
© Council for the Development of Social Science
Research in Africa, 2012
(ISSN 0850-3907)
Africa’s
Growth and Development Strategies:
A Critical
Review1
Musibau Adetunji Babatunde*
Abstract
At independence in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, there were high hopes about the growth prospects of the new
politically independent African states. Economic conditions, such as per capita
real income, were comparable to other developing countries like South Korea and
Taiwan. By the mid-1970s, the growth profile of most African countries had
started to decline and by the mid-1980s, it became obvious that the African
continent needed rescue packages which came in the form of Structural
Adjustment Programmes. However, countries like Taiwan and South Korea had made
tremendous progress such that their per capita real incomes had grown more than
tenfold while those of most African countries had declined considerably
compared to the immediate postindependence era. What role did the growth
strategies adopted by African countries play in this tragedy? How do we rethink
Africa’s growth strategy? What were the lessons learned and which way forward?
These and other related issues are what this article sets out to address. The
article identifies three distinct growth phases for the economies of Africa and
analyzes critically the various models embedded in those phases. Among other
things, the article strongly canvasses for the deepening of regional
integration, enhancing productivity and competitiveness through investment in
technology and education, and the reinventing of African labour markets to
promote productivity and good labour relations.
Résumé
Au moment des indépendances de la
fin des années 1950 au début des années 1960, le continent plaçait de grands
espoirs sur les perspectives de croissance des Etats africains nouvellement
indépendants. Les conditions économiques telles que le revenu réel par
habitant, étaient comparables à celles d’autres pays en développement comme la
Corée

*
Department of Economics, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. Email:
tunjiyusuf19@yahoo.com
142
du Sud et
Taiwan. Dès le milieu des années 1970, le profil de croissance de la plupart
des pays africains avait commencé à se dégrader et au milieu des années 1980,
il était devenu évident que le continent africain avait besoin de programmes
d’aide dont il a effectivement bénéficié sous forme de programmes d’ajustement
structurel. Toutefois, des pays comme Taiwan et la Corée du Sud avaient
accompli un progrès tel que leurs revenus réels par habitant ont été multipliés
tandis que ceux de la plupart des pays africains baissaient sensiblement par
rapport aux toutes premières années après les indépendances. Quel rôle ont joué
les stratégies de croissance adoptées par les pays africains dans cette
tragédie? Comment allons-nous repenser la stratégie de croissance de l’Afrique?
Quelles sont les leçons apprises et quelle est la prochaine étape? Cet article
se propose donc de s’attaquer à ces questions et à celles qui y sont liées.
Cet article identifie trois phases
distinctes de croissance pour les économies africaines et procède à une analyse
critique des différents modèles inhérents à ces phases. Cet article explore
également les voies et moyens de renforcer l’intégration régionale, relever la
productivité et la compétition à travers l’investissement dans la technologie
et l’éducation et réinventer les marchés de main d’œuvre en Afrique dans le but
de promouvoir la productivité et de bonnes relations de travail.
Introduction2
The growth performance of African countries can be described
as among the least encouraging economic performances of the twentieth century
because of its dismal nature and disastrous socio-economic implications for its
approximately one billion people. After gaining independence from the colonial
powers in the late 1950s and early 1960s, African countries had high hopes for
development; but most of them are substantially poorer now than they were when
their nations gained political independence.3 Prior to the 1974
international oil shock, the growth rates were positive. For example, Artadi
and Sala-i-Martin (2003) observe that for the whole continent, growth was
around three per cent in the early 60s, close to two per cent in the late 60s,
and slightly below 1.5 per cent between 1970 and 1974. Things changed
dramatically in the second half of the 1970s. The growth rate for the countries
became negative 0.5 per cent in the late 70s, negative 1.2 per cent in the
second half of the decade, and zero between 1980 and 1985. Growth dropped
dramatically to a record negative 1.5 per cent per annum in the first half of
the 1990s. The continent seems to have recovered a bit since then with
positive, albeit small, growth rates for the second half of the 1990s and the
first two years of the new millennium. There were exceptions, of course, with
the oil-producing nations such as Nigeria, Libya, Gabon and Algeria;
143
but in all these cases, though growth was positive, it
did not trickle down. One only has to look at the Gini coefficient numbers for
countries like Nigeria and Gabon to appreciate the fact that even when there
was growth, it was very uneven; great individual wealth was generated but only
for those in command of the post-colonial state. One should also note that from
the
1960s to the 1990s, there was much
political instability on the African continent
– taking the form of the Cold War competition between the
West and the
Communist bloc, the ideological struggle between Third World
socialism (Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana) and neo-colonial capitalism (Houphouet
Boigny of Ivory Coast), and the military anti-colonial conflicts in Southern
Africa. These political events should be factored into any comprehensive
analysis of post-colonial Africa.
Taking the above into
consideration, we note that the African growth performance has been very weak
in absolute terms, but appeared worse if we take into account that, during this
same period the rest of the world has been growing at an annual rate of close
to two per cent. The biggest contrast in terms of development has been between
Africa and the Asian continent. In the 1960s, most African countries were
richer than their Asian counterparts, and their stronger natural resource base
led many to believe that Africa’s economic potential was superior to
overpopulated Asia’s. In 1965, for example, incomes and exports per capita were
higher in Ghana than in South Korea. But projections proved to be far off the
mark. Korea’s exports per capita overtook Ghana’s in 1972, and its income level
surpassed Ghana’s four years later. Between 1965 and 1995 Korea’s exports
increased by a factor of 400 in current dollars. Meanwhile, Ghana’s increased
only by factor of 4 and real earnings per capita fell to a fraction of their
earlier value. The parallels are considerable between Africa today and Asia in
the 1960s. Africa’s economic and social indicators in 1995 were not much
different from those of Korea in 1960 or Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand in
1975 – although savings and school enrolment rates were somewhat lower (UNCTAD
1998). In sum, the continent’s growth record has fallen well short of
expectations.
When expressed in terms of purchasing
power parity (PPP) – which takes into account the higher costs and prices in
Africa – real income averaged one-third less than in South Asia, making Africa
the poorest region in the world. In East Asia and the Pacific, per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) growth was over five per cent and Latin America grew at
almost two percent per annum (Easterly and Levine, 1997).4
Unlike other developing regions, Africa’s average output per capita in constant
prices was lower at the end of the 1990s than 30 years before – and in some
countries had fallen by more than 50 per cent. In real terms, fiscal resources
per capita were smaller for
144
many countries than in the late 1960s. Africa’s share of
world trade has fallen since the 1960s: it now accounts for a minor portion
(Gelb 2000). Three decades ago, African countries were specialised in primary
products and highly trade-dependent. But Africa missed out on industrial
expansion and now risks being excluded from the global information revolution.
In contrast to other regions that have diversified, most countries in Africa
are still largely exporters of primary commodities. They are also aid-dependent
and, until recently, deeply indebted. Net transfers from foreign assistance average
nine per cent of GDP for a typical poor country – equivalent to almost half of
public spending and far higher than for typical countries in other regions.
Africa is the
only major region to see investment and savings per capita decline after 1970.
Averaging about 13 per cent of GDP in the 1990s, the savings rate of the
typical African country has been the lowest in the world. Africa’s development
challenges go deeper than low income, falling trade shares, low savings, and
slow growth. They also include high income inequality, uneven access to natural
resources, social exclusion, insecurity and severe growth-dampening conflicts.
But why have African growth and development been so slow and sometimes
reversed? Where there is growth, why have the majority of people been excluded
from the growth process and even from the benefits of growth? Why is
unemployment-growth pervasive? Why has growth not translated into structural
changes? Is it because of the adoption of imposed growth formulae and models
irrespective of the structural characteristics of economies in Africa? What
role do the prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions and the idea of total
liberalisation and globalisation play in this respect? Arguments have been put
forward in the literature that the suggested economic reforms for Africa by the
Bretton Woods institutions have failed to produce the kind of growth they were
meant to achieve.5 Rather it is believed that they have
contributed to the economic stagnation that Africa as a continent has witnessed
over the years.
This article
sets out to review the growth and development profile of Africa in the context
of the neo-liberal growth and development strategies it has adopted over the
years. Further, it sets out to propose alternative agenda for African growth
and development.The sequence of this paper is as follows. After the
introduction, section two presents a review of Africa’s growth performance over
the years; section three discusses and evaluates the various growth strategies
that have been adopted in Africa over the years; section four proposes a viable
policy framework for Africa’s growth and development; and section five
concludes the discussion.
145
Review of Africa’s Growth Performance
Per Capita Income Growth
Africa’s growth performance cannot be said to be
encouraging, especially when compared to other regions of the world. National
development of countries in the African continent has been stunted.6
In terms of annual growth rate of per capita GDP presented in Table 1, evidence
reveals that African growth rates of per capita GDP increased from 4.5 per cent
over the decade 1970-80 to 4.8 per cent over the period 2000-2005. The average
annual growth rate which stood at 5.9 per cent in 2007, however, declined to
4.9 per cent in 2009. This decline is perhaps as a result of the global
financial/ economic crisis. Nevertheless, the surge in growth recorded in 2007
could be attributed to favourable primary commodity prices fuelled by high
demand by emerging economies like China and India.77 China is
currently receiving about nine per cent of Africa’s total export while India
sources about 24 percent of
its crude oil from the continent
(Hanson 2008; Beri 2009).
Between early 2003 and mid-2008,
oil prices climbed by 320 per cent in dollar terms, and internationally traded
food prices by 138 per cent. The increase in prices of the most sought-after
primary commodities was also driven by the high demand for these commodities by
emerging economies like China and India.
Africa holds a relatively minor share of
the world’s proven oil reserves of approximately 10 per cent compared to the
Middle East’s nearly 62 per cent.
It should be noted though that Africa is a vast continent
and that oil exploration is still ongoing. China’s booming economy, which has
averaged an annual nine per cent growth for the last two decades, requires
massive levels of energy to sustain its growth. Though China relies on coal for
most of its energy needs, it is the second-largest consumer of oil in the world
behind the United States. Once the largest oil exporter in Asia, China became a
net importer of oil in 1993. China’s biggest suppliers in Africa as of 2006
were
Angola, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan.
It has also sought supplies from Chad, Nigeria, Algeria, and Gabon. At the same
time, currently around 24 per cent of India’s crude oil imports are sourced
from
Africa. Indian national oil
companies like the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (OVL) have
also invested in equity assets in African countries.
However, the recent sharp
declines in oil and food prices mark the end of what has been the most historic
commodity price boom of the past five years. Following a historic five-year
boom during which energy prices, metals and minerals prices, and food prices
soared, the prices of those commodities plunged in late 2008. However, when
compared to other regions, the African growth rates were lower than those
recorded by economies in transition and the developing economies of Asia during
the same period (Table 1).
146
Table 1: Annual Average Growth Rates of Total and per Capita Real
GDP of
Regions
Region Total Real Gross Domestic Product
(Percentage)
|
|
|
||||||
|
1970-
|
1980-
|
1990-
|
2000-
|
2005
|
2006
|
2007
|
2008
|
|
1980
|
1990
|
2000
|
2005
|
|
|
|
|
World
|
3.8
|
3.2
|
2.8
|
2.8
|
3.4
|
4.0
|
3.8
|
2.1
|
Developing
Economies
|
5.8
|
3.9
|
5.0
|
5.4
|
6.7
|
7.1
|
7.3
|
5.5
|
Economies
in Transition
|
4.9
|
1.2
|
-4.8
|
5.4
|
6.1
|
7.2
|
8.2
|
5.4
|
Developed
Economies
|
3.4
|
3.2
|
2.5
|
1.9
|
2.3
|
2.8
|
2.5
|
0.8
|
Developing Economies:
Africa
|
4.5
|
2.3
|
2.8
|
4.8
|
5.7
|
5.6
|
5.9
|
4.9
|
Developing Economies:
America
|
5.8
|
1.7
|
3.2
|
2.7
|
4.7
|
5.4
|
5.7
|
4.4
|
Developing Economies:
Asia
|
6.2
|
5.7
|
6.3
|
6.5
|
7.5
|
7.9
|
8.1
|
5.9
|
Source: UNCTAD
Handbook of Statistics, 2008. Table 8.2.1, and updated with statistics obtained
from http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?
ReportId=2069
Trade Structure and Performance
The export share of the African
continent in the world trade has been experiencing a gradual decline since
1960. This may be due to the fact that the vital commodities that Africa
exports have been grossly underpriced over the years. Important export
commodities such as oil, diamonds, gold, copper, bauxite, coltan, uranium,
coffee, cocoa, tea, rubber, etc, all belie the claim that Africa’s share of
world trade is minimal. But the fact remains though that Asian output and share
of world trade is much higher than that of Africa. The African goal in this
regard should be to follow the lead of South Africa and start exporting
value-added items. There is also much scope for intracontinental trade that is
not presently exploited.
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
The average value of the percentage share of the gross fixed
capital formation statistics in Africa has consistently stood below the 25 per
cent mark. A continent that is concerned about achieving rapid economic growth
should
147
strive to record a higher share in its gross fixed
capital formation. Rather, general government final consumption expenditure is
higher in Africa. Salaii-Martin and Subramanian (2003) argue that more public
spending is bad for economic growth. This is true both for public consumption
and public investment, but public consumption turns out to be more robust. This
is hardly surprising because public consumption does not tend to have direct
positive effects on economic growth. It needs to be financed through added
taxes which, according Salai-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) could have a
negative effect on growth (the same argument applies to public investment if it
is wasteful, as it is in many African countries).
Once again, Africa does not
score well on these grounds: the fraction of GDP devoted to public consumption
spending is 0.16. The corresponding numbers are 0.07 for OECD and 0.06 for East
Asia. It is suggested that if Africa had had a level of public spending similar
to that of the OECD over the last 40 years, its annual growth rate would have
been 0.40 percentage points larger (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 2003).But the
problem is that Africa needs to spend maximally on public goods such as
universal health and education. Perhaps wasteful spending for personal
consumption on the part of politicians should be curtailed as a way of spending
publicly but in the right and efficient direction. The Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian thesis is also problematic in the sense that public spending in
areas such as human development and health do have long and short-term effects
on growth and development in terms of efficiency and productivity. Multiplier
effects should also not be discounted.
Figure 1:
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP)

148
Figure 1 shows that since the 1960s to late 1970s, gross
fixed capital formation (as a percentage of GDP) rose from about 15 per cent to
about 23 per cent, before declining throughout the 1980s up to the late 1990s.
This trend has been reversed somewhat since the mid-2000s. Figure 2 indicates
that similar behavior can be established for general government final
consumption.
Primary commodities dominate African
exports unlike the Asian countries that have manufactured exports as the bulk
of their export. Except for Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Mauritius that
had a significant part (over 50 per cent) of their exports being dominated by
manufactured goods, virtually all the other African countries have their
exports being dominated by basic agricultural produce (Table 2). Nigeria,
Cameroon, Gabon, and Angola had a significant part of their exports in
petroleum with a low percentage share in the manufactured exports category.
Currently, the structure reported in Table 2 has not changed significantly for
any of the countries.
Table 2:
Export share in World Trade
Region
|
Percentage of Export Share in World Trade
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
|
2006
|
2007
|
2008
|
|||||
World
|
100.0
|
100.0
|
100.0
|
100.0
|
100.0
|
100.0
|
100.0
|
100.0
|
100.0
|
Developing
Economies
|
24.49
|
19.09
|
29.40
|
24.25
|
31.85
|
36.04
|
37.27
|
37.51
|
38.67
|
Economies
in Transition
|
4.75
|
4.56
|
4.20
|
3.41
|
2.39
|
3.42
|
3.71
|
3.85
|
3.06
|
Developed
Economies
|
70.75
|
76.34
|
66.39
|
72.33
|
65.75
|
60.52
|
59.00
|
58.62
|
56.57
|
Developing Economies:
Africa
|
5.52
|
4.98
|
5.85
|
3.07
|
2.37
|
2.89
|
2.97
|
2.87
|
3.45
|
Developing Economies:
America
|
7.48
|
5.46
|
5.47
|
4.13
|
5.64
|
5.44
|
5.65
|
5.53
|
5.52
|
Developing Economies:
Asia
|
11.34
|
8.46
|
17.96
|
16.96
|
23.77
|
27.64
|
28.59
|
29.05
|
29.64
|
Source:
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2008 and updated with statistics
obtained from
http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=2069

Figure 2: General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (%
of GDP)

Human Development
Human development indicators of
different regions are presented in Table 3. Although life expectancy has been
on the increase in Africa since 1960, the figure is the lowest across other
regions. While the 2005 -2010 value in Africa stood at 54.1, the figure is 68.3
for Asia and 73.4 for the developing economies of America. In addition, infant
mortality is higher in Africa than any other region of the world. While the figure
is 82.3 in Africa, it is 24.15 for transition economies and 42.74 for the Asian
region. The population growth rate is also the highest in Africa when compared
with other regions of the world. In addition, the enrolment rate in Africa is
concentrated on primary schooling while tertiary school enrolment which is
expected to spur economic growth is less than 10 per cent on the average. Table
3 suggests that economic growth in Africa has not translated into any
significant and meaningful improvement in the wellbeing of the people. Various
human development indicators have either deteriorated over time or are worse
than what obtain in other parts of the world.
150
Table 3: Human Development Indicator
across Regions
Region
|
Human Development
Indicator
|
1960-
1970
|
1970-
1980
|
1980-
1990
|
1990-
2000
|
2000-
2005
|
2005–
2010
|
Transition economies
|
Crude birth rate
|
20.79
|
18.41
|
19.05
|
21.19
|
12.17
|
13.57
|
|
Crude death rate
|
8.82
|
9.50
|
10.48
|
18.35
|
13.44
|
13.53
|
|
Infant mortality rate
|
56.06
|
44.54
|
38.75
|
37.14
|
28.56
|
24.15
|
|
Life expectancy at birth
|
67.45
|
67.70
|
67.95
|
66.05
|
65.90
|
67.20
|
|
Population growth rate
|
1.22
|
0.90
|
0.84
|
-0.318
|
-0.22
|
-0.08
|
Developed economies
|
Crude birth rate
|
18.64
|
15.53
|
13.78
|
12.46
|
11.51
|
11.46
|
|
Crude death rate
|
9.65
|
9.44
|
9.29
|
9.318628
|
8.94
|
8.99
|
|
Infant mortality rate
|
28.08
|
17.95
|
10.71
|
7.31
|
5.57
|
5.15
|
|
Life expectancy at birth
|
70.40
|
72.50
|
74.75
|
76.75
|
78.60
|
79.60
|
|
Population growth rate
|
0.98
|
0.73
|
0.59
|
0.68
|
0.58
|
0.51
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Developing economies: Africa
|
Crude birth rate
|
47.84
|
46.75
|
44.64
|
40.17
|
37.69
|
36.41
|
|
Crude death rate
|
21.54
|
18.26
|
15.65
|
14.33
|
13.44
|
12.64
|
|
Infant mortality rate
|
148.05
|
125.73
|
108.24
|
99.40
|
89.16
|
82.31
|
|
Life expectancy at birth
|
43.60
|
47.55
|
50.80
|
51.75
|
52.70
|
54.10
|
|
Population growth rate
|
2.52
|
2.73
|
2.811
|
2.49
|
2.33
|
2.29
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Developing economies: America
|
Crude birth rate
|
40.04
|
34.64
|
29.63
|
24.52
|
21.40
|
19.15
|
|
Crudedeath rate
|
11.84
|
9.39
|
7.53
|
6.39
|
6.01
|
5.96
|
|
Infant mortality rate
|
96.66
|
75.90
|
53.20
|
35.93
|
26.55
|
22.42
|
|
Life expectancy at birth
|
57.7
|
61.90
|
66.05
|
69.70
|
72.10
|
73.40
|
|
Population growth rate
|
2.67
|
2.36
|
1.99
|
1.64
|
1.31
|
1.12
|
Developing economies: Asia
|
Crudebirth rate
|
40.34
|
32.89808
|
29.68551
|
24.38494
|
22.17234
|
19.56946
|
|
Crude death rate
|
16.64
|
10.96466
|
9.542109
|
8.196803
|
7.943284
|
7.411155
|
|
Infant mortality rate
|
123.01
|
94.56328
|
![]() |
57.42999
|
48.42752
|
42.74166
|
|
Life expectancy at birth
|
49.95
|
56.95
|
64.35
|
66.9
|
68.3
|
|
|
Population growth rate
|
2.318
|
2.153646
|
1.988363
|
1.576736
|
1.296888
|
1.179861
|
Source:
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/TableViewer/ tableView.aspx?ReportId=2064
(accessed 31 May 2010).
151
Figure 3:
School Enrolment Rate in Africa

Source: World Development Indicator (2008)8
Africa’s Growth Strategy: 1960-2009
Africa has adopted a wide range of
strategies in order to achieve sustainable and sustained economic growth and
development. In most cases, these strategies were usually handed down to the
African countries by the advanced capitalist economies through the Bretton
Woods Institutions as a way of ‘enhancing economic performance’ of the
continent with little or no input by
African countries. Nevertheless, the economic performance of
the region in relation to other regions that adopt similar strategies has shown
that there is a need for reconsideration of these approaches to achieve
economic growth and development. Various phases can be identified in Africa’s
growth profile since the late 1950s. In this section, we review the various
phases that are identified.
Immediate Post-Independence era
Import Substitution
Industrialisation (ISI) strategies were at the heart of Africa’s growth and
development strategies during the immediate postindependence era starting in
the late 1950s to the 1970s. The importsubstitution strategies adopted were
meant to produce consumer goods locally, which had previously been imported
from developed countries, so as to promote the diversification of their
economies. This strategy was aimed at beginning with the local sale of final
goods, and moving gradually towards the production of intermediate goods, then
capital goods. The strategy also involved the introduction of restrictive
external trade policies and considerable
152
protection for emerging infant
industries. Complex systems of tariffs and non-tariff protection, exchange
control and import licensing were set up to defend local production. Protection
was designed to assist emerging industrialists to move up the learning curve
during a transitional period when the domestic price of production exceeded
international prices.
For example,
industries producing final goods, mostly intended for the new urban middle
classes developed. The industries included flour milling, industrial bakery,
and breweries, as well as raw-material processing enterprises such as
oil-mills, sugar refineries, fruit and vegetable canning factories and coffee
processing plants. The textile industry also developed rapidly in most African
countries. A few iron and steel-making factories opened in some countries, due
to the development of small-scale electrical steelworks. Other industries that
developed include the manufacture of small agricultural equipment and hardware
articles, paint and varnish industries, and mechanical and assembly workshops
(Hammouda 2004).
The
justification for the ISI strategy was based on the historical development of
countries such as France, Germany, United States of America, China and USSR
that took advantage of high levels of protectionism to develop manufacturing
and technology. Many countries in Africa ventured in this direction to produce
consumer goods, mostly intended for the new urban middle classes. The ISI
strategy ostensibly was geared to enable African countries begin the
modernisation of production structures inherited from the colonial period.
It should be
observed that African countries inherited viable agricultural sectors from the
colonial period. Though countries produce and export agricultural raw materials
mainly to the former colonial powers, favourable terms of trade made the
agricultural sector contribute significantly to growth. In many countries, it
is the largest employer of labour and main source of foreign exchange. Thus, in
the initial period of this growth phase, African countries witnessed positive
and relatively stable growth in real per capita income. However, by the early
1970s, socio-economic indicators were already showing signs of poor economic
management. Growth had become volatile, positive but declining (Figure 4).
However,
after almost two decades of experimenting with ISI strategy, available
statistics suggest that the strategy did not produce the desired results in
Africa. The results of the ISI model were initially seen in an average annual
industrial growth rate of 5.5 per cent during the 1970s but which fell to 2.5
per cent between 1980 and 1984, and 0.4 per cent between 1984 and 1987
respectively. Manufacturing as a proportion of GDP increased rapidly and there
was a rise in industrial employment in its share of overall employment
(Hammouda 2004).
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Figure 4:
Growth of Per Capita Real GDP

![]() ![]() |
SSA (Excluding Nigeria & South Africa)
|
Source: World Bank (2010) World Development Indicators (online)
Nevertheless, this strategy soon
ran into problems (Bruton 1998). The development of final goods production led
to rapid increase in imports of intermediate and capital goods, leading to
worsening trade imbalances and balance-of-payments deficits. Small domestic
markets did not generate sufficient demand for the products of emerging
industries, industries were prevented from reaping the advantage of economies
of scale, and import substitution was biased towards elite urban consumers to
maintain political support while focusing on consumer goods for the middle
class. It therefore generated rentseeking behaviour by firms, as they took
advantage of insulation from international competition to remain inefficient
and non-innovative. The disappointing outcome of the import substitution
strategy in Africa was seen most starkly in the poor productivity performance
of the new enterprises.9 Import substitution delivered very poor
results in terms of productivity improvement, innovation, structural
transformation of the economy and export diversification. The set of countries
that adopted ISI include Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, Botswana,
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Algeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Guinea, and
Benin Republic, among others.
Thus, by the
late 1970s, socio-economic conditions in most African countries were very much
below par. Many countries were experiencing successive trade deficits,
worsening term-of-trade, rising level of international indebtedness, huge
fiscal deficits, rising subventions to inefficient and unproductive public
enterprises, and substantial loss in foreign reserves. Coupled with these were
some natural calamities such as drought and famine that made agricultural
production almost grind to a halt, thus worsening the international current
account position of many countries. One thing that was
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clear here was the fact that
African governments had failed woefully in economic management and there was
the need to re-examine the role of the state in economic management. The
pervasive presence of the state in economic management became challenged and a
new growth agenda was about to be set.
Since 1973,
the management of macroeconomic policy has been altered due to the high and
rising oil prices. By way of illustration, the price of crude oil rose
considerably from US$3.89 per barrel in 1973 to US$6.87 in 1974 and US$12.64 in
1979 because of the Iranian revolution and the start of the Iraq-Iran war in
1979. The annual average price of crude oil peaked at US$31.77 in 1981, before
declining to US$28.52 in 1982 and then to US$24.09 in 1984 (CBN 2008). The
upward movement in prices led to an increase in crude oil exploration and
production outside of OPEC. From 1980 to 1986 non-OPEC production increased 10
million barrels per day. OPEC was faced with lower demand and higher supply
from outside the organization. Thus, prices continued to decline reaching a low
of US$12.51 in 1986 and US$15.86 in 1989 (British Petroleum 2007). The Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to a spike in oil prices as a result of the Gulf
War that emerged thereafter. They remained steady again at US$16.54 in 1991 and
US$15.56 in 1999, after a major low of US$10.87 in 1998. Price recovery began
in early 1999 as OPEC reduced production. Nevertheless, by the middle of 1999,
OPEC’s output dropped by about 3 million barrels per day, which was sufficient
to move prices to an average of US$26.72 per barrel in 2000. However, the 11
September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States caused the price of crude
oil to plummet, but production cuts by OPEC and non-OPEC members, particularly
Russia, had the effect of pushing the price up again so that by 2002, the
average price of crude oil was US$22.51. It therefore continued to rise
thereafter. For the major oil exporting countries in Africa such as Nigeria,
Gabon, Egypt and Algeria crude oil became a major player in these economies
during the 1970s.
For example,
oil was discovered in Gabon in the 1970s and has contributed significantly to
the determination of income in the country, and accounted for about 50 per cent
of GDP and 80 per cent of exports. The same pattern exists for Nigeria and
Algeria. Oil exports account for 90 per cent of total exports in Nigeria and
contribute to about 70 per cent of GDP. Although these countries experienced
significant inflow of revenues as oil prices increased, as argued by the
resource curse literature, there is no evidence of significant growth and
development in their economies. In Algeria, the growth rate of output declined
from 17.99 percent in 1979 to -2.82 percent in 1981, -0.04 percent in 1985 and
-0.22 percent in 1990, before rising marginally through 1.84 percent in 1995 to
2.54 percent in 2002 and 4.71 percent in 2004. During notable
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booms, Nigeria and Egypt recorded
different patterns of economic growth. For example, in 1980, GDP growth rate in
Nigeria was -7.2 percent, whereas in Egypt it was 9.79 percent. However, by
1981, output growth in Nigeria stood at 5.27 percent while that of Egypt
declined to - 0.71 percent. But by the end of the boom period in 1990,
Nigeria’s economy grew by 4.8 percent while
Egypt grew by 3.65 percent due to
earnings from oil exports. In 2001, when there was a slight increase in the
price of oil, Nigeria’s economic growth declined to -0.27 percent while Egypt
grew by 1.62 percent (Olomola 2007).
Table 4
highlights some economic and political indicators of economic growth and
development in Africa and selected oil exporting developing countries, for
comparative analysis. Despite the enormous oil rents to be generated given high
daily production and increasing prices of crude oil, available evidence shows
that the benefits failed to diffuse to the key sectors of the economy to
generate economic growth and development. For example, there is a high
incidence of corruption in Nigeria, Algeria and Libya (OPEC members). With the
exception of Algeria, these African
countries rank lowest on the development scale, with very low per capita
income. Nevertheless, Angola andEquatorial Guinea, which belong to non-OPEC oil
exporting African countries, recorded per capita income greater than that of
Nigeria. Nigeria has the smallest annual per capita health expenditures at
about US$15, while Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea have the highest
infant mortality rate (infant deaths per thousand live births). With the
exception of Nigeria that moved back to democracy in 1999, all other oil
producing African countries cannot boast of a reasonable experience of civil
liberties.
A dilemma
faced by most governments was lack of clarity as to whether the oil boom would
be permanent or transitory. However, the major challenge facing these African
countries has been whether to accumulate more foreign reserves, or expend the
windfall. If the decision is to spend, then is it for consumption or
investment? Driven byinfluences of rising powerful political groups, the oil
money has always been dissipated, as governments have to adjust their
expenditures to higher levels. For example, theshare of investment to GDP rose
in all the countries between 1973 and 1979, while consumption expenditures
fell, except in Nigeria. In Algeria, private consumption as a ratio of GDP
declined from 46 percent to 33 percent, while imports fell from 58 percent to
36 percent. Similar development was noted in Tunisia, where the investment
ratio rose to 22 percent from 18 percent in 1973, and private consumption fell
from 73 percent in 1973 to 71 percent in 1979. In Nigeria, however, private
investment fell from 27 percent in 1973 to 22 percent in 1979, while public
investment rose to 60 percent from 56 percent in 1973. Public consumption rose
from 8 percent to 11 percent in1979.
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157
The positive growth recorded during
this period could be due to the considerable increase in exports, from 20
percent of GDP to about 25 percent, more than the growth in imports.
Developments within these economies changed thereafter. In the 1980s only Algeria
experienced a marginal fall in private consumption from 66 percent in 1983 to
63 percent in 1986, while the investment rate was constant at 25 percent. By
the 1990s, however, private investment in Algeria had risen to 67 percent,
while capital formation declined to about 16 percent by 1997 (Olomola 2007). A
noticeable trend in these developments was that the oil windfalls that should
have ushered in sustained economic growth have exacerbated slow growth and
engendered poverty. This is what tends to echo the development in resource
curse literature, whereby a negative correlation exists between natural
resource abundance and economic growth.
The Era of Structural Adjustment
The failure of the ISI to launch
Africa into industrialization, the success of the ‘export-led’ South- and
East-Asian growth strategy, and the debt crisis of the early 1980s led to a new
consensus on the importance of trade policy reform and exports in growth
strategies. This new consensus was the main focus of the reforms recommended to
African countries and the developing world in general from the early 1980s,
within the framework of IMFengendered Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).10
As a result, the mid-1980s witnessed the formulation and implementation of
wide-ranging trade policy-related economic reforms by most African countries as
urged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.1111
According to Oyejide (2004) trade liberalisation implies the transformation of
the trade regime from an inward–oriented stance that discriminates in favour of
(and thus protects) import-competing activities into a neutral regime whose
incentive structure does not distinguish between exportables and importables or
into an outward-oriented trade policy regime that discriminates in favour of
and thus actively promotes exports. The adoption of trade liberalisation
measures should therefore produce either a neutral or an outward oriented trade
regime and allows certain productivity enhancing and growth promoting features
on the liberalised economy.
The end
result was that starting from the mid-1980s, and especially in the 1990s, most
African countries were required to liberalize their trade regimes, with many
countries reducing trade barriers significantly more than others (especially restrictions
on imports). These reforms were aimed at opening up Africa to more imports, by
reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and laying the foundations for cheap
exports, by eliminating export taxes and providing export incentives. In brief,
this was the US-engendered
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‘Washington Consensus’ in
practice. This was meant to open African markets so that the exportation of
Western-manufactured commodities could be facilitated and the reciprocal export
of raw material agricultural and mineral items at cheap prices to the Western
countries. One exception was petroleum which set its own prices according to
the group decisions of the OPEC nations.
For example,
there was a partial or complete conversion of quantitative restrictions to
tariffs (except for moral, health security, and environmental restrictions in
some cases) in most African countries. A study by Oyejide, Ndulu and Gunning
(1999) revealed that in line with this new strategy, Mauritius abolished import
permits in 1991, Ghana in 1989, Tanzania by 1993, Zambia by 1992, Kenya by 1993
and South Africa reduced 85 per cent of restrictions by 1990. Also, Mauritius
compressed its tariff structure from 60 to10 tariff categories, Kenya from 25
to 6, Cote d’Ivoire from 10 to 6, and Zambia and Tanzania compressed their
categories to 3. Mostly, this involves a switch from a positive list of
permitted imports to a small negative list of mostly prohibited items or items
considered to be luxury goods for the country. The sequence was first to levy
import surcharges and then to adjust the minimum and maximum tariff prior to
abolishing restrictions. Import permits were abolished in Mauritius, Ghana,
Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya in the 1990s. In addition, duty rates as part of
tariff liberalisation were also lowered in some African countries. Mauritius
reduced its rates from 250 per cent to 100 per cent; Tanzania from 200 per cent
to 60 per cent; Zambia from 150 per cent to 50 per cent and in Kenya from 170
per cent to 40 per cent. In Zimbabwe and Ghana the rates ranged from 5 per cent
to 30 per cent and 10 per cent to 40 per cent respectively. Tariffs are now the
main trade policy instruments of most African countries. While the overall
variation or spread in tariffs has been reduced, progress varies across
Africa’s regions.
Exchange rate
regimes in most of the African countries were also liberalised. A good number
of African countries stopped fixing exchange rates and overvaluing their
currencies in order to stimulate exports and make the economy more competitive.
Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, and Cote d’Ivoire virtually
eliminated exchange rate premiums, where buying and selling of foreign exchange
is now market-based and abolishing previous restrictions on current
transactions. The system of multiple exchange rates was abolished in Burundi.
From 1996, the Ethiopian currency, the Birr, was allowed to float, thereby
resulting in the convergence of the official,
auction and parallel market
exchange rates. After liberalising its external sector in 1990, Benin
Republic’s currency was devalued and its black market premium averaged only two
per cent between 1990 and 1999.We can therefore conclude that most African
countries witnessed a significant
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relaxation of trade barriers.
Import restrictions are now lower and export barriers have been significantly
reduced.
For most of
the years during this phase, growth in per capital real GDP was negative and
highly variable (see Figure 4). However, growth recovered in the mid-1990s
after about a decade of adjusting, with average annual rates of 4 per cent in
1996, 2.9 per cent in 1997 and 3.3 per cent in 1998 (Hammouda 2004). The
outcome of these reforms fell below expectations if we examine the continent’s
sectoral performances. The agricultural sector, which employs nearly half of
the African population, dropped from 22.3 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 19.4 per
cent in 1997. The performance of the industrial sector was no better, with a
decline in its contribution to GDP from 39 per cent to 32 per cent during the
same period. The sector’s productivity also decreased from
3.8 per cent in 1997 to 3.2 per
cent in 1998. The proportion of manufactured products in total exports
increased from 6.4 per cent to 22 per cent between 1980 and 1995, but the
increase was due to the fact that a few countries such as Tunisia, Mauritius, Egypt
and Morocco had succeeded in diversifying their industrial structures and
negotiating for international integration based on the export of manufactured
products (Hammouda 2004). For most other African countries, no significant
diversification occurred. Thus, the dismal economic performance of the African
continent after the adoption of SAP led to serious questions about the
viability of the SAP initiative. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, due to the high
socio-political cost of SAP, a new growth agenda was beginning to emerge.
It should be borne in mind in all of
this that the SAP conditionalities imposed on debt-ridden African countries
incurred great human costs on the populations of the countries in question. The
menu was always selling of as many public assets as possible and the severe
conditions being placed on public welfare assets such as health services,
education at all levels, and retrenchment of government-employed personnel. The
publicity given to the public reaction to IMF conditionalities imposed on
European Union countries like Greece proves the point.
Post-Adjustment Era: Neo-liberalism, IMF and the
World Bank
At the end of the last decade,
three main factors forced the World Bank and the IMF to change their attitude
and to seek a renewal of their approaches and practices in the developing
countries. The first reason was the acute awareness of the increase of the
poverty incidence in many parts of the world, particularly Africa. The second
one was related to the failure in most countries of structural adjustment
policies and the questioning of the Washington Consensus on which they are
based. The third factor was the crisis in legitimacy of the Bretton Woods
Institutions (BWIs) which had to
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answer the rising criticisms from
civil society and various protest movements. As a result, a joint initiative
launched by the BWIs at the end of 1999 set the fight against poverty at the
heart of growth and development policies. Under this initiative, low-income
countries wishing to apply for financial aid from either of the organizations,
or for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative,
were required to draw up poverty reduction programmes known as Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Since then, the BWIs have mobilized human
and financial resources to implement this initiative (Cling et al 2002). It
should be understood, above all, that these initiatives have been undertaken
according to the paradigm of neoliberal economics which has affected Africa’s
economies much more negatively
than otherwise. But some details
are in order.
The PRSP outlines a national programme
for poverty reduction which is the foundation for lending programmes with the
IMF and the World Bank, and for debt relief for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPCs). The Bank and Fund developed the PRSP approach as a way to ensure that
debt relief money would go to poverty reduction, and to respond to evident
weaknesses in relations between poor countries and the Bretton Woods
Institutions – in particular, lack of poverty focus, and no country ownership
of reforms. There are five core principles underlying the development of
poverty reduction strategies, namely:
• Country-driven
– involving broad-based participation by civil society and the private sector
in all operational steps;
• Results-oriented
– focusing on outcomes that would benefit the poor;
• Comprehensive
– in recognising the multidimensional nature of poverty; • Partnership-oriented
– involving coordinated participation of
development
partners (bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental);
•
Based on a long-term perspective for poverty
reduction.
The PRSP preparation involved a
two-stage process. Countries must first prepare an interim PRSP (I-PRSP), which
is intended as a roadmap for preparation of the full PRSP. The I-PRSP paves the
way for the country to qualify for its decision point and interim support (or a
loan) from the IMF’s
Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (formerly the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility). Upon
submitting the full PRSP, countries are allowed to jump through the completion
point, which qualifies them for full debt stock reduction, but only after one
additional year of satisfactory macroeconomic performance.
The Bank’s
Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC), a lending instrument designed to
support implementation of PRSPs, was created to complement traditional
adjustment loans. In addition to the PRSP, countries still need a
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Letter of Intent (LOI) and a
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) spelling out their targets and actions to
request IMF and World Bank loans.
The
government is responsible for writing the PRSP and for commissioning and
organizing technical and donor input into it. While there have been examples of
innovation in some areas, the macroeconomic framework has remained largely
unchanged. There is a contradiction between the rhetoric on ownership and the
request for WB/IMF Boards to endorse the PRSP. Many NGOs are concerned that
this contradiction means that governments opt for programmes that they know
will be accepted even if they conflict with priorities identified through
consultative processes.
While the
World Bank leads in support for the PRSP process, the United Nations (UN)
system is, with the agreement of national governments, actively participating
in the millennium development goals (MDG). Targets are set at levels that
balance ambition with feasibility. Since the Millennium Declaration in 2000,
the MDGs have been touted as adequate tools of monitoring human progress across
nations.
Evidently,
growth performance has improved in Africa since the early 2000s and was only
recently slowed down by the global financial/economic crisis. To suggest that
the performance was due to the adoption of PRSP/ MDGs will definitely be an
overstatement. The observed growth was largely due to favourable external
conditions – rising prices and demand for primary commodities – and
entrenchment of more business-friendly domestic policies which have attracted
foreign investment to Africa. However, despite resumption of growth, human
development indicators have not shown signs of improving significantly. In fact
Africa is said to be behind in achieving all the MDGs (AfDB 2002). Again, the
disproportionate effect of the recent global financial/economic crisis on
African countries has called into question the sustainability and reliability
of the export-led growth strategy that is embedded in SAPs.
The above has merely outlined Africa’s
subjection to IMF’s conditionalities and its serious impact on the welfare and
growth of Africa’s economies. I
have also highlighted the response
of the BWIs to the failure of their initiatives on the African continent. But
such solutions being from the top downwards cannot really help in resolving
Africa’s economic problematic. There needs
to be a set of economic
reconfigurations that would set the necessary conditions for not only balanced
growth but also development. Economic growth is ultimately without significance
unless it is eventually transformed into technological development. The economic
reconfigurations that must be broached include regional integration at all
levels to create larger internal markets, greater economies of scale, greater
employment opportunities, increased efficiencies all under the rubric of single
regional integrated currencies.
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In sum, based on the trend in human
development indicators on the African continent, the unchanging structure of
African economies, the increased dependence and vulnerability of various
economies on the continent and the level of opposition to it worldwide, one can
only come to the conclusion that, despite modest successes, SAPs cannot be
described as viable and sustainable growth models. In general, SAPs have come
to be regarded as growth models without a ‘human face’.
Setting a New Agenda for Africa’s Growth and Development
Africa’s experience at implementing various prescribed growth
models now
calls for a rethinking of its growth strategies and charting
a new course. Also, recent events such as the global financial/economic crisis
suggest that overreliance on markets in the advanced economies can expose the
world to all kinds of international price and demand shocks. Thus, given past
and current experiences, certain proposals for sustainable growth and
development can be made.
Enhancing and Deepening Regional Integration
For African countries, the issue
is not whether to integrate or not. African countries need to and must
integrate their economies. More than ever before, African countries need to pay
more attention to their regional integration agenda. Regional integration
efforts should now move beyond rhetoric into concrete plans and action for
effective integration of markets. Africa is the most fragmented continent with
about 165 national borders demarcating the region into some 53 countries – 22
of which have a population of 5 million or less, and 11 of which have a
population fewer than 1 million. This does not augur well for industrialisation
as the national markets are small and fragmented. African governments would
need to explore the advantages embedded in sectoral cooperation such as
banking, telecommunications, transportation, etc. These have the advantage of
speeding up the 'one Africa' agenda. For example, one would wish that calls
made from any part of Africa to another should be regarded as a local call.
Though there are few African-owned telecom service providers in the
telecommunications sector, they should be given license priorities across the
continent, and also nonAfrican telecom service providers must be licensed based
on agreed terms and conditions that promote regional integration in Africa;
Africa should not just be seen as another promising market. Also, one would
wish that African entrepreneurs access their bank accounts from any part of the
continent. This implies that African countries must take full advantage of all
the opportunities and benefits provided by recent advances in information and
communications technologies to integrate key sectors such as the financial and
telecommunications.
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Furthermore,
African political parties (and even civil societies and media) need to bring
the issue of regional integration to the fore of their programmes, manifestoes,
rallies, and campaigns. In most countries, the issue of regional integration
does not feature at all in the development agenda of political parties. The
politicians and even the electorates are generally not aware of the issue of
regional integration as it is largely driven by the different governments who
have different political and selfish agendas for supporting integration. It is
by creating this awareness at the party levels that the much needed 'political
will' would be generated and sustained. Also, since market integration remains
a permanent and abiding component of regional integration in Africa, the
private sector must be made the driver of regional integration in Africa. They
are the main producers and marketers of goods and services; as such, they must
be actively involved in the integration process. An enlarged and integrated
market has the advantage of spurring productive investment (local and foreign).
Increased intra-African trade would reduce Africa's vulnerability to
international price and demand shocks originating outside the continent.
Pan-African
development institutions like the African Development Bank (AfDB) should be
encouraged and even mandated to commit a sizable proportion of their
development financing to trans-national projects. Funding country-specific
projects would not hasten the regional integration agenda of the continent. Thus,
projects like intra-national roads, rail lines, power plants, and so on should
be the new financing focus of such institutions.
Also, African
countries need to speed up the issue of monetary union. Having several
currencies all around the continent definitely increases the cost of
international transactions. Again, as many countries do not have the
appropriate capacity to manage exchange rate volatility, monetary cooperation
would reduce the risks posed by currency instability. It is worth noting that,
as at the beginning of the global financial/economic crisis in late 2008,
African countries had combined foreign reserves in excess of US$340 billion.
But unfortunately, this is divided among several national apex banks, making it
inaccessible to African countries as there is no standing monetary cooperation
amongst most of the central banks. Thus, many African countries have been
forced to seek short-term stabilization funds from the usual discredited
sources. With a common monetary framework, the reserves would have been
available for the use of African countries at more favourable conditions.
It is also
important that African countries invest in infrastructure and trade
facilitation as a means of enhancing intra-African trade, regional cooperation,
and competitiveness. Investment in functional and efficient infrastructure such
as transportation, electricity, and ICT have the ability to reduce
significantly cost of operations by enterprises which translate to lower
164
cost of goods and services. This
would enhance the ability of African firms to compete globally. Productive
infrastructure is necessary for global competition and market access. Trade
facilitation, in terms of improved government services, access to finance and
good private solutions for transport and logistics should complement the
provision of productive infrastructure. Thus, the trade regulatory environment,
trade and customs documentation, procedure and enforcement, and trade finance
framework must be business and trade-friendly. African countries have taken
some steps in this direction, however much still needs to be done. Custom
checks and procedures along most international routes are notoriously
inefficient. The Common Market of the East African Community which was
implemented in July 2010 is a welcome development. It is hoped that other
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) would earnestly tow this line. It is well
known that cross-border informal trade is huge in Africa. Thus reducing
bottlenecks to intra-African movement of goods would certainly reduce
transaction costs and also increase the flow of goods and services.
Thus, it is in this light that the ongoing tripartite
discussions between the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the
East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) be encouraged and pursued to a logical conclusion. If this pulls through
successfully, then the much talked about Cape-to-Cairo free trade arrangement
would be speedily realised. RECs should be encouraged to take concrete actions
that will ensure that all types of overlap, confusion, duplication, and so on
are urgently corrected. Further mergers should also be encouraged. The various
national markets need to be consolidated into one huge internal market - the
African market. It is based on this internal market that Africa will anchor its
growth, not on some unpredictable and volatile global markets. In the short-term,
exportation to earn foreign exchange to finance growth and development and
repay foreign loans is still important, but sustained and sustainable growth
and development would have to be internally designed, motivated, financed,
managed and sustained – this, essentially, is the justification for market
integration in Africa.
Enhancing Productivity and Competitiveness
Productivity measures indicate the
capacity of a country to harness its human and physical resources to generate
economic growth. They are key indicators of economic performance. It should be
observed that, among several factors, the inefficiency of public enterprises is
one of the key ones that led to the dismal African growth profile of the 1970s
and 1980s. These enterprises enjoyed monopoly power and were also being
subsidised by the public budget.
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Thus, sheer incompetence and lack
of innovation were the order of the day, leading to gross failure of these
enterprises. Also, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a boom in public investment
expenditure with little or no return. Most of the public expenditures were made
on ill-conceived projects, while a lot of the projects were also not completed.
Thus they served no meaningful purpose.
Given the
above narration, it is important that African countries start to learn the art
of prioritising public investment based on productivity. Rigorous methods of
public investment analysis must be applied so that so-called ‘whiteelephant’
projects are not given priority. Rather, investment expenditures should be channelled
to projects that enhance productivities of the public service and private
sectors. A major challenge to industrialisation in Africa is energy and
transportation. Poor provision of these services reduces productivity and also
raises the cost of operation and service delivery. Thus, it is important that
African governments concentrate on providing uninterrupted energy and efficient
transport systems. In most African countries, the rail systems are obsolete,
inefficient and unreliable, thus leading to increased degradation of the
already unviable road network system. The result of poor transport systems is
that the costs of delivering goods to many land-locked countries have increased
significantly in recent times.
It is also
important that African countries invest significantly in human capacity
development through investment in technology and education. If we understand
that productivity is determined by the available technology or know-how for
converting resources into outputs desired in an economy, then it is important
that African countries put in place efficient and effective methods for
continually developing and improving their educational systems for productivity
enhancement. The world is currently driven by knowledge and African countries
cannot afford to be left behind in this regard. Emphasis must shift to the
important role of tertiary education in the quest for human capacity
development. Technological advancement, research and development, and
innovations do not significantly come from primary or secondary education, but
from a well-functioning tertiary education system which would have a good
interface with other sectors of the economy. Furthermore, since there is a
large pool of African professionals outside the continent, African countries
should have in place means of using the services of these professionals for the
development of the continent. Professional services can be provided without the
professionals having to leave their places of work. This suggests the
importance of investing significantly in information and communications
technology so as to reap the enormous productivity benefits it offers.
166
African
countries can also identify key sectors of the economy and target them for
productivity increases. First, identify sectors that employ significant
proportions of the labour force; second, identify sectors that have potential
for rapid and significant growth and linkages with the other sectors of the
economy. These sectors can be deliberately targeted for productivity increases.
It is important to note that when sectors that employ a large percentage of the
labour force are productive and growing significantly, poverty and income
inequalities tend to reduce significantly. In this connection, the goal would
be to encourage the growth of small and medium-sized businesses. The
development of the financial system would significantly boost productivity as
it eases the constraints involved in effecting transactions. A well-developed
and competitive financial system would ensure that business information be
accessible and widely distributed. There should also be in place efficient
legal systems that would guarantee redress on the enforcement of business and
property contracts, etc. All this would translate to higher productivity in the
private sector.
Another way
the government could intervene to improve productivity is to establish a
productivity enhancement fund for the benefit and use of organizations in such
areas as training, skill upgrade, consultancy, and so on. Thus, if firms contribute
to the fund, they can be given access to such funds in form of grants or
subsidies for the purpose of training and upgrading their workforce.
Enterprises should also be mandated to have and regularly implement a workforce
development programme. This and other related productivity issues can be
managed and overseen by a national productivity enhancement authority.
Incentive rewards for innovative and productivity enhancement enterprises can
be put in place to ensure that enterprises conduct businesses based on best
practices. The role of research universities and research centres is crucial
here. In the industrialised nations technological research of all kinds is
usually carried out by universities and research institutes, both of which are
often jointly supported by government and business. In this regard, the
maintaining of research centres and research universities of high and reputable
quality is crucial here. Proof of Africa’s lag here is that its output of
research papers in the natural and social sciences plus patents is less than
two percent worldwide. The problem is that given the fragmented state of the
African continent in terms of scientific and technological research
infrastructure, not much can be done in the way of competing with areas such as
the West and Asia. This is another reason for initiatives such as regional
integration in all dimensions.
Thus, if
regional integration is deepened, and there is adequate investment in
infrastructure and trade facilitation as earlier discussed, then what African
167
countries need to do to enhance
(international) competitiveness is to enhance value-addition in export by not
only diversifying the range of goods and services available for export, but
putting more value and quality into goods and services before they are
exported. The recent global financial/economic crisis has made this more
imperative than ever. It should be realized that, among other things,
value-addition requires innovations, which implies that African government
cannot afford to underplay the importance of research and development in
expanding value-addition. Again, incentive structures such as ‘value-addition’
funds, tax rebates, easy credit access, grants, and so on, can be provided by
the government to encourage firms to increase value-addition in exports. An
important advantage of expanding value-addition in production and export is
that, given the presence of flexible and efficient counter-cyclical measures,
it would aid in mitigating shocks during export demand or international price
contractions.12 Thus, expanding value-addition in exports not
only boosts growth but can also act as a stabilization instrument. Reinventing Africa’s Labour Markets
and Institutions
There is no doubt that when one is
looking for the connection between growth, employment, poverty and inequality,
the labour market is the place to look. Africa’s labour markets, standards and
institutions are some of the most rigid, weak and underdeveloped in the world,
despite the ratification of several core international labor conventions. A
major reason for this is that there are wide gaps between these various
commitments and national labour laws on the one hand and between national
labour laws and the enforcement of these laws on the other hand. In most
countries, labour organizations form unions for the purposes of ensuring that
workers’ welfare and rights are respected and upheld. In the case of Africa
such functioning workers’ unions are limited to workers in the urban areas as
in industrialising nations such as South Africa.13 But with the
norm of large informal sector employment, particularly in agriculture and
retailing, this would mean that a large proportion of the labour force is not
enfranchised for any meaningful bargain or standard. Core neo-liberal economic thinking
sees labour unions as constituting market distortions and that income
distribution does not matter for growth and development.14
It is worth noting that labour standards in the form of employment laws
regulating hiring and firing practices, working hours, and other individual
employment relations can be seen by employers as obstacles that reduce economic
opportunities. Hence, since formal employment laws and standards are not
generally observed in the informal sectors, many enterprises prefer to operate
in the more informal sector due to the flexibility it affords. Thus, due to the
low rate of unionisation, the impact of labour unions on market outcomes is at
best minimal and limited in scope.
168
However,
unions are a private sector solution to market failure concerning the huge
imbalance of power that exists between individual workers and their
enterprises. Economic efficiency requires absence of market power, yet real
world labour markets are characterized by significant imbalances of power that
favour firms over individual workers. This is particularly so in African
countries where workers have few rights and social safety nets are lacking.
Moreover, employers’ power advantage has been increasing owing to technological
and capital markets developments that have increased the mobility of
businesses. Seen in this light, the development of workers’ unions in Africa
will signal another step in the right direction of balanced economic growth and
development.
Labour
standards fit with this new approach. Freedom of association and unions can be
viewed as creating the counter-veiling powers that check such practices. The
mainstream counter is that open markets can compete away the problem of
corruption, yet the reality is that open markets simply get captured by
corruption. The logic of capture is reflected in the problem of bribery.
Despite the wastefulness and inefficiency of bribery as a way of doing
business; left to itself the market will produce a world in which bribery
prevails. This is because every private agent has a private incentive to bribe
to try to win business. However, the socially optimal outcome involves no
bribery, and the only way to achieve this is through legal prohibition of
bribery and enforcement of anti-bribery measures. In effect, political action
is needed to deal with the problem of bribery. Labour standards and the
promotion of the right of freedom of association – which extends beyond just
the right to join trade unions – can be viewed as fostering political
conditions supportive
of such measures.
Another
argument in favour of labour standards is that by promoting good governance,
they draw on all elements of civil society which in turn facilitates economic
crisis management. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence (Palley 2001) that
countries with improved labour standards appear to be less susceptible to
financial crisis. A possible explanation for this finding is that financial
markets recognize the benefits of sound civil society institutions and give
economies with such institutions more financial space.
Through all
of these channels, labour standards can help put in place the income
distribution and political conditions necessary to sustain domestic demand-led
growth. But the benefits of labour standards do not end there. Labour standards
can also benefit the international economy by helping solve the contradictions
of export-led growth. As noted above, trade and exports will remain a vital
necessary ingredient of development, but the challenge is to avoid the pitfalls
of export-led growth. By improving income distribution
169
and increasing the space for
domestic consumption, the growing productive capacity of developing countries
will be subtly tilted away from world markets. This should help mitigate the
problem of declining terms of trade which has so far afflicted African
countries, both in their traditional role as primary commodity producers and in
their newer role as producers of lowerend manufactured goods.
Labour
standards can also help block off the race to the bottom, which has an
incentive structure that parallels that of the problem of bribery – which can
be viewed as a race to the bottom in corporate business practice. In an
export-led growth world every country tries to gain international competitive
advantage by exploiting every possible margin. Good competition focuses on
productivity and quality; bad competition eats away at workplace safety, the
environment, and income distribution. Labour standards can contribute to ruling
out the bad competition outcome by blocking countries from gaining competitive
advantage by eroding standards.
Thus, Africa
governments must, as a matter of urgency, redesign and reorganize labour
institutions to eliminate all forms of discrimination in the labour markets,
and also to reduce child labour and other forms of abuses. A way of doing this
is to follow in the steps of Mauritius, a country that has made quality
education free and compulsory, at least at the primary school level. In an
attempt to use the labour market and its institutions to reduce poverty,
African countries must implement and enforce minimum wage rules across all
economic sectors.
At the same time, national labour
market institutions like labour advisory councils, labour productivity boards,
and so on, should be empowered to effectively enlist the support and
cooperation of employers and union members in addressing all issues relating to
labour-management relations and productivity in a tripartite manner. Such a
tripartite framework would provide the mechanism for reaching good labour
relations, increasing productivity, and building consensus on socioeconomic
issues. However, there is the tendency in many countries to turn it into a
state-controlled mechanism. This would only result in friction and dissent. In
sum, while it is necessary to get the microeconomic structure of labour markets
right, domestic demand-led growth also requires that countries get the
macroeconomic environment right.
Paradigms of Growth and Development
In the above discussion we have
looked at the actual empirical state of Africa’s post-colonial economies and
have seen them wanting in dimensions. But given the enormous influence that
Western-generated economic theories have had on the economic life of the
continent, it would be useful now to examine
170
such theories critically to determine
whether or not the African problematic springs from theories that have not been
adequate for the task at hand.
There was a
time when it was argued that economic socialism or communism was the way to
develop non-Western economies. The Soviet Union and China were the models to be
followed. But both the Soviet Union and China abandoned the strict socialist
model – state control of the means of production – in the 1990s to adopt both
market and statist economic initiatives. Well, how have they fared? The Soviet
Union that became Russia has not produced the free market paradise as the
neoliberal mantra argued for. There is much poverty due to the fact that state
welfare institutions have been dismantled. There is much crime and corruption.
China experienced much economic growth ever since market structures were
adopted. But such growth has been unbalanced growth and the poverty index has
been rising. So which model should African nations adopt once regional
integration and other restructurings will have been adopted? In practice there
have been the experiments of Ghana and Tanzania introduced by Nkrumah and
Nyerere respectively. And there have been the writings of Samir Amin, Claude
Ake and Bade Onimode. But it has been the neoliberal theories emanating from
the West that Africa has been made to comply with.
Perhaps the
path of least resistance is to seek to establish welfare-type economic systems
that prevail in the Scandinavian countries, countries that always top the
annual UN ‘quality of life’ list in terms of metrics such as general welfare,
GINI coefficient, life expectancy, education, health, etc. What stands out
above all in these countries is the spirit of communitarianism that is woefully
lacking in most African nations. And what characterizes such countries’
economic systems is a judicious mix of market economics and welfare economics.
But we should pay attention the caveat that welfare economics systems can work
only when there is a spirit of social communitarianism. Perhaps one reason for
the lack of communitarianism in most African nations is that the level of Civil
Society development is quite low. This lack would clearly encourage corruption
and influence-peddling all designed to distort efficient economic
decision-making and encourage unscrupulous rent-seeking.
I turn my
attention now to the economic theories that have determined Africa’s growth
patterns over the years. In terms of theory, there has been vast theoretical
literature on the issue of economic growth as it applies to all economies worldwide.
The point is that for an economy not to fall into recession it must continue to
grow. In this regard, there has been much research done on what ought to be the
necessary and sufficient conditions for growth. The British classical
economists (Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus)
171
all wrote on the growth trajectory
of the modernizing economy. While Smith was optimistic about growth, Ricardo
and Malthus were more pessimistic on grounds of the limits to land, increasing
wages and population growth. Later came the theories of growth expounded by
Keynes (1936), Harrod (1936), Domar (1949), and Lewis (1955), all of which were
concerned about establishing the conditions of growth when all savings were
invested and full employment guaranteed. The works of Harrod and Domar were combined
to form the Harrod-Domar model which stated that an economy’s growth rate was
determined by its marginal propensity to save (dS/dY) and its marginal productivity of capital.
In the case
of Africa and other areas, models such as the Harrod-Domar model and the Lewis
model were seen as the way forward. Since there was little savings in
post-independence Africa the solution was to borrow from Western institutions
such as the IMF and the World Bank to help develop capital infrastructure. This
venture invariably led to greater indebtedness which in turn opened up the way
for IMF-engendered SAP conditionalities.
With the
growing recognition of the importance of technology in productivity and growth,
the new theory to be touted was the neoclassical growth theory developed by
Robert Solow (1956). Solow’s model improved on the Harrod-Domar model by
questioning the assumption of fixed capitallabour ratios and positing that over
time there should be flexibility in production function in that all factors of
production could be subjected to varying degrees of substitution. With the
assumption of an added role for technology, the transition from growth to
development was established. Today, of course, the mantra is ‘sustainable
development’. All of this is good in theory, but as we have seen above, the
real world is a world of politics, economics, and sociology. The fact is that
the touted growth and development theories formulated by Western economists
will continue to fail Africa unless there is serious restructuring such as
regional integration, stronger and more viable currencies, workers’ right, less
individual rent-seeking, etc., as was
recommended above. Once this has
been achieved, then African governments would need to invest greatly in human capital,
fund technological research collectively and establish efficient banking
systems.
The present
state of the economies of Africa is indeed puzzling when one considers the fact
that there has been much growth and outside the Western orbit in the last forty
years especially in East Asia. Countries like South Korea and Taiwan, following
on the heels of Japan, have now effectively attained the status of
technologically advanced nations. And China, of course, is now the world’s
second largest economy. Some authors such as Samir Amin (1976, 1979) invoke the
centre-periphery thesis and argue that Africa’s
172
problems of growth and development stem from the fact that
Africa’s economies are too firmly embedded in the world’s capitalist system for
genuine development to take place. As was discussed above, one of the main
reasons for the African problematic is the fact of the peculiar configuration
of the collective African nation states. There are now 54 nations on the
African continent with relatively few of them viable in any conceivable way. It
thus becomes absolutely necessarythat there be regional integration at all
economic levels. This integration must be a complete one, and not in the
half-measured way of the European Union, if success is to be expected.
Conclusion
After five decades since the first set of African countries
started achieving political independence, the growth profiles of these and
others that followed have not been impressive. Growth has continued to be
highly variable and volatile. This article observed that the structure of these
economies at independence was not designed to ensure sustainable domestic
growth, but to service the economies of former colonial powers. However,
attempts to re-structure these economies have failed woefully to stimulate
growth and, in some cases, have generated growth-dampening conflicts. This
article has reviewed the growth profile of African countries and further
interrogated the various growth strategies adopted over time. Given the
pervasive tendency of African political elites to act in economically and
politically irrational ways, the article has pointed out grave faults in
relation to the various growth strategies African countries have adopted over
time. The article has alluded to the fact that there are hardly any of these
growth strategies that are motivated and designed internally. Most are borrowed
or imposed models that lead to disastrous economic growth and human development
consequences. The recent global economic\financial crisis has further demonstrated
how fragile and vulnerable Africa’s economies are. The article has suggested
that Africa’s growth strategy should be based on internal marketled growth
through the proper integration of the various narrow national markets.
Furthermore, enhancing productivity and competitiveness through investment in
technology and education; broadening the range and enhancing value-addition in
exports; and, making the necessary investments in production and trade
facilitation, are crucial to the resumption and sustainability of growth. The
article has canvassed for the reinventing of Africa’s labour markets so as to
ensure that they are growth-inducing and poverty-reducing. The importance of
exports in generating foreign exchange for development financing and debt repayment
is acknowledged, but sustained and sustainable long-term growth of African
countries would depend on building the ‘one 173 African’ market, as
envisaged in the Lagos Plan of Action. In the process of growing the African
market, the issues of pervasive and widespread gainful employment, social
welfare, and reduced poverty and inequality also need to be taken into
consideration. The ultimate goal, of course, is economic development.
Notes
1. Dedicated
to the memory of the late Dr. Tajudeen Oladipo Busari of UNIDEP, Dakar,
Senegal.
2. Except
otherwise stated, data used in this and subsequent sections are from
World Bank’s World Development Indicators & Global
Development Finance
(Online) and Africa Development Indicators (ADI) 2010
(Online).
3. In the
1960s, a leading development textbook ranked Africa’s growth potential ahead of
East Asia’s, and the World Bank’s chief economist listed seven African
countries that ‘clearly have the potential to reach or surpass’ a 7 per cent
growth rate. The seven promising countries identified by the World Bank’s chief
economist were among those African countries that have suffered negative growth
(Easterly and Levine 1997).
4 . The African
Economic Outlook (2009) report specifically mentions that Africa’s trade with
China has multiplied by 10 since 2001, reaching over USD 100 billion in 2008.
The economies of China and India have grown rapidly, while Latin America has
also experienced moderate growth, lifting millions above subsistence living.
5. Hammouda
(2004).
6. Bannock et
al. (1984) defined national development as the process of growth in total and
per-capita income in a country, over time, accompanied by fundamental changes
in the structure of the economy of the country. Associated with this economic
process are important social and political reforms, such as revision in the
system of land tenure, and a greater democratization of the political system.
The main objective of national development is to raise the living standard and
general well-being of the people in the economy.
8. The
statistics reported are African averages.
9. Mayer
(1996) shows that in general, import substitution will lead to a shift of the
workforce to formerly imported goods and rapid learning effects will occur.
However, this shift represents a one-time stimulus to learning, while
thereafter the production mix of the closed economy will change only slowly,
i.e., at the pace of the economy’s shift in consumption pattern. This means
that import substitution may stimulate growth in the short run but will be
detrimental to long-term growth. Entering into competition with foreign firms
is likely to generate more learning effects than living in autarky, and being
active in the world, rather than only in the domestic market, is likely to give
rise to more 174
spillover effects. The assumption here is that the
foreign firms are not capitaldeep multinational corporations.
10. Other
reasons identified by Oyejide, Ndulu and Gunning (1999) as stimuli for the
liberalisation of trade regimes include the conditions imposed for gaining
access to external finance, positive external shock, specific country own
initiative, and membership in a sub-regional economic integration scheme.
12. An example
of a flexible counter-cyclical instrument is the current account of the public
budget, as it does not require lengthy legislative process and consultations to
adjust. It becomes efficient if it minimizes leakages and is well-targeted
during recessions.
13. Again, much
of these formal-urban enterprises have disappeared (closed shop or became
informal) due to the impact of liberalization process that started in the
1980s.
14. The
argument of the neo-liberal economic thinkers is that incessant agitations and
strikes of organized labour groups have negative implication for economic
growth and development. However, this has been proved otherwise. For example,
Irrmen and Wigger (2000) argued that a labour union whose purpose is to raise
wages above the competitive level may foster economic growth if it succeeds in
shifting income away from the owners of capital to the workers and if the
workers’ marginal propensity to save exceeds the one of capitalists.
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