
In most theories on
democracy, parties, and in particular an effective opposition, are
indispensable for democratic consolidation. Ware defines a political party as
an institution with two specific characteristics: (i) it seeks influence in a
state, often by attempting to occupy positions in the government; and (ii)
usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so, to some
degree, attempts to aggregate interest (Ware 1996).
In the theories of multi-party
democracy, political parties are supposed to play a number of vital roles for
democratic development, including being a political machinery for the
aggregation of interest, representation and governance. In a pluralist democracy
the opposition parties hold the ruling party accountable. According to Lipset
and Lakin, political parties perform three major functions, namely, (i) the
communicative function – to channel communication from the state to the public;
(ii) the expressive function – to channel communication from the public to the
state; and (iii) the integrative function – to channel communications among
different groups within civil society (Lipset and Lakin 2004:64ff.).
Political parties in Africa meet a
number of challenges, both in term of internal capacity, outreach, mobilisation
and weak institutionalisation and in terms of external constraint in the form
of ruling party dominance and prohibitive legislations (Salih 2002; Olukoshi
1998). The mere presence of political parties does not necessarily indicate
more democratic forms of governance. The multi-party systems’ democratising
role depends on the degree to which the parties manage to fulfil the roles
spelled out above and whose interest they represent.
An effective opposition is
absolutely indispensable to the emergence and consolidation of a stable
democratic order, in liberal democratic theory. In order to be effective, a
number of structural and practical conditions must easily available.
Institutionalisation of the parties is crucial for them to develop
67
democratising capabilities.. The
opposition parties need to be distinct from and autonomous of the ruling party.
The rules of the political system must allow freedom of organisation by the
parties on a level playing field and in a framework that allows the rotation of
power based on the free choice of the electorate. The opposition parties would,
in the interval between one election and the other, serve as the formal,
institutionalised watchdog within and outside parliament, to keep the ruling
party in check. At election time, the opposition will provide the electorate
with choice, politically and ideologically (Olukoshi 1998; Wiseman 1996;
Randall 1998; Salih 2001, 2002; Diamond 1999).
As the development of a healthy and vigorous opposition is
a major part of a democratic framework, this is a serious development that has
to be investigated further. This paper seeks to demonstrate how the situation
in Tanzania has emerged over the past seventeen years of putative multi-party
democracy through a specific study of the life of Professor Ibrahim Lipumba,
leader of Civic United Front (CUF), one of the major opposition parties in
Tanzania. And it is against the theoretical context discussed above that we
have tried to understand what concrete challenges an opposition party meet in
the process when a single party system is dismantled and a multi-party system
is established.
The Political Structure in Tanzania1
Tanzania is still in transition from a
one-party to a consolidated multi-party system. The formal and informal
institutions of democracy are still weak compared to the ideal in the liberal
democratic models. This is in spite of efforts made to strengthen a more liberal
democratic ethos, including change of legislations, reforms of central and
local government to make them more transparent and accountable, and various
projects aimed at strengthening the political parties and institutions. This
section analyses the party system in order to identify some of the major
challenges for the opposition.
Tanzania had 18 registered political parties in the
2005 elections. In March 2010, a 19th party was given preliminary registration.
This was a splinter party from CCM which later ceased to work. Only five of
these parties are, however, represented in the Parliament. The ruling party
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has a well-developed organisation with elaborate
procedures and structures for (relative democratic) decision-making within the
party. But it also contains strong central authority and personal networks,
with close links to the administration at different levels.2
The one-party culture continues to define parts of the party, the
administration and the political culture – not least on local level.
Nevertheless, changes are taking place.
68
Although CCM is formally detached
from the governmental structures, ties between the party and the administration
still exists both formally and informally (Mukandala, Mushi, Barkan et al.
2005). An example of the existence of these formal ties is that all key
government functionaries down to district commissioners and judges are directly
appointed by – and thus dependent upon – the Presidency. As most ‘political
opportunities’ arise within the government administration – rather than the
political structures or the private sector – there are incentives even for
strong leaders from opposition parties to join CCM. This could be observed
during the preparation and campaign for presidential and parliamentary
elections in 2000 and 2005.
With a high degree of fungibility of funds, economic
support to the government may be indirectly or directly diverted to the ruling
party. The opposition is therefore weakened by CCM’s control of the government,
administration and media, even at the local level. The strong donor interests
in the managerial issues of the public sector may undermine the efforts to
build a strong political community and opposition, due to the informal
interlinkages of the ruling party with central and local government
administration.
The Opposition
No real challenges
exist to CCM, particularly in rural areas, as the opposition parties have
neither the organisation nor the resources to fully develop structures at all
district/local levels in the vast country. No strong and wellorganised
nationwide opposition has emerged – as in most other African countries
(Olukoshi 1998; Melber 2003; Lumumba-Kasongo 2006; Mbaku and Ihonvbere 2006;
Rakner and van de Walle 2009). Zanzibar, and in particular the small island of
Pemba, are however an exception. Here, CUF poses a real challenge to CCM, based
on the turbulent history of the islands. It is also at Zanzibar that political
conflicts have been most intense and at times fiercely violent, with 45 people killed
in the peaceful demonstration for rerun of the elections in 23 January 2001.
Most opposition parties lack a
comprehensive and realistic political programme, with the exception of CUF and
CHADEMA, and, to a lesser extent, NCCR-Mageuzi and TLP. All parties are, to a
large extent, based on charismatic individuals, have a relatively narrow social
base, and are mostly urban biased (various interviews and (Mmuya 1998). After
the election in 1995, the opposition parties disintegrated and became even
weaker in 2000 than they were during the previous election. After the election
in 2000, the situation changed slightly for the majority of the parties. The
CUF, CHADEMA, NCCR-Mageuzi and, to a lesser extent, TLP and UDP, might be
considered more fully developed parties. The remaining 12 parties are very
small. The lack of comprehensive policy alternatives to CCM was also
69
one of CCM’s critiques against the
opposition in 1995, 2000 and 2005 election. This critique is shared by the
media, CSO, key informants and voters interviewed.
A large part of the parties’ time and energies are devoted
to internal power struggles, quite naturally for newly-formed parties in newly
introduced multi-party context. The struggle over who should be chairman and/or
presidential candidate, as demonstrated by, e.g., the struggles within
NCCRMageuzi and TLP, is a case in point. The same is true for the struggles and
rivalry with other parties in the opposition. Influential individuals could be
attracted to leave a party that does not give them what they (most often)
consider the prime position they seek, hence they move over to another party
with their followers. That was what happened to the strongest and most
prominent opposition party during the 1994-1999 period, the NCCRMageuzi. It was
split in 1999 when Augustine Mrema, a strong and popular former Minister of
Home Affairs, left CCM and joined the NCCR in 1995 to run for the presidency on
NCCR ticket, leaving the majority of his followers to join TLP. As a result,
both NCCR and TLP became preoccupied by internal power struggles, thereby
weakening both parties – and most likely the opposition as a whole. These
struggles are often related to which faction of the party has the right to
government subsidies to the parties or other assets – or who should be the
presidential candidate, MP/councillor or occupy some similar position in the
party. The struggle within TLP continued after 2000 election, and the party did
not manage to reorganise itself to its former strength before the 2005
election. TLP’s presidential candidate got only 0.75 per cent of the vote.
With NCCR and TLP thus preoccupied with internal
struggles, CUF emerged as the strongest opposition party during the 2000
election and continued to improve on its organisation and policies in the
period up to the 2005 election. The CUF is often accused of being mainly an
Islamist party, with its strong base being in Pemba/Zanzibar and along the
Coast. The party strongly denied this.3 Several of its
leading cadres are Christians and the party also had one of the most developed
programmes among the opposition parties. By way of contrast, CHADEMA developed
its organisation and changed its leadership prior to the elections in 2005. Its
presidential candidate, the young and dynamic businessman, Freeman Mbowe,
attracted young and aspiring businessmen and women during the election
campaigns. Policy wise, both TLP and NCCR-Mageuzi define themselves as
leftist/social democratic parties, while CHADEMA describes itself a
conservative party and is a member of the African and international
conservative alliance. The challenges for the opposition parties are clearly seen
in the election results since the multi-party system was introduced in 1992.
70
The Union
Presidential elections 1995, 2000 and 2005 ( Percentage of total votes,
mainland + Zanzibar)
|
1995
|
2000
|
2005
|
CCM
(Benjamin Mkapa 1995 & 2000, Jakaya Kikwete 2005)
|
61.8
|
71.7
|
80.3
|
CUF (Ibrahim Lipumba (1))
|
6.4
|
16.3
|
11.7
|
TLP (Augostine Mrema) (2)
|
27.8
|
7.8
|
0.75
|
UDP (John Cheyo)
|
4.0
|
4.2
|
-
|
CHADEMA (Freeman Mbowe)
|
|
- (1)
|
5.9
|
NCCR-Mageuzi (Mvungi Sengondo (2))
|
|
0.5
|
Source:
NEC 2001, 2006
1) I.
Lipumba was a joint candidate for CUF + CHADEMA 2000
2) A.
Mrema was the Presidential candidate for NCCR-Mageuzi 1995, crossed over to TLP
from 2000)
The parliamentary
election results show an even more crushing defeat for the opposition. In 2000,
the opposition only managed to win 14 (6.1 per cent) of the 181 seats while CCM
won in 164 constituencies on the mainland. In the union as a whole, the
opposition won 29 seats (125 per cent) of the 232 constituencies and CCM 198
seats. In 2005 the loss of the opposition on the mainland continued. It only
managed to get seven seats on the mainland (representing 38 per cent of the 182
constituencies) and 26 (11.2 per cent) of the total 232 seats in the union.
Nineteen of the opposition seats came from Zanzibar, and more over 18 from the
small island of Pemba. From the 46 directly elected seats the opposition got in
1995 it was left with only 26 in 2005. In percentage terms, that equals a fall
from about 20 per cent of the directly elected seats in 1995 to about 11 per
cent in 2005. The deteriorating performance of opposition parties in subsequent
elections can be interpreted as an indicator of the weakness or lack of popular
support for opposition parties or the increasing capability and expertise of
the ruling party and the state to rig elections.
In what follows, we focus on the
largest opposition party, CUF, its structure and the challenges it has faced
for a proper understanding of why the opposition remains largely marginalised
in Tanzania 18 years after multiparty democracy was introduced.
71
Civic United Front (Chama Cha Wananchi)
CUF identifies itself as a social-liberal
party, opposing the ruling ‘revolutionary’ party. CUF is a member of the
Liberal International and the Africa Liberal Network (ALN).4
It was formed in March 1992 through a merger of KAMAHURU, a pressure group for
democratisation in Zanzibar, and the Chama Cha Wananchi (CCW), a human
rights-oriented political organisation based on the mainland. The party has its
strongest support in Pemba and Zanzibar, along the coast and in the lake
region, as well as in Dar es Salaam.
Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba is the national Chairman of CUF. He had an academic career and received
a PhD in economics from Stanford University, USA, in 1983 before venturing into
politics. Upon his return back home, Lipumba taught and conducted research in
economics at the University of Dar es Salaam . He took active part in national
policy debates and was appointed Economic Adviser to President Hassan Mwinyi in
1991. From 1993-1995, Lipumba was a Visiting Professor of Economics at Williams
College, Massachusetts, USA, and was part of a team that evaluated the crisis
of aid donors and Tanzania. Between 1996 and 1998, Lipumba worked at the United
Nations University World Institute of Development Economics Research (UNU
WIDER)and between 1995 and 2000, he was a member of the United Nations
Committee for Development Policy.
Lipumba has held the position of Chairman of CUF
from 1999, and was re-elected in 2004 and 2009. He has contested in the
presidential elections in Tanzania since the country instituted a multi-party
system in the early 1990s. Professor Lipumba is a respected economist and a
skilled orator drawing large crowds to CUF’s rallies. He still continues his
career as a freelance economist on a smaller scale.
Election Results
In the 1995 national election, CUF
Presidential national candidate, Ibrahim Lipumba, got 6.4 per cent of the vote,
coming third behind Benjamin Mkapa of the CCM and NCCR-Mageuzi candidate,
Augustine Mrema. In the parliamentary elections, the party won 24 of 232
elective seats, making it the largest opposition party in the legislature. All
CUF seats came from Zanzibar constituencies. In Zanzibar, the CUF presidential
candidate for Zanzibar, Seif Sharif Hamad was narrowly defeated by CCM
candidate Salmin Amour, winning 49.8 per cent of the vote to Amour's 50.2 per
cent. Observers noted serious irregularities in the poll and the CUF rejected
the result as rigged. CUF boycotted the House of Representatives and refused to
recognise the Salmin government as legitimate. In November 1997, eighteen
leaders of the CUF were arrested and subsequently charged with treason. These
charges were later dropped.
72
In the October 2000 national presidential election, Lipumba
was a joint candidate for CHADEMA and CUF. He got 16.3 per cent of the votes,
second to President Benjamin Mkapa. The party maintained its status as the
largest opposition party in the National Assembly by winning 17 of 231 elective
seats. In Zanzibar Seif Sharif Hamad won 33 per cent of the vote against 67 per
cent for the ruling party's Amani Abeid Karume in elections for the presidency
of Zanzibar. In the Zanzibar House of Representatives, CUF won 16 of 50
elective seats. The 2000 elections were considered largely free but not fair on
the mainland. However, observers noted serious irregularities in the Zanzibar
polls citing widespread irregularities and instances of intimidation of
opposition supporters by the security forces. CUF accused the government of
rigging the election and called for a complete re-run of the polls. When the
electoral commission nullified the results in only 16 constituencies, CUF
announced that it would boycott the new elections conducted on 5 November 2000.
The Commonwealth Observers concluded that:
The conduct of the elections
fell far short of minimum standards. (…) The cause was either deliberate
manipulation or gross incompetence. (…) The Group believes that only a properly
conducted and fresh poll, throughout Zanzibar, undertaken by a Commission
reformed in line with international good practice, with its independence
guaranteed in both law and practice and a restructured and professional
Secretariat, can create confidence in and give credibility to Zanzibar’s
democracy (Commonwealth Observer Group 2001)
In January 2001, 45
CUF supporters were shot by Tanzanian Security Forces in peaceful demonstration
for a re-run of the election. The event led ruling CCM party and opposition CUF
to have a dialogue that resulted in signing of a peace accord named MUAFAKA II,
designed to ensure electoral and constitutional reforms. Most of the planned
reforms were not implemented by the government, including, crucially, an agreed
credible voter's register prior to the elections of October 2005.
In the 2005 national election CUF
and CHADEMA did not have an alliance. Ibrahim Lipumba won 11.7 per cent of the
vote, a distant second to CCM’s Jakaya Kikwete. Out of the 232 National
Assembly seats filled through direct election, the CUF won 19. In the 2005
elections for the Zanzibar Presidency and House of Representatives, Seif Sharif
Hamad placed second to incumbent Amani Abeid Karume, winning 46.1 per cent of
the vote. The party won 19 seats in the House of Representatives. International
and domestic observers heavily criticised the conduct of the Zanzibar polls;
again CUF disputed the election and refused to recognise Karume as President.
The United States boycotted the swearing-in ceremony of Abeid Karume as
President.
73
The Story of an Opposition Leader: Ibrahim Lipumba
The following account is based on a series
of interviews over a ten-year period with Ibrahim Lipumpa by Lennart Wohlgemuth
and Jonas Ewald at different occasions. It is the testimony of a politician in
action with all its pros and cons. The series of interviews show that there are
capacity and personal commitment in the political opposition in Tanzania. The
views presented here are verified in several other interviews we had with
several other political leaders in Tanzania, with similar stories on formal and
informal constraints (Ewald 2011).
After a long career as an
academic and researcher you are now involved in politics in Tanzania. What
makes a senior and prominent researcher enter the arena of politics?
I believe that politics is too
important for development in poor countries such as Tanzania to be left only to
professional politicians. I entered the Presidential race in 1995 to initiate
development policy debate. My party was strong in Zanzibar and was expected to
win the elections in that part of the country, but weak in mainland Tanzania. I
believed that being a mainlander I would provide a unifying link if my party
won the elections in Zanzibar and the ruling party won the elections in
mainland Tanzania. The main opposition candidate in mainland Tanzania was not
providing a principled challenge against the past policies of the ruling party
and was using the tactic of blaming the Indian business community for the
economic problems affecting the majority of Tanzanians. I believed it was my
civic duty to accept the challenge and debate the past policies of the ruling
party that hindered individual freedom, freedom of expression and deliberately
curtailed opportunities for self-advancement and the establishment of a
broadbased market economy. I also articulated a socially inclusive
market-oriented development strategy that had confidence in Tanzanians' ability
to manage their own affairs and establish a vibrant economy.
I did not expect to win the presidential election. My
objective was to strengthen democracy by debating and supporting policies that
promote an open society, the rule of law, and establishing a socially inclusive
competitive market economy. To promote growth requires institutional
arrangements that clearly define and protect property rights and encourage the
establishment of transparent and accountable government that prioritises its
expenditure on education, health, infrastructure and agriculture. As one of the
members of Professor Gerry Helleiner's team that evaluated the donorgovernment relations,
I had realised that the level of corruption had reached an astonishingly
dangerous level that was threatening political and economic stability. By
raising the corruption and governance issues in the campaign I
74
believed they would be included in the
policy agenda by whoever won the presidential elections. After the elections, I
returned to the University to teach but I was expelled from the University for
political reasons. The official reason was that I had gone to Washington for
short-term research without permission from University authorities.
Have you tried to combine your
research capabilities with political work?
Yes, I have, for
example, spent three months as a guest researcher at the Nordic Africa
Institute in late 2002/early 2003 in Uppsala, reviewing and rethinking
development policy in Tanzania. I started by reviewing the levels of poverty in Tanzania. My estimates at
that time indicated that poverty has increased from 48.5 per cent in 1991 to 75
per cent in 2000. The main cause for the increase in poverty is that growth has
been modest; an average of 4.2 per cent per year during 1995-2000, and income
distribution has worsened. The fastest growing sector is mining but it is
capital intensive, does not generate employment and has displaced artisan
miners. The agricultural sector has been neglected. The growth of agricultural
value added has hardly kept pace with population growth rate. Although the
agricultural sector employs 70 per cent of the labour force, in the past seven
years the government has allocated only 4 per cent of its total expenditure to
this sector.
An appropriate development strategy
in Tanzania must focus on transforming the agricultural sector and promoting
labour-intensive industries and services. The government has been successful in
reducing inflation from 34 per cent in 1994 to 4.5 per cent in 2002. The
success in reducing inflation is largely the result of stringent use of the
cash budget to contain aggregate government expenditure. Reducing inflation to
single digit levels by itself will not mobilise domestic saving and increase
investment. Financial sector reforms that included the privatisation of
state-owned banks have not improved the availability of financial services.
With inadequate financial services, limited access to credit and the
prohibitively high cost of credit, sustained high growth rate of output cannot
be achieved. There is an obvious market failure in the financial sector that
has to be tackled by government intervention.
In order to address mass poverty,
Tanzania needs to move beyond the ‘Washington Consensus’ policies to focus on
an agriculture-led development strategy based on enhancing the democratic
rights of the rural population and empowering smallholder farmers to increase
their productivity. We need to deliberate on the appropriate institutional and
policy framework for promoting broad-based development through learning from
our past mistakes and successes.
75
I also continued to work on globalisation and Africa's
development. In this research I attempted to answer key questions on
globalisation. Is subSaharan Africa being marginalised in the global economy
because of bad domestic policies, or because of unequal and exploitative terms
of integration into the global economy? Does globalisation give the poor
African countries an opportunity to leapfrog several decades of development if
they combine their low wages with basic education, technical skills and
export-led growth to take advantage of the rapidly opening global markets? Can
globalisation be managed to promote pro-poor growth that uses abundant labour,
generates employment and avoids ruthless growth that increases income
inequality and the ranks of the poor?
Even in the era of globalisation, development is a
do-it-yourself process. Africa needs policies to integrate into the global
economy while promoting poverty-reducing growth. Broad participation of the
population in the market economy by utilising Africa's comparative advantage in
agriculture is an important initial step. Policies that support smallholder
farmers to participate in a market economy and protect rights of peasants,
including women, to access land, credit and improved technology are particularly
important for broad-based development. African countries' mineral resources
have not been fully utilised. Foreign investment is indispensable for the
exploration and exploitation of these resources. It is however important to
adequately tax the rents to support human development; that is an end in itself
but it will also create new areas of more rewarding comparative advantage.
Special efforts are however needed to attract FDI in export-oriented
manufacturing. Investment in infrastructure, including telecommunications,
power, water supply, roads and ports is a pre-requisite. The private sector may
provide part of this investment, particularly in telecommunications, but the
public sector will have to be responsible for the other investments
particularly road infrastructure. A minimum basic level of human development in
the form of universal basic education, health, nutrition and housing is
necessary for a sustained integration into the global economy.
How do you see the development in
Tanzania in the immediate future? As an opposition politician, do you see a
development towards a 'real' democracy?
After forty-fifty years of
independence, 75 per cent of Tanzanians are poor, spending less than one dollar
a day. Life expectancy at birth has decreased from a peak of 52 years in 1991
to 48 years in 2000. Infant mortality is 104 per 1,000 live births. Tanzania
needs to initiate a broad-based growth of output of 8 per cent per year, invest
in agriculture and rural infrastructure and improve the delivery of education
and health services. Agricultural
76
transformation is
the key to long-term development and poverty eradication in Tanzania. In the past seven years, the government
has allocated less than 4 per cent of its total budget directly to the
agricultural sector. Tanzania is lucky. It has plenty of land. Nevertheless,
land-grabbing is now on the increase and the government has unfortunately
ignored the key recommendation of the Shivji Commission, the recommendation on
its land policy particularly providing security of access to land by peasants.
Tanzania has important
characteristics that make it feasible to establish a democratic society and a
broad-based socially-inclusive market economy. First, there is a common lingua
franca, Kiswahili, that provides a cultural and communication bond. Second, in
many rural areas of the country, almost all households have access to land and
we do not have a landed gentry and a landless peasantry. Third, the potential
of promoting economic growth based on small-holder agriculture and
labour-intensive manufacturing has yet to be fully exploited. The mineral
potential that is just beginning to be exploited can provide government
revenues to support human resource development, including investment in
education and life-long learning, and improvement in health services. Fourth,
the potential for increasing living standards by concentrating public resources
on basic health and education is enormous. Fifth, Tanzania does not have a
history of civil violence and political extremism, and the people have a
tradition of tolerance and compromise. It is possible to encourage competitive
political processes based on policy issues rather than ethnic, racial or
religious chauvinism and character assassination. Establishing a democratic
system of government with free and fair elections and where democratically
elected governments are transparent and accountable to the electorate will,
however, not be easy. The single party system had entrenched itself. The
machinery of government was answerable to the ruling party.
The coercive machinery of the state, including the army,
police and the security (secret police) were under the party authority. The
judiciary was only nominally independent of the government and the party. The
present constitution does not allow independent candidates to contest any
elective office at all levels from village government, municipalities, and
parliament to the presidency.
How is this influencing you
practically as an opposition party?
We are constantly
harassed and stopped in our work on reaching the electorate. Problems occur in
the period leading up to elections, during the elections and between elections.
This becomes most evident at times of elections as the following examples among
many shows:
77
In October
2002 we were stopped from holding a public rally in Kigoma town on the shore of
Lake Tanganyika. The rally was called according to the rules but 30 minutes
before the start thereof police came and stopped the meeting on the pretext
that there was an outbreak of meningitis in Kigoma. (But meningitis does not
spread in open areas). After the police cancelled the public rally, we
organised a meeting with our district party leaders outside their office. We
put chairs outside the office for the meeting because meningitis spread easily
in closed indoors. Immediately two land rovers with field force paramilitary
police drove in and arrested the district chairman and one supporter on the
pretext that we attempted to hold a public meeting without the permission of
the police.

Such behaviours do strangle the opposition
and it is no doubt meant to. And what is the evidence that this behaviour is
aimed at strangling the opposition?

78

More examples of harassments

What was
even worse, very few voters turned out to vote on the Election Day. CCM had a
network of its cadres purchasing voting cards from young voters
79
who were
considered potential supporters of CUF for between 1000 and 5000 shillings. In
spite of a very high public interest in the campaign because of the important
issues affecting the constituency raised by the CUF candidate and a distrust of
the CCM candidate, participation in the election were less than 50 per cent of
the registered voters. It is illegal to collect or purchase voters
identification cards. We reported the allegations to the police and National
Elections Commission but the authorities refused to investigate. Our candidate
who got 37 287 (45 per cent) votes in 2005 election, according to the official
tally, received only 18 182 (37 per cent) in the by-election less than half of
the 2005 votes. There is no reason that our candidate should have fewer votes
in the by-election than in 2005. If anything he had a better campaign and
should have had more votes in 2007.

80
wrote a
letter to the police but was told that we could not hold that rally because
12th of January was the Revolutionary day of Zanzibar and all the police and
armed forces in the country were on a standby so there was no police available
to come to our rally - to provide security. We told them that there were no
security problems that required the presence of police, but they did not
accept. So I went to the Nsa Kaisi, the Regional Commissioner to appeal to be
allowed to hold a rally. He told me that a Regional Commissioner could not
interfere with police decisions. I questioned: how could Revolution Day
celebrations in Zanzibar, affect the security situation in far away Mtwara.
With a straight face he responded by saying that the situation in Mtwara could
easily be unstable because it is so close to the border of Mozambique and you
cannot easily distinguish who is from Mozambique and who is from Tanzania. So
we could not hold any rally in Mtwara. Amazingly we now consider Mtwara Region
particularly Newala and Tandahimba districts as strong areas of CUF. We did
well in the 2009 local elections.

This rule
that limits campaign rallies to six in the evening makes it extremely difficult
with the long distances and the bad roads. It always takes longer time to
travel than you have scheduled and you always arrive late and then the police
stop you. We have 60 days of campaign and have to cover so much ground. So this
happens again and again. In some cases police allows you to go on to 6.30 but
in most cases they do not. We try to appeal to the National Electoral
Commission. In most of the areas in the Western part of the country there is
sunlight up to seven. The law is set to ensure peace and security but most
political rallies are generally peaceful. During the campaign you have to give
your campaign schedule to the National Election Commission and then follow it.
If your vehicle breaks down on the road and you are delayed for one reason or
another you still have to keep to that schedule. Adjusting your schedule even
if
81
it does not
conflict with schedules of other candidates is usually not allowed. For example
we were late for our campaign rally in Meatu, Shinyanga region. We could not
have our rally as scheduled. We tried to have the rally next day because there
was no other political party scheduled to have a rally in Meatu that day. The
police intervened and refused us to have the rally because it was not in our
official schedule. We explained that we were late the day before but the police
insisted that the new date was not in the schedule so that they could not allow
the meeting to take place. In some cases the police understand your predicament
and accept to reschedule. But often the District Commissioners who are members
of the ruling party and head of government operation in the district pressure
the police to make the environment as difficult as possible for opposition
parties. My NCCR colleague who was a parliamentary candidate for Ngara
constituency informed me that Kikwete, the then CCM presidential candidate,
arrived in Ngara late in the evening. He had a campaign rally at eight in the
evening and another one in the morning. So the ruling party do not have those
schedule limitations.

A final
example: Dr Mvungi was the NCCR Presidential candidate in the 2005 elections.
He went to cast his vote with his whole family of six persons. When the votes
were counted he got one vote in his polling station so he said to me that this
result would imply that even his own wife did not vote for him. CCM and the
state have become experts at rigging elections. Election observers who come few
days before the election cannot understand the rigging process.
82
This is how it is
to work as an opposition in Tanzania. We have to devote a lot of time and money
to get lawyers to represent us. When I am touring the country so much time has
to be spent on negotiations with the police and local administration officials.
It varies from case to case whether the police act locally on their own
initiatives, if they lack knowledge of the rules of the game or whether the
central government or CCM directs the activities of the police. Overall the
conditions facing opposition parties are deteriorating. The 1995 election was a
more level-playing field. The government paid for polling agents and there was
no harassment during the campaigns. In 2000 election there was much more
unequal access to resources and a lot of more harassment and in 2005 even more
so.
The most serious problem is that the opposition has no
resources to have polling agents to follow up the elections and the counting of
the votes. Can you give examples of how your financial situation affects you
personally?
In 1995 when I
entered into the Presidential race in the last minute, I was not very well
prepared. My colleagues were also not very well prepared particularly in
financing the campaign. At that time, I had just returned from my teaching
assignment at Williams College in the USA. I had US$ 40,000 of savings from
Williams College. So I used all my saving for the campaign. This was not much
but with the help of supporters who provided food and shelter for us during the
campaign we managed. After 1995, the government started providing subsidies to
parliamentary parties in proportion to the number of seats. The bulk of the
government subsidy, more than three quarters go to CCM.
The government subsidy is the most
dependable source of financing. In 2000 General Election, we had saved some of
the subsidy to finance election activities. During 1996-1998 I was a Senior
Researcher at WIDER in Helsinki so I had a small saving from there which I also
used to finance our party campaign. So we managed, but with minimum resources.
As a presidential candidate I had only one vehicle – a two-door short chassis
Land Cruiser – that was packed with a public address system, campaign
materials, personal luggage and a five- person campaign team. We travelled
around the whole country with this vehicle. So we really lived on a shoestring
budget. The most discouraging part of the campaign was that although we
attracted huge crowds of supporters and discussed pertinent policy issues
facing the country, we received limited media coverage. Many days could pass
without any mention of our campaign in the media despite many journalists being
present in our campaign rallies.
83
In 2005 we were a little better organised but we also
had some luck. We had been underpaid of our government subsidy. We obtained a
sum of 400 million shilling as arrears just before the election campaign. The
subsidy is not for the election but rather for the period in between elections
and is supposed to help the party in its operations. The subsidy arrears helped
us finance our campaign. Although we continued having the problem of not
receiving adequate media coverage, we had an effective campaign and trained
polling agents for more than half of the 45,000 polling stations. Unfortunately
the vice-presidential candidate of CHADEMA died only a few days before the
election date. The elections were therefore postponed. If we had an independent
electoral commission, only the Presidential election should have been
postponed, but the parliamentary and council elections should have taken place
as planned. But they postponed all elections for 45 days. That allowed the CCM
to be better organised because they had financial resources. For us it was a
disaster because we had no more money left to travel around the country
campaigning. We had budgeted money for allowances of polling agents. The money
had already been transferred to parliamentary candidates. These candidates had
to continue with campaign activities for another 45 days and ended up using the
money budgeted for the polling day activities. So we really did not have
effective polling agents in most of the 45,000 polling stations. This was true
for all opposition parties, although, CHADEMA seem to have been somewhat better
financed even after the elections were postponed. The ruling party CCM spent
more money after the election was postponed and had more campaign activities.
Are there any possibilities to
act in parliament for an opposition party in Tanzania today?
The Civic United Front is the largest
opposition party in parliament with 32 MPs. We have formed an alliance with
other opposition parties in parliament and established an official opposition
in parliament. The official opposition has done an excellent job in parliament
such as exposing grand corruption involving the external payments account of
the Bank of Tanzania whereby phoney companies acting as agents of external
creditors collected US$ 113 million from the Central Bank. The power of the
opposition in parliament to hold the government to account is however
constrained by the parliamentary rules that have vested authority and powers in
the Speaker of the Parliament. The Speaker has to agree before a private motion
of a Member of Parliament is brought up for discussion in Parliament.
84


85
Are there any formal or informal
limitation to act as an opposition today in Tanzania? Any major changes in the
past years?
After the 2000 election, President Mkapa
stated that CCM had won in a big way; it should be given the opportunity to
implement its manifesto. Opposition parties should stop political rallies and
demonstration until the next election campaigns in 2005. In January 2001 we
held political demonstration to demand an independent electoral commission, a
new democratic constitution and a re-run of the Zanzibar election. Before the
demonstration I was beaten up, arrested and imprisoned. My arrest did not
prevent the demonstration from taking place. During those demonstrations more
than 45 people were killed by the armed forces in Zanzibar. In October 2001,
CCM and CUF reached a political accord (MUAFAKA) on Zanzibar. For the first
time since the 1995 Presidential debate in 1995, I met President Mkapa face to
face on October 10, 2001 during the MUAFAKA signing ceremony. Since then
significant changes have taken place.
The major one is a significant decrease of harassment
of the top leadership of opposition parties. As a leader of the largest
opposition party I have been invited to major events such as national
ceremonies, state banquets and festivities and meetings with visiting heads of
government and states. When we had foreign visitors in the country, President
Mkapa organised for opposition leaders to privately meet them. I met the
President of Germany, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, the President of Kenya
and the Prime Minister of Denmark. We freely discussed with these leaders
political, governance and development problems of Tanzania. Most of these
improvements took place during the last two years of the Mkapa presidency.
After 2005, with President Kikwete at the helm, opposition leaders’ meetings
with visiting heads of government and states stopped. I have been invited twice
to state banquets in honour of visiting Head of State. The first was for the
President of Burundi and the other was for the President of China.
At the local level there are still big problems with the
ruling party and government accepting the legitimacy of opposition political
parties.
86

87
For the national leadership the situation
has thus improved but for the local cadres nothing has improved.
In Parliament also some changes have taken place. The
public accounts committee has been chaired for a long time by a Hon. John Cheyo
a member of parliament for UDP. A common principle among Westminster
parliamentary system is for a member of parliament from the opposition party to
chair the public accounts committee. Tanzania observes the principle of a
member of the opposition chairing the Public Accounts Committee but does not
give the opposition members the right to select who will chair the Committee.
All members of parliament vote. CCM account for more than 80 per cent of all
members and they decide who will be the Chairman of the Public Accounts
Committee. Since 1997 they have voted Hon. John Cheyo to chair this important
committee. Recently he has been extremely supportive of President Kikwete to
the extent of discouraging opposition parties not to contest the presidency in
2010. Also the parastatal sector committee is chaired by an opposition member
this time from CHADEMA and, through the committee, is able to raise a number of
important issues.
Members of Parliament can speak freely within the
parliamentary rules on basically any policy issue. During the budget session
our members can give comments and alternative ideas on the budget. Their
questions, comments and speeches are usually covered by the media particularly
radio and television. It is possible for members of parliament to challenge the
government and bring up new ideas. The parliamentary Hansard is posted in the
Bunge website. The Tanzania parliament website is among the best in Africa. It
shows the number of questions and comments contributed by each Member of
Parliament. The major problem of most members of parliament is that they lack a
professional staff to do research and provide relevant information that can be
used to challenge the government. What about availability of strategic
information for the opposition?
We really have major problems in
terms of obtaining high quality information. Tanzania statistics are still very
poor. National accounts indicate that annual GDP growth averaged around 7 per
cent in 2000-08, but head count poverty has decreased from 36 per cent in 2001
to 33 per cent in 2007. Recorded growth seems to have an insignificant impact
on poverty. The new national accounts show the share of agriculture in total
GDP in 2005 was only 27.6 per cent compared to 46.1 per cent in the old
accounts. This 18.5 percentage point reduction in the share of agriculture is
supposed to have been absorbed by an increase in the share of services. This is
not plausible. The 2007 Integrated Labour Force Survey still shows that 75 per
cent of the labour
88
force depends on
agriculture as the main source of income. Other information we get particularly
through our member of parliament and the parliamentary web site.
In order to control aggregate
expenditure, the government continues to use the cash budget system except for
priority sectors. Budgeted expenditure may vary greatly with actual expenditure
and it is difficult to get the correct information. The website of the IMF and
the World Bank contain a lot of information on economic policy. The letter of
intent to the IMF contains most of the macroeconomic and financial policies the
government intends to implement.
Dr Slaa, a CHADEMA member of parliament and the deputy
leader of opposition in parliament, has been excellent at getting sensitive
information particularly related to the Bank of Tanzania. Foreign newspapers
that are now available on the web have been a good source of information. We
were first informed about possible corruption in the purchase of the BAE radar
through reading the UK Guardian newspaper on the web.
What about press coverage?
The media was
basically bought by CCM in 2005. The press was almost only covering CCM and
particularly Kikwete. CHADEMA got some press but the other opposition parties
hardly any. We felt as if our campaign activities were boycotted. It became
even worse after the elections were postponed. The Zanzibar election took place
on 30th of October 2005 as scheduled. The results announced by the Zanzibar
Election Commission did not match with the results we received from the polling
stations and we protested vehemently. We just did not accept the Zanzibar
results. When the results came out there were a lot of demonstrations at our headquarters
in Dar es Salaam demanding that we should do something to get the correct
results in the Zanzibar election. We had announced a press conference in our
Dar es Salaam headquarters. Journalists came as requested. They came in the
midst of a heated demonstration outside our offices and some journalists were
beaten up. I went to see one particular journalist that was wounded to
apologise, and he told me that the person that beat him and kicked him probably
was not a CUF member. The perpetrator had worn army boots and he suspected that
he was from the security services. I apologised to the journalists and the
media house but after that sad incident, the media particularly the IPP media
which is the largest media house in the country, with television station that
has widest coverage in the country, radio network and numerous newspapers
completely boycotted us. We were only covered when there was something negative
to report. For example, they did report that my laptop was stolen although it
was not my laptop but a flash disk.
89
So how do you meet these
challenges?
It should be a concrete effort to
level the playing field for the opposition and other countries should be aware
of that and assist. And we in the opposition have come to the conclusion that
without an independent electoral commission and a constitution that calls for
an independent electoral commission and an independent anti-corruption board it
would be extremely difficult to have a real democratisation process to take
place. And now we are focusing on how to obtain such a better democratic
constitution and an independent electoral commission. We started by forming a
committee consisting of not only political parties but also of NGOs, human
rights groups to draft a constitution taking in views from all stakeholders in
Tanzania. The committee completed a zero draft of the constitution that was
discussed and distributed to political parties and other stakeholders for
comments. Lack of financial resources have slowed the process of organising constitutional
review meetings and it is unlikely that a final document can be available
before the October General Election
We have to organise locally, provide our members with
simple messages [with which] they can inform their fellow citizens in their
localities. The key issues we focus on include human rights, each individual’s
right to adequate nutritious food, basic health and education. We tell our
members that in a day may be they meet 6 – 8 people and if they manage to give
them CUF key policy position we can reach a lot of people without being covered
in the press. Tell the people what CUF stands for. Tanzania has been
independent for 50 years, but what has the common man got out of it. We receive
a lot of aid and where is all that money gone.
It is extremely expensive to keep up the party
organisation all over the country. We lack infrastructures, transport and
communication. To have meetings with chairmen of the districts is a major
logistical problem. To organise a national congress of the party is an effort
that requires significant financial resources. We have revised the party
constitution to reduce the number of these meetings as well as the number of
delegates.
What is your forecast for the
election of 2010? Will it be fairer than earlier elections?
We still have problems with the
National Electoral Commission. We still think that it is very biased in favour
of CCM, the party in power. NEC is not transparent in its operations. As an
example, we had received tips that voting identification cards had been burned
in one of the Government warehouses. I did not believe it so I went with my
party functionaries and journalists to investigate the issue. We found a heap
of voting identification cards that had
90
been burnt. Some of
them were only half burnt so we collected them. Some were from Zanzibar; some
were from 2005 others from 2008. We had not been informed that the National
Electoral Commission would burn voting identification cards. The journalists
telephoned the chairman of the Commission but he was not aware of the burning
of any voting identification cards. They called the executive secretary of the
commission who was also not informed that voting identification cards were
being burned. He was more interested to know how we had received that
information. When the journalist told him that we had seen with our own eyes a
heap of burned voting identification cards in the Government warehouse, he was
furious and wanted to know who allowed us to go there. The journalist told him
that how we entered the government warehouse was not the issue but rather the
burning of the voting identification cards without informing key stakeholders.
After some time, the National
Electoral Commission gave a press statement in which they explained that they
were burning old voting identification cards which were exchanged with new
cards. We are suspicious that there were many CCM supporters who have been
registered more than once. The burned voting registration cards were part of
the excess of double registered cards. The National Electoral Commission had
not provided the required information to political parties. They do not provide
us with information that they are supposed to according to the rules and
regulations. Most serious opposition parties have no confidence whatsoever in
the Electoral Commission and we have called for the resignation of the
chairman. It is a problem that the Chairman is selected by the president
without any consultation. But the key problem is not the Commission itself but
the fact that it does not have any independent structure at the district,
constituency and ward level. The officials representing NEC at the regional,
district and ward level are government executive officers working under the
instructions of District and Regional Commissioners who are CCM party cadres.
Therefore we have a lot of problems all over the country. We are not competing
with CCM but with the state machinery. President Mkapa was an old-fashioned
autocrat and had no commitment to laying the foundation of a democratic polity.
President Kikwete has enormous political skills but is completely uninterested
in thinking about a development vision that includes building democratic
structures for Tanzania.
91


92
Concluding Discussion
This article is an
effort to present the situation of the opposition in Tanzania – a country that
has been regarded to be well under way towards a consolidated democracy.
Methodologically it is questionable to base any conclusion on interview of only
one person, however important and trustworthy. We have however, sought to
present, in this article, the opinion of one of the most important
representatives of the opposition in Tanzania while still in office. And we use
this mainly to illustrate his subjective feelings and understandings of his
findings over a long period of years. First, his testimonies do very well
coincide with many other documented experiences (Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler
2007; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Menocal, Fritz and Rakner 2008; Lindberg 2009;
Rakner and van de Walle 2009). Second, Jonas Ewald has, for his PhD thesis
(Ewald 2011), in addition done many similar interviews with other members of
the opposition in Tanzania, which give similar testimonies. While our primary
aim is to add to the empirical evidence of the situation of the opposition in
many African countries in general and Tanzania in particular, we also feel that
some of the findings are of a more general interest.
The most important finding is the
feeling of hopelessness in a longstanding and active opposition politician;
whatever effort is put into making a positive impact on the political map of
the country is hindered by the ruling party with the help of state resources,
both manpower, such as police and the legal system, and budgetary means. Added
to this is the lack of all kinds of resources to build a strong organisation
that could compete with the well organised ruling party. This feeling –
subjective or not – is a very important limitation for building strong opposition
parties that can compete for power and thereby act as a check on the abuse of
power by the ruling party. This is of particular importance in a relatively
homogenous country such as Tanzania which lacks broader social or ethnic groups
competing for power like in more diversified societies such as Kenya and
Zambia. In addition, parties in Tanzania must be active and obtain support in
many parts of the huge country. The existing rudimentary infrastructure in
combination with the limited resources of the parties makes it more demanding
for the opposition to build the required organisation and to campaign
effectively. Lipumba’s description on how the opposition is failing in its work
for a more level playing field for the political parties in the opposition is therefore
of utmost importance. Apart from the oppositions parties’ internal
institutional, financial and human weaknesses, the opposition strongly
perceives that the state and ruling party use various methods to hinder the
opposition from developing. Tanzania has also been one of the larger receivers
of development aid,
93
not the least from the Nordic
Countries. Among the donor objectives in the last 20 years has been the
commitment to support development towards democracy. Many steps forward have
been taken in that direction, but at the same time, the ruling party’s grip on
the state apparatus is stronger than during its first multi-party election in
1995. It might be that the unintended side effects of large budget support and
public sector reforms has strengthened the executive power, and hence the party
controlling the executive, relatively more than other institutions of
democracy. This calls for a review of how various forms of aid intentionally or
unintentionally contribute to the absence of a level playing field.
The testimonies also confirm most of the points made
in the literature referred to in our introduction: The difficulties to
campaign, the widespread accounts of harassment of all levels of the opposition
both in its party organisation work and particularly in connection with
elections; the asymmetry in information and of financial resources; and again
the non-neutrality of key state agencies and institutions during elections, etc
are all well-documented. Here, again, Tanzania is particularly influenced by
the very long period of one-party state during which the ruling party became
conflated with the state in a way that is very difficult to change.
The testimonies presented above – however subjective in
nature – are very important and must be taken seriously if Tanzania is to
develop a democracy worthy of note and which will serve the Tanzanian people.
Notes
1. This
section is based on a number of interviews made with representatives
ofdifferent political parties, the media, civil society, researchers and the
donor community for Jonas Ewald’s doctoral dissertation (Ewald 2011). As well
as earlier writings (Ewald 1996; Ewald 2001)(Ewald; 2010).
2. Apart from
various interviews in Tanzania, see Mmuya (1998;) Hyden (1999;) and Hyden
(2005).
3. Personal
interviews with CUF National Party Secretary and InformationSecretary,
mainland, in October 2000, June 2001, May 2002, and with District Party
Secretary and District Chairman Pangani in October 2000, August 2002, December
2005 and May 2006, April 2010. Also with CUF Chairman in 2003, 2006, 2007 and
2010.
4. ALN is made
up of 17 parties from 15 African countries and is an associatedorganisation of
Liberal International ALN whose aim is to spread Liberal values across the
Africa and facilitate the development and growth of Liberal parties,
organisations and individuals in all African countries.
94
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