Africa Development, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, 2014, pp. 103 – 116
© Council for the Development of Social Science Research in
Africa, 2014
(ISSN
0850-3907)
Opposition
Politics and Electoral Democracy in Cameroon, 1992-2007
George Ngwane*
Abstract
This article seeks to assess the
impact of electoral democracy in Cameroon especially in terms of the
performance of the Opposition between 1992 and 2007, evaluate the internal
shortcomings of opposition parties, and make a projection regarding a vibrant democratic
space that will go beyond routine elections to speak to the issues preoccupying
the Cameroonian masses.
Résumé
Cet article vise à évaluer l’impact de la démocratie
électorale au
Cameroun en particulier en termes
de performance de l’opposition entre 1992 et 2007, à évaluer les lacunes
internes des partis d’opposition, et à faire une projection concernant un
espace démocratique dynamique qui ira au-delà des élections ordinaires pour
aborder les questions qui préoccupent les masses camerounaises.
Introduction
The political history of modern Cameroon can be divided into
four periods. The first was the period of total dependence on the colonial
power which extended from 1884 to 1945 during which the country did not possess
representative institutions. The second period stretched from 1945 to 1960/ 61
during which Cameroonians passed their apprenticeship in democracy. The third
started on 1st January 1960, with the proclamation of
independence in French Cameroon and the reunification of West and East
Cameroons in 1961 in a federal structure, and the fourth saw the light of day
on 20 May 1972 when the federal structure was abolished in what the then Head
of
State, Ahmadou Ahidjo termed the ‘Peaceful
Revolution’ (Sobseh Emmanuel 2012:88).
* AFRICAphonie, Buea, South West Province Cameroon. Email:
gngwane@yahoo.com
104
During the Federal structure, multiparty
politics was vibrant in both the
West and East Cameroons until 1 September 1966 when the
Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), the Cameroon People National Congress
(CPNC) and the Cameroon Union Congress from West Cameroons decided to fuse with
the Union Camerounaise (UC) into a single party called the Cameroon National
Union (C.N.U). According to Ahidjo, multiparty politics was a luxury and
politics under this system was bitter and could easily lead the nation into
civil war. However when Ahidjo left power on 6 November 1982, his
constitutional successor Paul Biya changed the name of the single party to Cameroon
Peoples’ Democratic Movement (CPDM) in March 1985. The
CPDM single party did not last as internal and external
pressures militated against multiparty electoral democracy in Africa. Cameroon
could not be insulated from this wind of change. Internal pressure in Cameroon
arose mainly from people’s power when some civil society actors decided in
February 1990 to challenge the single party system and they
were all arrested and detained. This gave a leeway to Ni John Fru Ndi and a
group of lawyers to file in a document in March 1990 for the creation of
another party called the Social Democratic Front (SDF). This was met with
reluctance and resistance by the ruling elite and the result was a bloody
confrontation between the masses and the soldiers, leading to death and arrests
on 26 May 1990. Triggered by the events of 26 May 1990, that led to the defiant
launching of an opposition party (Social Democratic Front - SDF), multipartyism
and eventually opposition parties became institutionalized following the Law of
Association of 19 December 1990 (Law No. 90/056). In spite of this reform to
accommodate multipartyism, the main kernel of a democratic transition to put
enabling structures in place eluded the political establishment in Cameroon.
Unlike other African Countries such as
Benin (1990), Mali (1991), Zaire, now Democratic Republic of Congo (1991) and
South Africa (1994) that planned a democratic transition, the leadership of
Cameroon at first resisted, then reluctantly gave in to a form of transition
whose outcome fell below general expectations. Such a context only encouraged
the emergence of a new elite in the political arena, next to the old ones who
switched over, for the occasion, to the virtues of political pluralism (Tidjani
Alou 2002:28). The setting up of Constitutional Conferences, Sovereign National
Conferences and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions as modes of transition was
meant to provide new political and economic paradigms suited to the demands of
pluralism. As discussion forums, transition modes served as the balm of
national reconciliation and as a catharsis as well as avenues to put in place
reforms and structures that would change the qualities of lives of the masses.
105
When President Paul
Biya therefore declared on 27 June 1991 at the National Assembly that ‘Je l’ai
dit et je le maintiens, la conference nationale est sans objet pour le
Cameroun’ (‘I insist that the National Conference is baseless in Cameroon’),
Cameroonians were stunned into both rage and revolt.
Biya’s refusal to yield to
popular demands for a national conference was partly due to the opposition
parties’ misconception of the purpose of such a conference. Their perception
was not one of overhauling the obsolete monolithic apparatus but one of
impeaching and eventually stripping Biya of legitimate power. Cameroonians
therefore missed a rare opportunity to reassess the gains of nation-building
and to examine the expectations of a democratic renewal. What they
(Cameroonians) instead got was a Tripartite Conference consisting of the ruling
party, the opposition and the civil society. This conference that was held from
30 October to 18 November 1991 proved to be futile as national aspirations
became mortgaged on the altar of parochialism. The main weakness of this
conference was the quasiobsessional temptations of the ruling party, which
wanted rules and results for its prime benefit alone.
So without any concrete rules on
the exigencies of multiparty politics, without a change of the monolithic
constitution, without a defined role of the opposition, and without a clear cut
line between the party and state, Cameroon set forth on the journey of
electoral democracy without a map (Ngwane 1996:175).
Justification
This article seeks to assess the impact of electoral
democracy especially in terms of the performance of the Opposition between 1992
and 2007, to evaluate the internal shortcomings of opposition parties, and to
make a projection regarding a vibrant democratic space – one that would go
beyond
routine elections to speak to the issues preoccupying the
Cameroonian masses. It does this through a presentation of the various election
data from 19922007, especially depicting the downward trend of opposition gains
in elections. It analyses this scenario and tries to look into the future of
opposition politics in electoral democracy in Cameroon.
Election Database
Parliamentary Elections
(a) 1 March 1992
|
Registered Voters
|
4.019.562
|
|
Total Votes
|
2.435.443
|
|
Voter Turn out
|
(60.6%)
|
106
|
Invalid /Blank Votes
|
238.200
|
|||
|
Total Valid votes
|
2.197.243
|
|||
|
Party
|
Number of seats
|
|||
|
Cameroon Peoples Democratic
Movement (CPDM)
|
88
|
|||
|
National Unionfor Democracy
and Progress (UNDP)
|
68
|
|||
|
Movement forthe Defense of
the Republic (MDR)
|
18
|
|||
|
Union of Cameroon Populations (UPC)
|
06
|
|||
Two opposition parties, the Social Democratic Front (SDF)
and Cameroon Democratic Union (UDC), boycotted the poll. b) 17 May 1997
|
Registered Voters
|
4.000.000 (approx)
|
||
|
Total Votes
|
Not Available
|
||
|
Voter turnout
|
Not Available
|
||
|
Party
|
Number of seats
|
||
|
Cameroon People’s
Democratic Movement (CPDM)
|
109
|
||
|
Social Democratic Front
(SDF)
|
43
|
||
|
National Union For
Democracy and Progress (UNDP)
|
13
|
||
|
Union of Cameroon Populations (UPC)
|
05
|
||
|
Movement for the Defense of
the Republic (MDR)
|
01
|
||
|
Union of Cameroon Populations (UPC)
|
01
|
||
|
Liberty Movement of the
Cameroon Youth (MLJC)
|
01
|
||
|
Vacant
|
07
|
||
The Supreme Court cancelled the election results in seven
constituencies due to serious irregularities. On 3 August 1997 further
elections were held to fill the vacant seats. The RDPC won all of the seats,
thus increasing its level of representation in the National Assembly.
(c) 30 June 2002
Registered Voters Not Available Total Votes Not Available Voter Turnout Not Available
The Supreme Court nullified the result for 17 seats on
account of various irregularities. By-elections were held on 15 September to fill
the vacant seats.
|
Party
|
Number of seats
|
|
Cameroon People’s
Democratic Movement
|
149
|
|
Social Democratic Front
(SDF)
|
22
|
|
Cameroon Democratic Union
(UDC)
|
05
|
|
Union of Cameroon Populations (UPC)
|
03
|
|
National Union For
Democracy and Progress (UNDP)
|
01
|
107
|
(d) 22 July 2007
|
|
|||
|
Registered Voters
|
5.000.000 (aprox.)
|
|||
|
Total Voters /Voter Turnout
|
Not Available
|
|||
|
Party
|
Number of seats
|
|||
|
Cameroon People’s
Democratic Movement
|
140
|
|||
|
Social Democratic Front
(SDF)
|
14
|
|||
|
Cameroon Democratic Union
(UDC)
|
04
|
|||
|
National Union For
Democracy and Progress (UNDP)
|
04
|
|||
|
Progressive movement (MP)
|
01
|
|||
|
Vacant
|
17
|
|||
The Supreme Court nullified the results for 17 seats on
account of various irregularities. By-elections were held on 15 September to
fill the vacant seats.
Presidential Elections
(a) 11 October 1992
|
Registered Voters
|
4.195.687
|
|||
|
Total Votes
|
3.015.440
|
|||
|
Voter Turnout
|
71.9%
|
|||
|
Party
|
% of Votes
|
|||
|
Paul Biya (CPDM)
|
39.98
|
|||
|
John Fru Ndi (SDF)
|
35.97
|
|||
|
Bello Bouba Maigari (UNDP)
|
19.22
|
|||
|
Adamou Ndam Njoya (UDC)
|
3.62
|
|||
(b) 12 October 1997
|
Registered Voters
|
Not Available
|
||||
|
Total Votes
|
Not Available
|
||||
|
Voters Turnout
|
81.4%
|
||||
|
Invalid/Blank Votes
|
Not Available
|
||||
|
Total Valid Votes
|
3.422.055
|
||||
|
Candidate (party)
|
Number of votes
|
% of votes
|
|||
|
Paul Biya (CPDM)
|
3.167.820
|
92.57
|
|||
|
Henri Hogbe Nlend (UPC)
|
85.693
|
2.50
|
|||
|
Samuel Eboua (MDP)
|
83.506
|
2.44
|
|||
|
Albert Dzongang (PPD)
|
40.814
|
1.19
|
|||
|
Joachim Tabi Owono (AMEC)
|
15.817
|
0.46
|
|||
|
Antoine N’Denabbu (RDPF)
|
15.490
|
0.45
|
|||
|
Gustave Essaka (DIC)
|
12.915
|
0.38
|
|||
The election was boycotted by three main
opposition parties – the Social
Democratic Front (SDF), National Union for Democratic
Progress (UNDP),
108
Cameroon Democratic Union (UDC) and a small Party, The
Union of African Population (UPA).
(c) 11 October 2004
|
Registered Voters
|
4.657.748
|
||||
|
Total Votes
|
3.830.272
|
||||
|
Voters Turnout
|
82.2%
|
||||
|
Invalid/Blank Votes
|
72.051
|
||||
|
Total Valid Votes
|
3.758.221
|
||||
|
Candidates (party)
|
Number of votes
|
% of votes
|
|||
|
Paul Biya
(CPDM
|
2.665.359
|
70.92
|
|||
|
John Fru Ndi (SDF)
|
654.066
|
17.40
|
|||
|
Adamou Ndam Njoya (UDC)
|
168.318
|
4.48
|
|||
|
Garga Haman Adji (ADD)
|
140.372
|
3.74
|
|||
|
Justice Mouafo (NPC–BUSH)
|
14.915
|
0.40
|
|||
|
Yondo Mandengue Black (MNSD)
|
13.601
|
0.36
|
|||
|
Ancient Ekane (MANIDEM)
|
13.290
|
0.35
|
|||
|
Fritz Pierre Ngo (MEC)
|
13.122
|
0.35
|
|||
|
Jean Michel Tekam
|
12.785
|
0.34
|
|||
|
Victorin Hameni Bieleu (UFDC)
|
11.920
|
0.32
|
|||
|
Boniface Forbin (JDP)
|
10.542
|
0.28
|
|||
|
Djeukam Tchameni (MDI)
|
10.539
|
0.28
|
|||
|
Jean-Jacques Ekindi (MP)
|
10.158
|
0.27
|
|||
|
Hubert Kamgang (UPA)
|
7.508
|
0.20
|
|||
|
George Dobgima Nyamndi (SLC)
|
6.730
|
0.18
|
|||
|
Gustave Essaka (DIC)
|
4.996
|
0.13
|
|||
Note:All
election data were collected from the book ‘Rethinking Citizenship, Politics
and Governance in Cameroon’.
Analysis
Statistics show that in 1992, opposition parties put
together won 92 seats as opposed to 88 for the ruling party giving the
opposition a 51.1 percent representation in Parliament. On the face of it, this
would have given the Opposition a strong weapon to initiate reforms through the
Assembly but for the fact that one of the Opposition parties (Movement for the
Defence of the Republic) decided to form a coalition with the ruling party.
That kept the opposition in a minority status in the National Assembly.
In 1997, the Opposition had 64 seats of
the 180 scoring 35.5 percent of the vote.
In 2002 the Opposition had (before the
rerun for 17 seats nullified by the Supreme Court), 31 seats of the 180,
scoring 17.2 percent of the vote.
109
In 2007 (pending results of the rerun
for 17 seats nullified by the Supreme Court) the Opposition had 23 seats, 12.7
percent of the vote.
So from 51.1 percent of the vote in
1992, the Opposition had plummeted in parliamentary representation to 17.2
percent in 2007.
With regards to presidential elections,
the combined Opposition obtained 58.81 percent as opposed to 39.98 percent for
the ruling party of President Paul Biya in 1992. Therefore, had the opposition
parties presented a single candidate, they would have won the presidential
elections of 1992. Nonetheless the election results were shrouded in
controversy with other sources giving opposition party (SDF) leader (Fru Ndi)
37 percent, and the ruling party (CPDM) 36 percent.
The fragmentation of the Opposition, a
flawed electoral system and the absence of a run-off electoral procedure
deprived the Opposition from winning the first multiparty presidential
elections in Cameroon in 1992.
In 1997, the Opposition combined
received a dismal 7.42 percent of the vote, as opposed to 92.57 percent for the
ruling party. A major reason for this ridiculous performance by the Opposition
was the fact the three main opposition parties (Social Democratic Front,
National Union for Democratic Progress and the Cameroon Democratic Union)
boycotted the election.
In 2004 the Opposition all together
received 29 percent of the vote, as opposed to 70.92 percent for the ruling
party.
So from a 58.81 percent figure in the
presidential elections in 1992, the combined opposition dwindled in its share
of the vote, attaining only 29 percent in 2004.
It can be seen that for both
parliamentary and presidential elections since 1992, the Opposition has shown a
steady decline.
Categories of Opposition Parties
The circumstances that led to the emergence of
opposition parties in Cameroon were predicated on the twin phenomena of
challenge and change. Challenge was based on the need for the establishment to
reform itself and to give access to alternative voices while change referred to
a political agenda that was meant to overturn the ruling oligarchy in favour of
a new dispensation by a change of regime.
Initially as
in most African countries, the resurgence of multipartyism in Cameroon was
borne out of the hunger for change, hence the liberation theology preached by
most opposition parties became the democratic mantra. Liberation theology
according to these parties meant that change could come to Cameroon only when
the incumbent President Paul Biya was unseated. To them Biya the person was the
stumbling block to democratic development in Cameroon.
110
In Cameroon the slogan
‘Biya must go’ was used by opposition parties as a template for achieving
power. But even the most radical of the opposition failed to go beyond what
Celestin Monga has termed ‘slogans in line with populist illusions’. In other
words, transforming liberation theology into a structured ideological
philosophy seemed a task beyond the power of the opposition parties.
Since the quest for political pluralism
comes down to the installation of multipartyism, opposition parties are
expected to be distinct from and autonomous of the ruling party (Olukoshi
1998:19). Some opposition parties in Cameroon on the other hand believed that
the real problem confronting political change went beyond Biya the person
(liberation theology) to a complete cleansing of the dictatorial system which
Biya had come to incarnate. To them structured ideological philosophy hinged on
constitutional reforms and the putting in place of vibrant democratic
institutions.
With no clear constitutional provision
on the status of opposition parties in Cameroon (unlike a country like
Mozambique where the Opposition is treated as a government in waiting), opposition
parties in Cameroon have through various electoral processes given themselves a
political identity.
The Opposition of Liberation
The SDF approach appears to focus on a zero-sum
arrangement. Referred to as an external’ opposition by Tangie Fonchingong, this
category of opposition is formed outside the ruling constellation and often
against the background of deep-seated disagreement, conflict and protest. It
sees itself as a symbol of change and fights to the end for a radically
alternative system (Tangie 1998:125). Its political mind-set is based on a
‘Biya must go’ strategy.
The Opposition of Co-optation
This approach is characterized by the desire to share power
and the prebends or spoils of power with the ruling party. Attracted by the
obnoxious notion of broad-based governance or
a government of national unity, this category of opposition poses no
fundamental challenge to the regime. It shores up the regime and seeks mainly
to ensure its own share of the spoils rather than presenting radically different
proposals (Tangie 1998:125). The mind-set of such opposition is based on a
win-win situation. All through the electoral process in Cameroon, the NUDP,
MDR, MLJC and UPC (the latter being the only opposition of liberation in
Cameroon since 1948) and quite recently Minister Issa Tchiroma’s party are
opposition parties that belong to this nomenclature. Its political paradigm is
based on a ‘Biya must share’ strategy.
111
The Opposition of Proposition
This kind of political activity is characterized by a
strong ideological bent, working more on ideas rather than revolutionary
propaganda. Emerging from the mass base within the same party, the opposition
of proposition seeks mainly for a redress of grievances either in terms of
party policy or party performance. It may sometimes break away as splinter
group but more often than not stays within as mainstream members disagreeing at
their own risk and peril, with a party focus. The case of the Progressive or
Modernist wing of the CPDM comes out with its lists of grievances presented in
‘The White Book’ written by Chief Milla Assoute. The postures by the CPDM
Parliamentary candidate the Honourable Adama Modi Bakary
and the erstwhile
CPDM Parliamentarian, Honourable Paul Ayah,
now leader of the People’s
Action Party (PAP) to break away from socialised violence
(irrational obedience to party ideology) are cases in point. The political
mind-set of this group is based on a ‘Biya must change’ strategy.
In sum it is
fairly easy to distinguish the opposition of conviction from the opposition of
convenience within the electoral process in Cameroon, with the latter always
enjoying a strong numerical advantage, albeit with a weak ideological stance,
over the former. In the end we have witnessed an opposition that has over the years
become a vehicle for the maximization of the interests of political
opportunists and not frameworks for mobilizing popular forces for genuine
change (Tangie 1998:127). This has taken its toll on our democratization
process which according to Francis Nyamnjoh has served mainly as ‘face powder’,
used to justify reactionary propaganda by
the ruling party and its acolytes and revolutionary
propaganda by the opposition (Nyamnjoh 1999:115).
Shortcomings of the Opposition
It is generally accepted that the playing field in
Cameroon does not work in favour of opposition parties winning elections. With
no genuine independent or neutral persons within the Independent Electoral
Commission (be it the National Elections Observatory or Elections Cameroon),
and with a contentious new electoral code adopted by a CPDM majority parliament
in March 2012, the elections have been reduced to a two-horse race between the
CPDM and its French translation – RDPC. In effect there are a lot of exogenous
factors that deprive the opposition from starting the election race from the
same blocks as the ruling party – disenfranchisement, a nonchalant
international community, low civic participation, mass rigging, sterile
political debates occasioned by the trading of accusations of illegitimacy
between the ruling party and the opposition parties, and so on (Fonchingong
2004:35).
112
But apart from these failings, there
are problems that are inherent in the modus operandi and structures of
opposition parties in Cameroon. They include:
A Lack of Internal Democracy
The first thing that one notices is that all opposition
parties have as Chairmen or Presidents those who founded the parties. So, for
close to two decades, the same people who created these parties are at the helm
of affairs (Ngwane 2004:21) Paradoxically, most of these opposition members
were hell-bent on pushing the ruling party leader Paul Biya out of power when
he was ‘only’ eight years into his term of office as President of the country
(19821990) and ‘only’ five years as Chairman of his CPDM party (1985-1990).
The case of the main opposition party
(SDF) is a cause for concern. Apart from the tenacity syndrome of its leader,
Article 8.2 of the party’s constitution raises issues around the role of
dissent versus debate, and discipline versus dictatorship. Elected mayors have
been dismissed for not complying with the caprices of the National Investiture
Committee. The axe of Article 8.2 has fallen on militants who opposed policies
or performances of the party hierarchy. Yet it must be recalled that the SDF
was founded ‘to rid the Cameroonian society of a system that deprives people
from being free men or otherwise punishing them for daring to think freely,
associate freely, assemble peacefully and freely’.
This long tenure of leadership at the
helm of all opposition parties has resulted in party clientelism, personality
cults, and the personalization of power.
A Lack of an Opposition Leadership Consensus
Since the creation of opposition parties, attempts at
instituting an identifiable, credible and consensual leadership and programme
have failed. Unlike other African countries that have a clear leadership within
the Opposition (Gabon, Zambia, Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe), the case of
Cameroon differs widely. Ni Fru Ndi would have easily stood out as a rallying
point as opposition leader owing to his grassroots support, but he has been met
with contempt for his relatively ‘low academic’ baggage and because of mistrust
for his Anglophone origin. Fru Ndi’s own inflexibility and temper tantrums have
sometimes not helped matters.
Broken Strategic Alliances
Alliances formed before elections tend to
be broken even before the elections take off. The ‘Directorate’, ‘Union for
Change’, ‘Allied forces for Change’, ‘Coalition for National Reconciliation and
Reconstruction’, the ‘G7’, and
113
now the ‘Republican Pact’ (2012), have not been as coherent
and programmefocused as for example, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) by
the opposition in Kenya, set up for the 2002 Presidential elections, resulting
in a victory with 62.2 percent of the vote.
Disconnection with Democratic Development
Most opposition parties concern themselves with what
happens during elections and not what takes place between elections. In other
words, within the five years that span municipal/ legislative elections and the
years that span presidential elections, the opposition parties do not connect
with the population on issues of daily survival (power cuts, fuel price hikes,
inflation, water outages, unemployment, industrial action, and so on). Nor do
they agitate continuously around government policies (IMF policies,
sub-regional or continental disaffection, for instance). This is compounded by
the poor performance of some of the elected opposition party representatives in
local councils and the National Assembly.
To quote Achille Mbembe, it is
necessary for the opposition to define a real strategy towards a social
struggle (social democracy and democratic development) that is adapted to the
present Cameroonian conditions (Mbembe 2004:12).
Lack of Linkages with Activist Elements of Civil
Society
One of the most important groups in the pro-democracy
movement is the activist elements in civil society, which include the human
rights lobby, minority rights groups, movements for the empowerment and
participation of marginalized groups such as women and youth, students and
labour, the Church and the media (Ake 2000:135). The opposition in Cameroon
built organic linkages with these groups in the early 1990s, but the
relationship has strained due to so many reasons. Yet it was the youth that
gave power to succeeding opposition leaders turned Presidents in Senegal, like
Abdoulaye Wade in 2000 and Macky Sall in 2012; it is the feminization of power
policy that Paul Kagame of Rwanda survives on, while the opposition leader and Prime
Minister Morgan Tswangirai of Zimbabwe feeds on workers’ union
(himself a product of it) and most recently on the church.
Projections
In my opinion the real battle for the sustenance of
democracy in Cameroon lies in what happens between now and future presidential
elections. This battle in my view would take on either a positive peaceful or a
negative peaceful avenue or both.
114
Positive Peaceful Avenue
Politics is the art of the possible and no one can rule out
the possibility of Paul Biya’s disengagement from subsequent presidential
elections in
Cameroon. Were he to do so then the ruling party would be
forced into searching from among their ranks for a moderate yet benevolent
disciplinarian leader. Such a leader’s mission would be to walk the talk of
balanced development, equitable resource allocation, and the West Cameroonian real
or perceived identity of systematic victimhood. On the other hand, the
successorship hypothesis provides the opposition with a beacon of hope. If a
successor to President Biya did not sustain enough party consensus it could
force some of the opposition of proposition militants in the CPDM to join camps
with the opposition of liberation, the opposition of co-optation and activist
elements of civil society to win fresh elections. It happened in
Kenya when Daniel Arap Moi chose Uhuru Kenyatta as the KANU
party leader, giving room for the joint opposition alliances (NARC) to win. If
Biya’s successor within the CPDM party did not command some charisma and aura,
he could lose an election to the opposition presidential candidate, as it
happened in Sierra Leone in 2007.
Were President Biya to turn his back on
future elections, he would have to assume a neutral statesmanlike status (hints
of which have been recurrent in his recent speeches), and not interfere with
the electoral process. He has always wanted to be remembered as the person who
brought democracy to Cameroon, and it would be in his interest to leave the
scene with that legacy. With a law that was adopted by Parliament in 2011
giving the President immunity from criminal prosecution after leaving office,
the fear of quitting office and being pursued for criminal offences could be
allayed.
Ahmed Tedjan Kabbah, in spite of his
lacklustre performance as President of Sierra Leone for ten years has been
praised for his non-interference in the 2007 electoral process which brought
theopposition to power. Mathieu Kerekou of Benin and Ould Ahmed Taya of
Mauritania are of this same democratic school.
The second condition would be for the
President in collaboration with all political beneficiaries to reform or
re-examine the nature of elections in Cameroon.
Third, the electoral law needs to be
revised to allow Independent Candidates to run for presidential elections
without the infamous 300 signature clause. Related to this would be the need
for a second round or run-off electoral process to be introduced during future
presidential elections. Also in this connection, the civil service, the
judiciary and the army must be depoliticised (Mbile 1990:14).
Fourth, while the elite should resist
peddling compensatory development advantages by parties, the Cameroonian
electorate would have to rise above its present inertia, its blind party
adherence, and refuse to be cheaply bought
115
off by allurements and material inducements (bags of rice
and bottles of beer). The youth in particular must see the long term advantage
of building a sustainable development policy for Cameroon rather than trivial
immediate interests that border on greed and gluttony. This means constant
political education should be provided by activist elements of the civil
society with funding assistance from development agents.
Negative Peaceful Avenue
If the positive peaceful avenue fails, at best
activist elements or pro-democracy movements in civil society may throw caution
to the winds and shed all party influences to flood the streets for a repeat of
the 1991 Ghost town experiences, and the February 2008 mass demonstrations, but
this time on their own terms. This happened in Guinea in 2007 and 2008 when the
populace forced their agenda on the political class. At worst, ‘khaki’ rule may
rear its head, as used to be the case when civilian chaos and predatory
governance jeopardised genuine democracy and national unity, leading to army
intervention.
Conclusion
In spite of all external odds, the opposition in Cameroon
still survives, albeit waning in numerical strength, controversial in
ideological focus, and riven with leadership tussles. This is symptomatic of
the liberal democratic choice most African countries adopted rather than a
peculiar disease of the opposition in Cameroon (Ngwane 2004:18). From all
indications, the green tree of nationstatehood has not yet borne the yellow
fruits of national cohesion. Perhaps a new democratic transition bringing all
active forces together in an AllCameroonian Congress could help chart a new
course that would go beyond routine elections and usher in bold, creative and
indigenous development programmes that resonate with human and infrastructural
progress.
But before then it would be
necessary for the opposition in Cameroon to shed itself of its embedded and
shifting political predatory metaphors of grievance, greed and griotism to
embrace a new political patriotic dispensation of values, views and vision.
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