
© Council for the Development of Social Science Research in
Africa, 2012
(ISSN 0850-3907)
The Youth
and Political Ideology in Ghanaian Politics: The Case of the Fourth Republic
Ransford Edward Van Gyampo*
Abstract
The youth of
Ghana have played an important role in both local and national politics since
the inception of the Fourth Republic. Among other things, they have served as
the foot-soldiers and channels through which party manifestoes have been
transmitted to the electorate and polling agents during registration and voting
exercises. Through chanting of their party slogans and house-tohouse campaign,
the youth have often made the presence of their various parties felt across the
country. In developed democracies, one key factor that motivates the youth in
playing active role in politics is political ideology. This is because
political ideology largely shapes the political future of the youth, especially
students in tertiary institutions. Unfortunately, a brief survey shows that
political ideology, though relevant, contributes little in whipping up support
for political parties among the youth.
The article discusses the
reasons for the seeming irrelevance of political ideology among the youth. It
recommends massive campaign by political parties to educate the youth on their
respective political ideologies, their relevance and the need to uphold them.
It also stresses the need for party leaders themselves to insist on ideological
purity in all their dealings with other parties to serve as an example for the
youth to emulate.
Résumé
La jeunesse ghanéenne a joué un rôle important à la
fois dans la vie politique locale et nationale depuis la naissance de la
Quatrième République. Entre autres chosee, les jeunes ont servi de militants,
mais aussi on permis la transmission des manifestes de partis à l’électorat et
aux agents électoraux au cours des inscriptions sur les listes et des
opérations de vote. A travers la chanson des slogans de leurs partis, ils ont
souvent rehaussé la présence de leurs divers partis travers le pays.

* University of Ghana, Legon. Email: vangyampo@yahoo.com
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Dans les
démocraties développées, un des facteurs clés qui motivent la jeunesse pour
jouer un rôle actif en politique est l’idéologie politique. Ceci est dû au fait
que l’idéologie politique forge dans une grande mesure l’avenir politique des
jeunes, en particulier les étudiants dans l’enseignement supérieur.
Malheureusement, une brève étude montre que l’idéologie politique, bien que
pertinente, contribue peu à encourager le soutien aux partis politique chez les
jeunes.
L’article
discute des raisons de l’apparente inutilité de l’idéologie politique parmi les
jeunes. Il recommande une campagne massive de la part des partis politiques
pour éduquer les jeunes sur leurs idéologies respectives, leur pertinence et la
nécessité de les maintenir. Il souligne aussi la nécessité pour les dirigeants
de parti d’insister eux-mêmes sur l’orthodoxie idéologique dans leurs
interactions avec d’autres partis pour servir d’exemple que les jeunes peuvent
émuler.
Introduction
Political parties, whether in democratic or authoritarian
dispensations always have an ideology that is intended to provide the
fundamental policies that will guide them, particularly when they assume the
reins of power (WayoSeini 2006). Political party ideology sets the beliefs of
the party and based on them, the basic rules and regulations that guide its
members. Indeed, the ideology of gives an immediate indication as to what the
party beliefs are and for that matter its philosophy. In other words, political
ideology, to a greater extent, concerns the beliefs, traditions and
philosophies of political parties (Wayo-Seini 2006:2).
In many democracies, the ideology and
philosophy of a political party are extremely important in attracting the youth
to that party. In western democracies, for example, political ideology is
particularly important in shaping the political future of the youth and
students in tertiary institutions because it sets the tone for their future
participation in politics by making them aware of the beliefs and principles of
the various political parties (Zukin et al. 2006). The young conservatives, the
labour youth and the young liberals in the United Kingdom and their
counterparts in the United States are very politically active in tertiary
institutions and, through healthy debates and other youth activities, they
serve as training grounds for future politicians (Zukin et al. 2006:120).
One is however not sure about the
relevance of political ideologies among the youth, particularly in times of
voting. The paper therefore seeks to test the relevance of political ideology
among the youth in Ghanaian politics under the Fourth Republic.
By Fourth Republic, I am referring to
Ghana’s fourth attempt at constitutional and democratic rule after
independence. The first attempt was in 1960, when the first constitution was
drafted by Ghanaians under the presidency of Ghana’s first president, Dr. Kwame
Nkrumah. Following
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the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime, a new constitution was
drafted in 1969 under the leadership of Dr. K.A. Busia. Busia’s regime was also
toppled by the military and after close to ten years of military rule, the 1979
constitution was adopted under the presidency of Dr. Hilla Limann. The Limann
regime was also toppled by the military and after close to thirteen years of
military rule led by Ghana’s former President J. J. Rawlings, who was then a
flight lieutenant, the 1992 constitution was promulgated. This marked Ghana’s
fourth attempt at constitutional rule.
Structure of the Article
First, the term ‘youth’ in this article is defined, followed
by a review of the age structure of Ghana. The next section discusses the
methodology used in data collection which is followed by a review of the state
of current thinking about the youth in Ghana in order to state in clear terms,
the contribution of this paper to the literature. The concept of ideology would
be discussed immediately after the literature on the Ghanaian youth is
reviewed. The background to politics and formation of political parties in
Ghana is then given to facilitate the understanding of how various ideologies
emerged in Ghana. The role and contributions of the youth to Ghanaian politics
in the Fourth Republic would also be discussed. This is also followed by an
attempt to spell out the ideologies and philosophies of the two main political
parties in Ghana, namely, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National
Democratic Congress (NDC). The question
‘Does ideology matter to the youth?’ is then discussed with the aid of
empirical data collected from a sample of 200 respondents who fall within the
category of youth. This is then followed by some concluding remarks and
recommendations.
The Youth Defined
There is no universal definition of youth, given that it is
a socially constructed category that enjoys tremendous variability from society to society.1 Various
definitions, however, exist for the term ‘youth’ in official documents.
According to the 2006 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, youth
is defined as the age between 15 and 24 years.2 The 1992
Constitution of Ghana also defines the youth as ‘anyone who is acknowledged by
deeds as identifying with and committed to youth development’.3
This definition is shared by the main opposition party in Ghana, the National
Democratic Congress (NDC) which has no age limit or barrier for determining who
is a member of the party’s youth wing.4 The ruling party in
Ghana, the New Patriotic Party’s definition of youth is a person between the
ages 18 to 39 years.5 Other political parties in Ghana such as the
People’s National
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Convention define youth to embrace persons aged between 18
to 35 years.6 The Convention People’s Party’s (CPP)
definition of youth is any person aged between 14 to 38 years.7
Again, in the Draft National Youth Policy of Ghana8 and in many
youth policy documents in Africa such as the African Youth Charter, a youth is
a young man or woman who falls within the age group of 15-35 years.9
In this paper, the term youth refers to
young men and women who fall within the age bracket of 15-39 years. The lower
age limit of fifteen years provides a major human – development watershed. That
is, it coincides with that period when most children experience puberty. The
upper age limit of thirty-nine years is the point when most young men and women
fully enter adulthood. It is also in consonance with the cliché in Ghana that
‘life begins at 40 years’.10
Age Structure of Ghana’s Population
Ghana, like many other countries in the world, has a largely
youthful population (Asante 2006:222). The 2000 Population and Housing Census data
estimates Ghana’s population at 18,912,079 (Ghana Statistical Service 2002).
Out of this, 15,054,015 (79.6%) are less than 40 years old (Table 1). Table 1: The Age Structure of Ghana’s
Population
Age Group
|
Number
|
%
|
National
|
18,712079
|
100
|
Less Than 40 years
|
15,054,015
|
79.6
|
40 years and above
|
3,858,064
|
20.4
|
Source: 2000
Population and Housing Census. Ghana Statistical Service, 2002
The voting age in Ghana is 18 years while the age at which
one qualifies to be a Member of Parliament is 21 years.11
The records of Ghana’s Electoral Commission
in 2005 shows that out of the 10,586,377 who registered for the 2000
elections, the majority of (76.19%) were between 18 and 39 years; with only
23.72 per cent aged 40 years and above. In 2004, the respective percentages
were 68.46 per cent and 31.43 per cent (See Table 2).
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Table 2: Age
Group Statistics of the 2000 and 2004 Elections
Election
|
Election 2000
|
Election 2004
|
Total Registered Voters
|
10,586,377
|
10,354,970
|
Percentage
|
100
|
100
|
18-18 Years
|
8,065,825
|
7,089,928
|
%
|
76.19
|
68.46
|
40 Years and over
|
2,511,290
|
3,255,140
|
Percentage
|
23.72
|
31.43
|
Others
|
9262
|
9902
|
%
|
0.08
|
0.09
|
Source: Electoral
Commission of Ghana, Accra, 2005
Even though the total number of voters within the age
category of 18-39 years in the 2004 elections was lower than that of 2000, the
youth still constitute the bulk of Ghana’s voting population by a wide margin
(Asante 2006:223). Despite this dominance of the youth on the national
population of Ghana, the country has no youth policy. Indeed, Ghana has
suffered from lack of state-sponsored youth policies right from the regime of
Kwame Nkrumah, the first president until 1999 when the National Democratic
Congress (NDC) drafted one after coming into power. This policy was however not
implemented. Instead, the government of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), after
assuming the reins of power in 2001, decided to draft a more comprehensive one
which has still not been finalised.12
Methodology
Using a combination of different sampling techniques, a
survey was conducted between 5 and 27 April 2007 to test the relevance of
political ideology in determining the outcome of elections among the youth in
the ruling NPP and the opposition NDC. Preference was given to only the NPP and
NDC because they both have been in power and have also been in opposition one
time or the other. Using the Purposive Sampling technique, 200 respondents made
up of 100 from each of the two main parties (See Table 7 at appendix) aged
between 15-39 were carefully selected from the Accra metropolis and Tema
municipality to represent the southern sector of Ghana and Tamale metropolis to
represent the northern sector. The selection of 100 respondents each, to
represent the two main parties in Ghana was
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done with the assistance of the National Youth Organisers of
the two parties who gave hints about where their supporters could be found
within the selected areas of study. As shown in Table 3, the respondents
comprised 82 females and 118 males.
Table 3: Gender
Distribution of Respondents
Gender
|
No. of Respondents
|
Male
|
18
|
Female
|
82
|
Total
|
200
|
Source: From the
Study
The breakdown of the respondents, comprising 82 female and
118 male respondents is as follows:
• 25
respondents (11 females and 14 males), from the University of Ghana Campus
comprising five each from the five traditional halls of residence (Legon,
Volta, Commonwealth, Sarbah and Akuafo);
•
25 respondents from Tema municipality (11
females and 14 males);
• 50
respondents from Accra metropolis (20 females and 30 males); and
• 100
respondents from Tamale metropolis (40 females and 60 males).
On the University of Ghana campus, only the Volta Hall is a
purely an allfemale Hall. To get 5 female respondents out of a population of
about 1000, every 100th female student was selected. The same technique was
used in selecting respondents from Common Wealth Hall of residence which is an
all-male Hall and has a population size slightly above that of Volta Hall. For
the rest of the Halls of residence, the ratio of male to female residents is
about 70:30. In this regard, three respondents were selected at random to
represent the male and two to represent the female in these Halls which have
both male and female residents (Akuafo Hall, Legon Hall and Sarbah Hall).
In the Tema municipality, there are
twelve traditional communities with Community One being the biggest. Five
communities comprising the first, third, fifth, seventh and nine were selected.
Three female respondents were randomly selected from the first community and
two each from the third, fifth, seventh and ninth communities. In selecting the
14 male respondents from Tema, six were selected randomly from the first
community and another two were randomly picked each of the third, fifth,
seventh and ninth communities.
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In selecting the 50 respondent from the
Accra metropolis, Accra Central, the centre of the metropolis, was chosen.
There are three electoral areas here, namely, Kinka, Kolewoko and Ngleshie. In
selecting 20 female respondents from the three electoral areas, eight were
picked at random from Kinka, the most populated of the three electoral
areas; while the remaining 12 were
picked randomly with six coming from each of Kolewoko and Ngleshie. The same
methodology was applied in selecting their 30 male counterparts. In this
regard, 12 male respondents were selected at random in Kinka, and nine each
from Kolewoko and Ngleshie electoral
areas.
In the Tamale metropolis, a random
selection of five major suburbs was done. These are Nyohini, Sabongida,
Bulpela, Kakpagyili and Choggu. In selecting 40 female respondents needed from
there, eight each were picked at random from each of the towns. The same method
was again applied in selecting their male counterparts resulting in 12 male
respondents being were randomly selected from each of the five major suburbs
identified in Tamale.
The age bracket of 15-39 was selected
not necessarily in consonance with the ruling New Patriotic Party’s definition
of the youth; but more to be in line with the definition of youth earlier
stated and given this age bracket also covers the bulk of Ghana’s voting population.
More respondents were selected from
Accra than Tema because Accra, being a metropolitan area, is bigger and more
densely populated than Tema. Moreover, more male respondents (118) were
interviewed than their female counterparts (82) because they were more easily
available and co-operative than their female counterparts. The reason(s) for
this may form the subject of another study.
Of the 200 respondents finally selected,
Table 4 shows that about 170 at least had some form of education while 30 had
no education at all. In all, 28 respondents had basic education, 48 had
secondary education while 94 had tertiary education
Table 4: Educational
Background of Respondents
Education Level
|
No. of
Respondents
|
None
|
30
|
Basic
|
28
|
Secondary
|
48
|
Tertiary
|
94
|
Total
|
200
|
Source: From the
Study
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The respondents were asked five major questions from which
to draw our inferences for the study. Admittedly, therefore, the work is a
sample study of the youth and may not necessarily reflect the general attitude
of the Ghanaian youth during voting.
With this in mind, we proceed to look at
the questions that were posed to the 200 respondents. First, they were asked
whether they supported and voted for any of the registered political parties.
The second question sought to find out whether they knew the respective
political ideologies of the parties. Finally, the respondents were asked to
mention the variables that influenced their
voting one party in preference to others.
State of Current Thinking on the Youth
There are several extant works generally on the youth, in
Africa and in Ghana. Scholars are unanimous about the vibrant and active nature
of the youth in the political processes even though they fail to discuss the
factors that make the youth active in the political process. Accordingly,
Knebel (1937), Miller (1936) and Rivta (1975) have described the youth as
active agents in the social and political processes and have, therefore, called
for greater responsibilities to be entrusted to them. However, what makes the
youth active in the political process have not been looked at by these
scholars.
Some scholars in Africa like Diouf
(2003), Durham (2000) and Burgers (2003) have pointed out the negative perceptions about the youth.
They see the youth as a threat to society; as irresponsible people and a means
through which leaders climb to power. Generally, the youth in Africa have been
labelled as ‘a lost generation’ especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where
civil wars have led to massive population displacement, a social upheaval
described by Richards (1995) as a crisis of the youth; and in South Africa,
where the ‘political’ youth generation of the 1980s has had to come to terms
with unemployment and social marginalisation in the 1990s. Thus, since the late
1980s and early 1990s, terms like the ‘the lost generation’, and ‘marginalised
youth’ have gained currency (Ntsebeza 1993). In West Africa, for instance,
though the youth constitutes 60-65 per cent of the population, they are
bedevilled by apathy, disenchantment, disempowerment and exploitation (Konteh
2007). These scholars nevertheless
recognise the contribution of the youth in providing support base to political
leaders who seek to capture political power. But they have been silent about
what motivates the youth to be active and to provide support for political
leaders.
Writing on the youth in Ghana, Chazan
(1978) argues that though Ghanaian societies have traditionally allotted a
major political role to the youth, their activities at the state level are
actually limited to the mere expression of support for leaders. According to
her, in the Ghanaian traditional
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setting the youth were recognised as active political agents
and were legally represented by their leader, ‘nkwaakwaahene’, in the council
of elders. She noted that the youth played the role of pressure groups and
approved or disapproved the nomination of rulers and could destool the
chief. She also observed that although
political parties in modern times stress mass participation in their formative
years, once in power, they narrow the opportunities for individual involvement
and limit activities of the youth in the central government by shifting them to
the local level (Chazan 1978).
Lentz (1995), on her part described the
youth in Ghana as very vibrant and noted that even though this characteristic
sometimes makes them prominent players during conflicts, it has led to a
certain distrust of, if not hostility, towards them by governments. The
government shows its discomfort with them by accusing them of parochialism and
tribalism. For this reason government is reluctant to take them on as serious
negotiating partners, thereby
restricting their negotiating abilities and scope of action. Nonetheless, the
youths have remained significant actors in various political arenas in the
country (Lentz 1995).
Ahwoi (2006) observes that the youth are
often manipulated by the adults in the political parties to fight their ‘dirty’
and unprincipled political wars within and outside the parties. He argued for
adequate political empowerment for the youth through sound instructional
programmes, including education on party philosophy, criticism and
self-criticism (Ahwoi 2006).
Asiamah (2006) largely agrees with Ahwoi
but calls for government funding of youth activities in political parties. He
is apprehensive that the lack of funding for youth activities in political
parties leaves the youth at the mercy of private financiers who then use them
for their own interest. He notes that the youth in Ghana have grown in
political participation and must therefore be made part of the decision-making
process. He cited instances of the youth being told to bid their time to allow
their adults whose political tenure was cut short by coup d’etat to ‘finish their term’, as an example of their frequent
marginalisation in the affairs of the state. He believes the youth should
undergo constant training to and prepare them for the future (Asiamah 2006).
All these works recognise the Ghanaian
youth as vibrant but failed to discuss factors that could spur them on to be
more supportive of regimes or party ideologies.
Also, even though much of the problems and negative perceptions about
the youth have been identified in the literature along with solutions on
how empower them, the positive
contributions of the youth have not been clearly portrayed in extant literature.
Furthermore,, in discussing measures to empower the youth, there is
considerable silence about the role of ideology in development of this corp of
loyal and effective core support-
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ers of the political process. The role of political ideology
in shaping the political future of the youth as well as empowering them is too
crucial to be downplayed or treated with significant silence as has been done
in existing literature. This is part of the void that this paper attempts to
fill. But before then, we need a closer examination of the concept of ideology
to be sure that this is what is really needed to liberate the Ghanaian youth
and unleash their potentials.
Ideology
The term ‘ideology’ was likely coined by the French thinker
Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1815) at the turn of the nineteenth century. For De
Tracy, ideology was the science of ideas and their origins. Ideology
understands ideas to issue, not haphazardly from mind or consciousness, but as
the result of forces in the material environment that shape people’s thinking
(Tracy 1815). De Tracy believed his view of ideology could be put to
progressive political purposes since understanding the source of ideas might
enable efforts on behalf of human progress (Tracy 1815:9).
Ideology today is generally taken to
mean not a science of ideas, but the ideas themselves, and moreover, ideas of a
particular kind. Ideologies are ideas whose purpose is not epistemic, but
political (Bell 2000). Thus, an ideology exists to confirm a certain political
viewpoint, serve the interests of certain people, or to perform a functional
role in relation to social, economic, political and legal institutions (Bell
2000:278). Daniel Bell dubbed ideology ‘an action-oriented system of beliefs,’
and the fact that ideology is action-oriented indicates its role is not to render
reality transparent, but to motivate people to do or not do certain things.
Such a role may involve a process of justification that requires the
obfuscation of reality (Grant 1987).
An ideology entails a body of concepts,
values and symbols which incorporate conception of human nature and thus
indicate what is possible or impossible to achieve; critical reflections on the
nature of human interactions; the values which humans ought to either reject or
aspire to; and the correct technical arrangements for social, economic and
political life which will meet the needs and interests of human beings (Andrew
1995:16). An ideology begins with the belief that things can be done better
than they are; it is basically a plan to improve society. It is a verbal image
of the good society, and of the chief means of constructing such a society
(Downs 1957:96). On his part, Kousoulas (1975:66) defined ideology as ‘a
cluster of beliefs relating to the basic organisation of society, its core
values and man’s place in it…it is fairly consistent, pervasive and affect our
thinking on questions of social organisation, values, processes, or priorities;
it is a mental filter which colours our perception of reality and determines
our
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reactions to key issues’. Stewart (1962:6) broadly agreed
with this, noting that an ideology comprises a set of beliefs and ideas which
incline a nation to accept certain reforms and to reject others; it is a
product of present needs and facts, and of beliefs, more or less accurate,
about the past.
Ideology, indeed, is a ready-made tool
which helps the individual, literate as well as illiterate, to make a quick
option on major political issues (Bluwey 2002:76). Often, it is spelt out in an
elaborate form to serve as a national consensus on basic values and as a guide
to rulers as well as followers (Bell 2000). Where this happens, the
constitution proclaims the ideology and government and all forms of political
activity are expected to be carried out within that framework. In other cases,
it becomes a handbook for revolutionary groups who set out to change the very
fabric of social organisation (Bluwey 2000:79).
Most ideologies can be traced back to
philosophers. Classic liberalism, for example, can be traced back to the
seventeenth century English philosopher, John Locke, who emphasised individual
rights, property and reason (Grant 1987:54).
There are several ideologies. Andrew (1995), for example, gives a
straightforward account of eight different ideologies: liberalism,
conservatism, socialism, anarchism, fascism, feminism, ecologism and
nationalism. He gives an account of the rise of these ideologies in question to
describe the variety of ideas that have fallen under a single label. Other
ideologies include marxism, capitalism, etc.
Marx and Engels are perhaps the most
famous of all the theorists of ideology. Like De Tracy, Marx and Engels (1976)
contend that ideas are shaped by the material world, but as historical
materialists they understand the material to consist of relations of production
that undergo change and development. Moreover, for Marx and Engels, it is the
exploitative and alienating features of capitalist economic relations that
prompt ideas they dubbed ‘ideology.’ Ideology only arises where there are
social conditions such as those produced by private property that are
vulnerable to criticism and protest; ideology exists to inure these social
conditions from attack by those who are disadvantaged by them (Marx and Engels
1976). Capitalist ideologies give an inverted explanation for market relations,
for example, so that human beings perceive their actions as the consequence of
economic factors, rather than the other way around, and moreover, thereby
understand the market to be natural and inevitable (Marx and Engels 1976:29).
Preachers and followers of a given
ideology, especially when they are in the opposition, argue that if their plan
is followed, things will be much better than they are at present. The concept
of ideology has therefore been commonly used as a political weapon to condemn
or criticise rival creeds or doctrines (Heywood 2002:40).
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As a rule, ideology is acquired through
the formal structures of socialisation: the family, religious organisations,
educational system, political parties and voluntary associations. In totalitarian
and authoritarian regimes, the state usually undertakes direct responsibility
for the inculcation of the single, unified national ideology. In liberal
democratic regimes, the individual acquires the values through the informal and
imperceptible influences of the family, peer and other social groups, the
school, the church and the press (Bluwey 2002).
Ideologies have been crucial in shaping
political events. Just as a ship cannot sail without a rudder, an ideology
serves as a plan of action that guides politicians in their endeavours as well
as holds together movements, parties or revolutionary groups (Kramnick and
Watkins 1979:4). To fight well and
endure sacrifices, people need an ideological motivation. Indeed, the founding
fathers of the United States, for example, shaped their Constitution as they
did because they were convinced of the rightness of the ideas of political
thinkers like Locke, Montesquieu, and so on. In the developing world, many
young revolutionaries are still fired by the ideas of Mao Zedong, an apostle of
revolutionary violence against colonialism (Kramnick and Watkins 1979:8). Andrew (1995) believes ideology has an
immense impact on education And argues that if the origin of ideas is understood,
then it could be used with great benefit in enlightened education and to
diagnose the roots of human ignorance and serve as a foundation for a rational
progressive society (Andrew 1995:3).
From the discussion so far, it is clear
that the role of ideology in politics cannot be relegated to the background.
Indeed, no political analysis can be complete without an examination of the
ideology and ideas of the relevant group (Heywood 2002:127).
But even though ideologies help to
develop ‘immature’ societies, it is held that in the industrialised democratic
societies, they no longer serve anything more than a decorative role (Andrew
1995:11). Most of the major parties in industrialised societies have achieved,
in the welfare, mixed economy structure, the majority of their reformist aims.
The Left had long accepted the dangers of excessive state power and the Right
had accepted the necessity of the welfare state and the rights of working
people (Eccleshall et al. 1998). This reflects a change in the perception of
the political terrain by political parties, both of the Left and of the Right.
Thus, it is no longer possible to gain political power by appealing to only one
section of the community by claiming that the views of the other section are
simply false (Eccleshall et al.
1998:14). As Seymour Martin Lipset remarked, ‘this very triumph of the
democratic social revolution of the West ends domestic politics for those
intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate
149
them to political action’ (Lipset 1969:406). Several other
weaknesses of ideology have been pointed out. In the view of Marx (1972),
ideology may denote not only practical ineffectiveness but also illusion and
loss of reality. Oakeshott (1962) has also pointed out the fact that ideology
represents a simplification, abstraction and an ‘abridgement’ of social
reality. This distorts a much more complex social and political reality. They
may be mere theoretical blueprints or ideals that leaders, especially in
emerging democracies, sometimes find no difficulty in abandoning after winning
elections and to face real or current political imperatives (Heywood 2002)).
The concept of ideology also denotes a totalitarian mentality which prevents
all political discussions other than on its own content, making it quite
distinct from pluralist, free and tolerant rational society (Andrew 1995).
The weaknesses of ideology
notwithstanding, its essence is of importance to this work because it gives the
theoretical base for analysing findings as to whether ideology has a place in
determining voting among the youth or not. Many philosophical and scientific
ideas have functioned within ideologies, in fact many philosophers and natural
scientists have allowed their thoughts to be used in an ideological manner and
have contributed willingly to ideological promotion (Andrew 1995:19).
In Ghana, the two main political
parties, the NPP and NDC have ideologies that are supposedly used to bind
members of their parties together. But are these ideologies of any practical
application to the youth, who constitute the bulk of the voting population?
(Asante 2006).
The argument of this paper is that
ideology plays little or no role in
determining which party to support and who to vote for among the youth. Indeed,
most supporters of the two parties are either oblivious of the ideology of
their parties or do not know their exact meanings and imperatives. For a proper
appreciation of this point, it is necessary to first discuss the background to
politics and formation of political parties in Ghana. Indeed, it would be quite
difficult to grasp the ideology of political parties in former colonies
anywhere in the world and for that matter in Ghana, without referring to some
historical antecedents dating back to the pre-independence and early
post-independence era.
Background to Politics in Ghana
Ghana was a British colony under the name Gold Coast. As the
colonial powers receded, new leaders, movements and political organisations
emerged in the two decades leading to independence. This happened in an
atmosphere of indirect rule which principally relied on traditional political
elites under the constant guidance of colonial officials (Awoonor 1990).
150
Given the background of the gap between
the rich south and the poor and underdeveloped north as well as the policy of
separate development of the three constituent parts of the Gold Coast,
political parties in the preindependence era were imbued with a very strong
character of regionalism (Wayo-Seini 2006). The United Gold Coast Convention
(UGCC) had its members largely from the South and even though the Convention
Peoples’ Party (CPP) was more nationalistic in nature, it was regarded as a
party committed to championing the course of the ordinary man in the then Gold
Coast (Austin 1964). In 1954, the Northern People’s Party (NPP) was also
established to promote northern solidarity and accelerate development in the
north as well as to work with likeminded parties in the south to delay the
attainment of self government so that an interim period could be used to
rapidly bridge the gap between the north and the south (Dickson 1968). Indeed,
the view of the people from the north was that independence should be delayed
until such a time that the region was placed on a footing of equality with the
south (Ladouceur 1979:93). A strong ally
of the NPP was the Moslem Association Party (MAP) which also emerged in the
early 1950s and whose strength lay among Moslem immigrant communities in the
major towns.
After the 1954 elections, the government
of Kwame Nkrumah, the first prime minister and, later, president of Ghana, who
led the country to independence, sought to proceed to full self-rule as soon as
outstanding questions could be settled. The north, it seemed, stood alone in
its determination to oppose or at least to delay independence even though it
was considerably weaker politically. Just at that moment when the future seamed
bleak to the NPP leaders, there arose a new political movement, the National
Liberation Movement (NLM), which became a strong and dominating ally of the NPP
(Austin1964). Essentially, the NLM was an Ashanti movement of political protest
against what many Ashantis considered to be unfair treatment in the hands of
the CPP government. The protest was primarily over low prices of cocoa the
government offered to cocoa farmers, but among the Ashantis, this quickly
transformed into a political issue directed against a government seen to be
dominated by coastal elements. The NPP and NLM were united primarily in their
opposition to the CPP and were joined by a number of smaller parties and
groups, such as the Togoland Congress Party (TCP), the MAP, and the Anlo Youth
Organisation (Austin 1964:45).
It was not until the attainment of
independence in 1957 that regionalism
gradually faded away and the parties opposed to the CPP in the legislature
merged to form the United Party (Chazan 1983). This effectively established two
main political traditions or ideologies in Ghana, namely, the Nkrumah
151
group (CPP) and the Danquah/Busia (UP) traditions. A
striking difference between the two main traditions is that while the CPP
aligned itself to the East and therefore favoured socialism, the Danquah/Busia
tradition was proWest and therefore favoured capitalism (ibid). A third
tradition which emerged out of a long period of military rule under the
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) could be described as the Rawlings
tradition. This tradition, dependent on the exigencies of time was either
pro-East, non-aligned or pro-West (Shillington 1992). While the Nkrumah group
is represented in contemporary Ghanaian politics by a number of political
parties particularly the Convention Peoples’ Party (CPP) and Peoples’ National
Convention (PNC), the New Patriotic Party (NPP) represents the Danquah/Busia
tradition while the Rawlings tradition is represented to a large extent by the
National Democratic Congress (NDC).
Having gone through the historical
antecedents of political parties in Ghana, one key question that comes to mind
is whether they were formed on the basis of any political ideology. This
question is pertinent because the historical antecedents of political parties
show that parties conformed to the three regions that were administered
separately by the colonial government (Austin 1964:318). Thus, it can be argued
that the protection of regional interests was the prime motive for the
formation of political parties. Though from the outset, political parties like
the CPP was seen as an Africanist national movement; it was only when they
gelled into post- independent national political parties that their ideologies began
to become more apparent.
Ideologies of Political Parties in Ghana’s Fourth
Republic
In this section we attempt a brief discussion of the
political ideologies of the ruling NPP and the main opposition NDC.
Ideology of the New Patriotic Party
The preamble of the Manifesto of the ruling New Patriotic
Party (NPP) (2004:1) summarises the party’s ideology as follows: ‘The party’s
policy is to liberate the energies of the people for the growth of a property
owning democracy in this land, with the right to life, freedom and justice, as
the principles to which the government and laws of the land should be dedicated
in order specifically to enrich life, property and liberty of each and every
citizen’.
This constitutes the guiding ideology of
parties that have succeeded the United Party since 1958. The main creed has
been the avowal of individual freedom in a liberal democratic state where the
development of the individual and of society in a free political atmosphere,
under the rule of law, is the principle of the state. Thus, the NPP operates
under the liberal democratic
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ideology and believes in the market economy, free
enterprise, fundamental human rights, and a vigorous pursuit of private
initiative without any hindrance. Based on this ideology, the NPP has some
fundamental beliefs that are stated explicitly as follows:
(a) The individual must be enabled to
develop in freedom to attain the highest level of their potentials or talents;
(b)The provision of quality
education, further training and expanding economy that creates jobs, as well as
the provision of good health facilities and medical care for all Ghanaians form
the basis for the development of the individual and the nation;
(c)A free enterprise economy is the
surest guarantee of economic growth and prosperity. Government must create the
environment for business to thrive and for efforts and initiative to be
rewarded. What a person makes legitimately must never be taken away
arbitrarily. The rights and needs of the individual are paramount as enshrined
in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the Constitution of the
Fourth Republic of Ghana;
(d)Individuals and societies make a
state – states do not make individuals – therefore the party believes in
freedom of expression and association, freedom from oppression, from fear and
from arbitrary arrest; and
(e) Justice is either for all or it
is for none. Every Ghanaian is entitled to the protection of the law. The
sovereignty of the people and the state should be anchored in the rule of law
and independent judiciary.
According to Nana Ohene Ntow (2007), the General Secretary
of the ruling NPP, these are the beliefs which successor parties of the UP
tradition have always held. They are beliefs which inspired the Progress Party
Government of 1969-1972 and informed all the policies and programmes of the
government. They are the same beliefs that inspire the NPP government. He
asserted that time has vindicated these beliefs as they have become commonly
shared by most parties that believe in participatory democracy.
Ideology of the National Democratic Congress
The National Democratic Congress (NDC) has its antecedents
in the 4 June 1979 and the 31 December 1981 military coups. It was from the
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which ruled Ghana after the
December 1981 coup until January 1992 that the NDC originated. In sharp
contrast to the ruling NPP, the NDC has no long history. Its founder, J. J.
Rawlings, who ruled Ghana for about twenty years, has been the main pillar of
the party.
153
The NDC’s ideology is Social Democracy
and is spelt out as follows in ‘A Social Democratic Agenda for Ghana’ (2006):
(a) Belief in the equality and
egalitarian treatment of all persons with respect to their political, social,
cultural and religious relations in a multi-party environment;
(b)Belief in the principles of
development through the united participation of all Ghanaians;
(c)Belief in the protection of the
under-privileged and the upliftment of the socially disadvantaged;
(d)Belief in the fact that the
orderly, stable and prosperous existence of society is a condition for the
orderly and prosperous development of individuals within the society; and
(e) Belief in the free market system
but with commitment to the cause of the socially disadvantaged and the
principle of equity in the exploitation of the country’s natural resources.
Apparently, the kind of social democracy being advocated by
the NDC blends the efficiency of the market and private initiative with state’s
intervention to protect the poor and to ensure justice for all.
With this background of the emergence of
political parties and their ideologies, we can now discuss the contributions
and role of the youth in Ghana’s Fourth and how they were influenced by the
ideologies.
The Youth and Politics in Ghana’s Fourth Republic
The youth of Ghana have played an important role in local
and national politics since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1993. The
youth have served as foot-soldiers and vehicles through which party manifestoes
have been transmitted to the electorate, particularly those in the hinterlands.
In all elections held under the Fourth Republic, the youth played a crucial
role; serving as polling agents during registration and voting exercises. In
this role, they have promoted fairness and transparency in the electioneering
process especially during voter registration exercises which are crucial for
the legitimacy of electoral outcomes and their acceptability. For example, the
decision of some parties to use indigenous youth groups to monitor polling
centres, especially in the rural communities, has contributed immensely towards
the checking of impersonation (Asante 2006:226).
Another key role of the youth in the
political process lies in their zeal to make the presence of their parties felt
across the country. They are often seen chanting their party slogans and moving
from house to house, campaigning for their parties in an attempt to win more
supporters. In the 2004 general elections, for instance, the NPP youth used the
propaganda that a
154
vote for Professor Mills of the NDC would mean a vote for
former president Rawlings. This propaganda seemed to have worked in almost all
the areas that the NPP won the elections in spite of all efforts by the NDC
youth to disabuse the minds of the electorate regarding the NPP’s propaganda.
Furthermore, the youth have also served
as pressure groups within their parties and often brought pressure to bear on
national executives over pertinent issues, including matters bordering on
internal democracy. Some youth have resisted attempts by party executives to
impose parliamentary candidates on them in their constituencies. For instance,
in the run up to the 2008 parliamentary elections of Ghana the youth in the
ruling NPP embarked on massive demonstrations, which sometimes resulted in
violent clash with the security agencies, in an attempt to press home their
disapproval of imposition of candidates on them by the party executives. These
were the experiences of several
constituencies, including Ablekuma South, Abirem, Bekwai, Suhum. In
addition, the youth wing of these two main parties sometimes organised press
conferences or issued press statements to enlighten voters about their party
positions on national issues or to deny
allegations made against their party. Furthermore, the youth have been instrumental
in organising party rallies and hoisting of party flags in an attempt to
promote the ideals of their respective parties. Moreover, usually rally support
for their peers who contest parliamentary seats. It is from such support base
that Haruna Iddrisu, the National Youth Organiser, and Isaac Asiamah, Policy
Analyst of the NDC and NPP respectively, secured their election to parliament
(Asante 2006:227).
Fundraising activities for political
parties is crucial role in many emerging democracies where the commitment of
the state to funding political parties is low. Since no meaningful party
activity can be embarked upon without adequate funding, the youth continue to
support their parties’ fundraising
activities through the sale and
distribution of party cards and other paraphernalia.
It is also well-known that the youth
make up the party stalwarts that get anything done in the interest of the
party. They are mostly available for engagement in any violent activities or in
settling inter-party and intra-party conflicts. There are several reported
cases where the youth of the two leading parties have clashed over the venue,
timing for organising rallies and other seemingly petty issues. In October
2004, for instance, supporters of the NDC and NPP clashed in the Yendi
constituency during an NDC rally (CDD 2005:30). Again in the Tolon/Kumbungu
district during the 2004 elections, the NPP youth stormed an NDC stronghold to
investigate allegations of under-aged voting. This led to a clash between the
two groups resulting in the death of two persons (Heritage 2005:1-3).
155
In some constituencies, such as Mion and
Tolon in the Northern Region and New Edubiase in the Ashanti Region, ballot
boxes were stolen and burnt by the youth of either the NPP or the NDC. The youth
activists were also involved in the destruction of bill boards, posters, etc.,
of their opponents as well as physical assault of their rival contestants
(Asante, 2006:229). The youth have generally been identified with the conflicts
in the parties – both as causes and factors in the internal and external
violence that often engulf the parties. Given that their activities often verge
on violence, it is instructive to ask what sort of orientation the parties give
their youth, or, to put it more effectively, does ideology matter to the youth?
Does Party Ideology Matter to the Youth?
The result of a mini survey conducted between 5 and 27 April
2007 to test the relevance of political ideology in determining the outcome of
elections among the youth of the NPP and the NDC seems to confirm the earlier
assertion that ideology does not matter so much to the youth. Admittedly, the
findings were based on the mini survey conducted, but could possibly explain
some of the features of the Ghanaian youth around the issues being addressed.
The respondents were first asked whether
they supported and voted for any of the registered political parties in Ghana.
About158 respondents out of the 200 sampled (79%) answered in the affirmative
while 42 (21%) said they did not support any of the registered political
parties (Table 5).
Table 5: Do you
support any of the registered political parties?
Response
|
No. of Respondents
|
%
|
Yes
|
158
|
79
|
No
|
42
|
21
|
Source: From the
Study
This is a confirmation that Ghanaian youth are politically
active and constitute the bulk of the voting population in the country. It
should be noted however that some respondents were suspicious of the motive
behind the survey despite all the explanations given to them and the assurance
of confidentiality. Consequently, they gave responses which suggested that they
were politically neutral even though there were strong indications and evidence
that they were active supporters of political parties. For instance, some of
the respondents were personally known to this researcher as party functionaries
who even held positions in their respective political parties. Yet, they
claimed
156
political neutrality.
In a rather curious twist to the exercise, at least 25 out of the 42
respondents who claimed political neutrality
owned up that they were only trying not to jeopardise their political
chances and fortunes should the party they did not support assume the reins of
power. It follows then that the number of youth party supporters are far more
than has been recorded in this mini-survey.
But why would some youth want to be seen
as politically neutral? Could it be that their party loyalty is skin deep or
that some of them have genuinely lost confidence in the political system? This
question is pertinent because it is widely believed that despite the invaluable
role they play in bringing political parties into power the youth play little
or no role in actual policy making and that still puts them at the receiving end
of official policies. It is even known that some youth leaders have expressed
disappointment and regret in supporting their respective parties. In other
words, two main reasons may account for the lack of enthusiasm on the part of
some youth to openly identify with the political parties of their choice.
First, it could be a strategy to benefit from any political party that wins
power. Second, it could also be that they may have lost confidence generally in
the political system and so may be unwilling to identify themselves with any
party. Whatever may be the true reasons, it is incontrovertible that the vast
majority of the youth sampled were politically active.
The second question posed to the ardent
supporters of political parties show that only 21 (13.3%) out of the 158
respondents know anything about the political ideology of their parties. The
remaining 137 respondents (86.7%) of the young party enthusiasts have no
awareness whatever about party ideology (Table 6).
Table 6: Do you
know the ideology of your party?
Response
|
No. of Respondents
|
Yes
|
21
|
No
|
137
|
No Response
|
42
|
Source: From the
Study
A simple cross tabulation of political parties and awareness
of party ideology shows that of the 137 respondents with no awareness of the
ideology of the party they supported, 70 were from the NPP and 67 from the NDC.
Similarly, of the 21 who claimed to know their parties’ ideologies, 8 were from
the NPP while 13 were from the NDC. This suggests that most of the youth
157
who helped the NPP gain political power were not aware of
the ideology of the party. The study also shows that, comparatively, there is only
a slight difference in the level of youth awareness in both parties (8 in NPP
and 13 in NDC) (see Table 7).
Table 7: Political Parties and Awareness of Party
Ideology
Political Party
|
|
Awareness of Party Ideology
|
|
Yes
|
No Total
|
||
NPP
|
8
|
70
|
78
|
NDC
|
13
|
67
|
80
|
Source: From the
Study
A cross-tabulation of
the educational background of respondents vis-a-vis their awareness of party
ideology is instructive. Table 8 shows no significant relationship between
education and awareness of party ideology. Out of the 21 respondents who
claimed to know their parties’ ideologies (see Table 6), 10 had no education, 1
had basic education, and another 1 had secondary education while 9 respondents
had tertiary education. The table also shows the distribution of the 137
respondents without any awareness of party ideology thus: 20 had no education;
27 had basic education; 40 had secondary education; and 50 had tertiary
education.
Table 8: Education and
Awareness of Party ideology
Educational Background
|
|
Awareness of Party Ideology
|
|
Yes
|
No
|
Total
|
|
None
|
10
|
20
|
30
|
Basic
|
1
|
27
|
28
|
Secondary
|
1
|
40
|
41
|
Tertiary
|
9
|
50
|
59
|
Source: From the
study
Table 8 is very revealing. It shows that youth who are
clueless about their party’s ideology outnumber those who know by nearly ratio
7:1. Furthermore, it shows that the problem of political illiteracy is more
with the so-called educated youth than the uneducated; hence they outnumber
them 2:1. The figures show at once that there are far more educated youth than
uneducated in Ghana but that their education does not translate to
158
political knowledge or awareness. It stands to reason that
if the youth, the real masses that sway electoral victory one way or the other
have no understanding of the basic ideology that rules their party, it means
they have no idea whatsoever how the parties are run; it also means they are
more like pawns in the party and the party leaders are at liberty to use and
dump them. It means their position in the party, formidable as it seems by
their sheer number, is very insecure. Finally, it also means that the role the
youth play in the party is mainly to secure for themselves a measure of
relevance – it means the older politicians tolerate and use them; they are not
really trusted.
To buttress this point, the NDC hosted
an international conference in 2007, which was attended by all parties that
subscribed to the Social Democracy ideology. Participants at the conference
were made up largely of the party gurus and bosses; the youth were hardly seen.
Some researchers have attempted to explain the nature of relationship between
the party leaders and the youth. Asante (2006), for instance, has observed a degree of apprehension between the
leadership of the parties and the youth. He said most of the adults in the
party perceive the youth as half-empty caps (Asante 2006:228). Asante further
notes that the older politicians’ perception of the youth range from the mildly
negative view that young people are a risk and an unknown quantity, to the
extreme view that characterises them as potentially dangerous to themselves and
society (Asante 2006:230). Could this explain why no conscious effort was made
to get the NDC youth to attend such an important conference? Perhaps. But it
shows a deliberate failure of the party leadership to groom the young ones for
leadership and reveals a more underlying problem, namely, an inclination on the
part of the party leaders to be non-ideological in their politicking. It makes
the party ideologies look as mere window dressing.
A cross tabulation between gender and
awareness (Table 9) shows that more male (18) awareness of party ideology than
female (only 3). That is in the ratio of 6:1. But with 67 male and 70 female
respondents claiming no awareness of party ideology (Table 9), it means the
degree of awareness for both genders is very low – low enough for both genders
to be used as pawns despite their overwhelming voting population.
Table 9: Gender
and Awareness of Party Ideology
Gender
|
Awareness of Party Ideology
|
|
|
Yes
|
No
|
Total
|
|
Male
|
18
|
67
|
85
|
Female
|
3
|
70
|
73
|
Source: From the
Study
159
The 137 respondents who know nothing of their party ideology
naturally have nothing to say about the relevance of ideology to the political
movement. But even 12 of the 21 who claim to know say political ideology is
irrelevant (Table 10). In between the two parties, the same perception
dominates (Table 11).
Table 10: Is the
concept of political ideology relevant?

Yes
9
No 12
Total 21

Source: From the
study
Table 11:
Political Parties and Relevance of
Ideology

Political Party Relevance
of Party Ideology
|
Yes
|
No
|
Total
|
NPP
|
4
|
8
|
12
|
NDC
|
5
|
4
|
9
|
Source: From the
Study
Remarkably, of the 12 respondents who consider party
ideology irrelevant, five said it is too abstract and not practical, and
therefore, has no place in modern-day
politics. Another four said there is no ideological difference between
political parties in Ghana while the remaining three said the attitude of
political leaders make any talk of ideology irrelevant. They cited the several
defections from one political camp to the other by respected political leaders
and argued that if ideology was that
important, leaders would not easily defect at will (Table 12).
Table 12: Reasons Why Ideology is Irrelevant
Respondents
|
Frequency
|
Yes
|
9
|
No
|
12
|
Total
|
21
|
Source: From the
Study
160
From the study and the preceding analysis, it seems the
youth of Ghana are a collective in double jeopardy. They constitute 80 per cent
of the national population and averagely 72 per cent of the voting population
(Tables 1 and 2). They take the battle cry of the parties to the grassroots,
convince reluctant voters, function as electoral officers, fight physical
battles to see their party prevail or to defend their party thereby
constituting themselves into the party security outfit and so on and so forth. It
is therefore an irony that this same youth should be largely uninformed about
the ideology and ultimate objectives of the party. What then fuels the fervour
of the youth that makes them do so much for so little? What philosophy or
worldview defines their voting pattern?
Answers to this question are not easy
because they have to balance theoretical postulates with practical experience.
For instance, from the theoretical point of view, Heywood (2002) has identified
four theories of voting, namely, party identification model, sociological
model, rational choice model and dominant ideology model.13
For the youth who make up 72 per cent of the voting population and play a
fundamental role in deciding who gets elected into what office and yet are not
taken into confidence in the party plans and core philosophy, it is
irresistible to ask which of these theories inform the voting of youth for
election candidates. Interestingly, none of the respondents cited ideology as
the reason for voting a party (Table 13). This means there are no thoroughgoing
objective principles guiding party activities and election in Ghana.
Table 13: What
makes you support or vote for your party?
Reasons
|
No. of Respondents
|
Parental Influence
|
44
|
Peer Influence
|
23
|
Personal Interest
|
76
|
Good Policies
|
15
|
Source: From the
Study
What then can be said to influence youth voting during
elections? Personal interest tops the table with 76 affirmations a total figure
of 158 respondents. Others are parental influence (44); peer influence (23);
and good policies (15). By implication, the 44 who voted for parties based on
the influences of their parents and grandparents fit into two main theories of
voting – the sociological model of voting (the dominant model) and the party
identification model of voting. It means the youth support political parties in
keeping with their parents’ preferences.
161
The 23 respondents who voted as a result
of peer influence also voted in conformity with both the sociological and the
party identification models. Similarly, 76 respondents claimed they supported their
parties for their personal gains and interest. Impliedly, they were more
concerned about what they can gain from a political system when their parties
assume the reins of power than the actual ideology of the party. In this
respect, the respondents tend to be more concerned about the improvement in
their individual and family well-being regardless of the ideology the parties
offer. Again, 15 respondents claimed their vote was in support of the good
policies contained in their party manifestoes. This satisfies the rational
choice model of voting. In all, 91 respondents were influenced by the rational
choice model during voting, which is good.
Discussions and Conclusion
This paper has furnished a sample study of the youth
involvement in the political process of Ghana. Though the findings cannot be
overgeneralised because of the small
sample used, yet it is a valuable indication of the political attitude of the
Ghanaian youth alongside their voting preferences and the raison d’être for
their political choices. With this, it
can be concluded that even though the vast majority of the youth are
politically active and play a crucial role in the emergence of political
leaders in the country, nevertheless, their actions are not guided political
ideology. Findings from the mini study show an uncomfortable pattern: that the
youth are motivated mainly by what they can gain from the parties and the
political process. This selfcentred reason for voting and supporting political
parties may be the result of poverty and unemployment among the youth in Ghana.
T is also the reason why it is so easy for the political class to manipulate
and use them for their selfish reasons despite the advantage of number they
have over every other segment of the population.
Given the results of the survey,
political parties, as key agents of political socialisation, have not fared
well in socialising the youth and setting up their organisation firmly on the
basis of a strong ideology. For as long as the political class is able to
continue running without party ideology, so long will there be no particular
destination they are taking the Ghanaian polity to. The damage they do by this
lack of ideology is double in that they rob the present of developmental
essence and framework and rob the future of developmental vision. Thsociologiey
are not operating within a developmental paradigm and they are not training the
youth to develop any. This is a serious challenge not just for the political
class but the country and the youth in particular. The youth are the agents of
social transformation, but for them
162
to truly achieve that feat, they need a thorough
reorientation and conscious development. They need to imbibe the right
philosophical outlook and commit to the historical challenges of their country.
The political class has to design this process and see it through for positive
change to happen. Without a properly weaned national ideology, it will be
difficult to bring to birth the Ghana of its compatriots’ dream.
Notes
1. I am
grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this paper for this view.
2. United
Nation Development Programme Report, 2006.
3. Constitution
of the Republic of Ghana, 1992.
4. Constitution
of the National Democratic Congress, 1992.
5. Constitution
of the New Patriotic Party, 1992.
6. Constitution
of the Peoples’ National Convention, 1992.
7. Constitution
of the Convention Peoples’ Party, 1992.
8. Republic of
Ghana (2004). Draft National Youth Policy of Ghana.
9. I am
grateful to Professor Pearl Robinson, Associate Professor of PoliticalScience,
Tufts University, Medford, USA, for this view.
10. Republic of
Ghana (2004). Draft National Youth Policy in Ghana.
11. Constitution
of the Republic of Ghana, 1992.
12. I am
grateful to Mr. E.K Adomah, National Co-ordinator, National Youth Councilfor
sharing this view during a discussion I held with him on Wednesday 16th April, 2008
in Accra.
13. According
to Andrew Heywood, there are four main theories of voting. Theseare:
Sociological
Model: This model links voting to group membership, suggesting
that voters tend to adopt a voting pattern that reflects the economic and
social position of the group to which they belong. Rather than developing a
psychological attachment to a party on the basis of family influence, this
model highlights the importance of social alignment, reflecting the various
divisions and tensions within society. The most significant of these divisions
are class, gender, ethnicity, religion and region. In simple terms, the model
states that people may vote for an aspirant if he belongs to their class, comes
from their ethnic group, shares the same religious beliefs, etc. This model
allows for rationality insofar as group interests may help to shape party allegiances.
The model has however been attacked on the grounds that, there is growing
empirical evidence that the link between sociological factors and party support
has weakened in modern societies. In particular, attention has been paid to the
phenomenon of class dealignment and the need for people to vote on issues and
not on class, religious or ethnic grounds.
Rational
Choice Model: In this model, voting is seen as a rational act, in the
sense that voters are believed to decide their party preference on the basis of
personal interest. Rather than being habitual, a manifestation of broader 163
attachments and allegiances, voting is seen as essentially
instrumental: that is, as a means to an end. The model stresses the importance
of ‘issue voting’, and suggests that parties can significantly influence their
electoral performance by reshaping their policies. It is generally accepted
that one of the consequences of partisan and class dealignment has been the
spread of issue voting. The weakness of the theory is that it abstracts the
individual voter from his or her social and cultural context.
Dominant
Ideology Model: This model stresses the importance of political ideology in
influencing the behaviour of voters. The model simply states that the dominant
ideology influences voters. Consequently, if voters’ attitude conforms to the
tenets of a dominant ideology, parties would develop their policies in line
with the tenets of that ideology so as to get the support of voters. The
weakness of this ideology is that, it takes individual calculation and personal
autonomy out of the picture all together. Impliedly, people are not willing to
weigh the merits and demerits of policy options being presented to them. Once a
candidate or a policy conforms to their ideological persuasion, they would
support it (Andrew Heywood, Politics,
Palgrave: MacMillan Press, 2002, pp. 242-245).
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Oral Interview
Ohene-Ntow, Nana, General Secretary of the NPP, 2007.
‘Interview’, 1 May.
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