
© Council for the Development of Social
Science Research in Africa, 2015
(ISSN
0850-3907)
Emerging Questions on the Shifting Sino-
Africa
Relations: ‘Win-Win’ or ‘Win-Lose’?
Phineas Bbaala*
Abstract
Orthodox
scholarly discourse on the theme of Sino-Africa relations has tended to
accentuate the efficacy of the South-South alternative to development, chiefly
as the vehicle for mitigating the developing countries’ peripheral status in
the global order. Literature has accused the North-South economic relations of
favouring the former. In search of justice and fair play in international
political and economic relations, most African countries started ‘looking
east’, mainly towards China. Notwithstanding China’s long solidarity with
Africa throughout the liberation struggle, and its contribution to the
continent through foreign direct investment, infrastructure development, trade
and bilateral aid, some of its recent engagements with the continent have
raised questions of neo-colonialism tantamount to those in the North-South
relations. The new Sino-Africa relations are being viewed by many as mainly
driven by China’s hunger for Africa’s natural resources and the search for
international markets for its manufactures, and business opportunities for its
multinational corporations. The article argues that the new Sino-Africa
economic relations, although still largely ‘win-win’, could soon plunge into
‘win-lose’ relations in favour of China.
Key Words: Global justice; China; Africa;
resources; market; neo-colonialism
Résumé
Le discours
savant orthodoxe sur le thème des relations sino-africaines avait tendance à
accentuer l’efficacité de l’alternative Sud-Sud pour le développement,
principalement en tant que véhicule permettant d’atténuer le statut
périphérique des pays en développement dans l’ordre mondial. La littérature a
accusé les relations économiques Nord-Sud de favoriser le Nord.
La plupart
des pays africains, en quête de justice et d’équité dans les relations

* Lecturer and researcher, Department of
Political and Administrative Studies, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
University of Zambia, Lusaka. Email:
pbbaala@gmail.com
politiques
et économiques internationales, ont commencé à « regarder à l’est »,
principalement vers la Chine. Nonobstant la solidarité longtemps exprimée par
la Chine à l’égard de l’Afrique à travers les luttes de libération et sa
contribution dans le continent à travers l’investissement étranger direct, le
développement des infrastructures, le commerce et l’aide bilatérale, certains
de ses récents engagements avec le continent ont poussé certains à soulever la
question du néo-colonialisme par comparaison avec les relations Nord-Sud. Les
nouvelles relations sino-africaines sont considérées par beaucoup comme
principalement animées par la soif de la Chine de tirer meilleur parti des
ressources naturelles de l’Afrique et par sa recherche de marchés
internationaux pour ses manufactures, ainsi que les opportunités d’affaires
pour ses multinationales. Cet article soutient que les nouvelles relations
économiques sino-africaines, bien que toujours largement « gagnant-gagnant »,
pourraient bientôt devenir des relations « gagnant-perdant » en faveur de la
Chine.
Mots clés : justice mondiale, Chine; Afrique;
ressources; marché; néocolonialisme
Introduction
Sino-Africa relations are a subset of
the much broader South-South relations which have assumed increased prominence
over the last six decades. Following many years of exploitation, economic
injustice and underdevelopment, many African countries started looking east,
particularly towards China, India, the Asian Dragons (also called Asian
Tigers), namely Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, and other
countries such as the Soviet Union with whom they seemed to have common
interests in the global economic relations. Further, the world’s top emerging
economies – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) – have also
moved to strengthen ties among themselves and other developing countries to
present a new bloc capable of challenging injustices within the South-South
relations and in the NorthSouth relations.
In the backdrop of three decades of a robust economy,
China has emerged as the single member of the BRICS with more economic
interaction with Africa. Over this period, China has emerged as one of the most
powerful industrial powers on the surface of the planet. The Chinese economy
has grown relentlessly for more than thirty years with an astonishing 9.3 per
cent gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate between 1989 and 2011, relatively
defying the global recession in the process (Jones 2013:6). Consequently, in
2010, China overtook Japan to become the second biggest economy in the world
after the United States. In order to fuel the robust industrial sector at home
and sustain its growth streak, China has had to abash its inward-looking policy
for a Zouchuqu (Going Out) policy,
primarily designed to gain access to global resources and markets. Africa, a
continent endowed with an array of scarce natural resources, such as oils and
gases, minerals, and virgin forests, was identified by China as particularly
suited for its economic objectives. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) summit held in Beijing from 4 to 5 November 2006, which attracted 48
African countries and 42 African heads of state (Chun 2009) demonstrated the
popularity of China’s foreign policy, at least among the elites, in Africa.
Today, China boasts of several trade-related deals with most African
governments that have culminated in Chinese multinational corporations’
involvement in the extractive industry, construction, agriculture,
manufacturing and commerce on the continent. Through these and other economic
activities, China has been feeding its resource-hungry industries with raw
materials, while accessing African markets for its goods and services.
However, although Sino-Africa contact spaces such as
the FOCAC, the Strategic Partnership and others are said to emphasise ‘win-win’
diplomatic relations, they could subtly serve as Trojan horses of China’s
resource and marketing interests in Africa, thereby raising the question of
neo-colonialism in the relations. In any case, economic relations can have
different possible results on partners. For instance, they can be ‘win-win’,
‘win-lose’, ‘lose-win’, or even ‘lose-lose’. A ‘lose-lose’ economic
relationship cannot be entered into knowingly or consensually because it is
against principle of profit maximisation. Rational economic partners seek to
maximise their share of benefits from their relationships. However, this is
only possible where there is equality and absence of the exploitation or
dominance motive. The object is a ‘win-win’ relationship. In its absence,
either the first or the second party gains or loses more than the other. This
creates either a ‘win-lose’ or ‘lose-win’ situation. With respect to
international economic relations, the North-South relations were deemed
‘win-lose’, hence the fostering of ‘winwin’ relations through South-South
cooperation of which the Sino-Africa relations are a part.
This article attempts to assess whether Africa’s
economic relations with China are truly ‘win-win’ or ‘win-lose’ instead. In
this case, the author commences by ruling out the ‘lose-win’ possibility on the
grounds of the hare-tortoise growth comparison between China and Africa over
the last couple of decades. The article attempts to evoke further debate on the
questions of equality and justice in global economic relations. It deliberately
exposes some of the emerging challenges to the enhancement of equal economic relations
in Sino-Africa relations in the wake of the changing global dynamics. In the
final analysis, the objective is, therefore, to arouse a broader and deeper
discourse on South-South relations in general.
Theoretical Perspectives
In order to competently deal with the
questions emerging in the relations between China and Africa, one needs the
guidance of theory. Historically, academic platforms in Africa have theorised
on how economic relations between developed and developing countries have
tended to tilt in favour of the former. Some of the most serious arguments on
the subject have taken the twist of the neo-Marxist dependency theories
popularised by the United Nations think-tank, the Economic Commission for Latin
American Countries (ECLAC) and some individual scholars in the late 1950s.
Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Walter Rodney and
Kwame Nkrumah are among those who took a frontline position on the subject. The
theory which was initially introduced as an explanation and remedy for the
chronic underdevelopment and backwardness of Latin American countries due to
their unequal relations with the United States, later dominated international
academic platforms.
For more than five decades, the African, Asian and
Latin American scholarship has investigated and written on how Europe had
undermined development on their continents through slave trade, colonialism and
later on, neo-colonialism. As Walter Rodney put it:
Western
Europe and Africa had a relationship which ensured the transfer of wealth from
Africa to Europe. The transfer was possible only after trade became truly
international; and that takes one back to the fifteenth century when Africa and
Europe were drawn into common relations for the first time – along with Asia
and the Americas. The developed and underdeveloped parts of the present
capitalist section of the world have been in continuous contact for four and a
half centuries. The contention here is that over that period Africa helped to
develop Western Europe in the same proportion as Western Europe helped to under
develop Africa (Rodney 1972:84-85).
The starting point was that global
inequalities were caused by an unfair economic system arising from resource
extractive colonialism and imperialism that the Northern colonial powers had
imposed upon the developing regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America. They
argue that much of the economic underdevelopment found in developing countries
was a direct result of these countries’ connection to the economic systems of
the industrialised countries of the North. They contend further that the
economic resources of the developing countries were being drained northwards to
the metropolises of the capitalist world, thereby making the African, Asian and
Latin American countries dependent states.
Kwame Nkrumah’s version of ‘Neo-colonialism’ and
Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘Metropolis-Satellite’ thesis of North-South associations
form the appropriate theoretical perspective for analysing the Sino-Africa
relations. Nkrumah identifies the larger part of the developing world as
historically entrenched in an exploitative association with the North. In his
view, a state can be said to be a neo-colonialist or client state if it is independent
de jure and dependent de facto (Nkrumah 1968: 1-7). By this,
he contends that even after independence, former colonies in Africa, Asia and
Latin America, remain under the control of the capitalist-imperialist forces
composed of the developed countries in the North. He argues that these capitalist forces, in
search of international capital, continue to exert control over their former
territories through international trade, aid and investment policies tailored
to sustain the movement of resources from the developing counties. As sources
of raw materials, and markets for the developed countries, the developing
countries had thus become client states.
After World War II, countries in
the North reformed the capitalistimperialist system culminating, firstly, in
the elimination of the ‘old-fashioned’ system of operating colonies exclusively
answerable to one capitalistimperialist state and, secondly, in the replacement
of ‘national’ imperialism by ‘collective’ imperialism (Nkrumah 1968:2). By
national imperialism, Nkrumah refers to the form of imperialism in which one
country exerts its control over its colonies. However, imperialism becomes
collective when one former colony is at the mercy of the many countries
controlling the capitalistimperialist system. Although, China played a key role
in the independence of African states by challenging the global capitalist
system, questions have now emerged as to whether its current scramble, with the
North, for Africa’s resources does not add to the continent’s ‘collective
imperialism’.
Since collective imperialism also
creates a conducive environment for what Nkrumah considers as the ‘Trojan
horses’ of neo-colonialism (Biney 2012), any analysis of Sino-Africa relations
requires one to go beyond tradition and the naked eye. While multinational
corporations (MNCs), bilateral and multilateral aid institutions, and overseas
technical advisors usually play an important developmental role in developing
countries, they can also be used as Trojan horses tasked with the responsibility
of blurring and extending neo-colonial influences across the developing world.
Nkrumah argues that ‘internationalisation’ or ‘syndication’ helped the United
States to fulfil two sin qua non
conditions of expansion into the European market and the developing world
market, and of militarising its economy on the pretext of increased global
threats (Nkrumah 1968: 6). However, as Ali Mazrui suggests, globalisation can
have positive and negative effects. It is negative when it allows itself to be
handmaiden to ruthless capitalism … deepens the divide between the haves and
have-nots (Mazrui 2004 cited in Biney 2012).
Closely related to Kwame Nkrumah’s version of
‘Neo-colonialism’, is Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘Metropolis-Satellite’ thesis.
Concerned with the underdevelopment of Latin American countries in the
aftermath of independence, Frank analyses their association with the developed
economies in the North. He begins with an argument that the underdevelopment of
Latin American countries (at the time) was the result of its centuries-long
participation in the process of world capitalist development (Frank 1966: 7)
which had led to their massive de-capitalisation. He sees the global capitalist
system as a chain of constellations of metropoles
and satellites … [running all the way] from its metropolitan centre in Europe
or the Unites States to the furthest outpost in the Latin countryside (Ibid:
6). In the development of underdevelopment in Chile, Frank noted that Chile had
become increasingly marked by the economic, social, and political structure of
satellite underdevelopment (Ibid: 7). He sees the increased polarisation of
developing countries’ economic, social and political structures as effective
means for continued satellisation. Therefore, one should understand the term,
‘development of underdevelopment’ as a connotation of the progression of
satellisation and its damaging effects on Latin America and the rest of the
developing world. The resource-based relations Africa has had with China over
the last decade, which promotes exportation of raw materials and importation of
finished products with very little, if any, technological transfer, and the
indiscriminate adoption of the Chinese development model, may not only have a de-capitalisation effect, but could
also make the continent Chinadependent over the long-term. Notwithstanding
other schools of thought on the current state of Sino-Africa relations, what is
incontestable is the fact that in the wake of China’s economic revolution,
fostered by the zouchuqu, Chinese
capitalism is in the fast lane.
Although the common understanding has been that the
developing countries would only succeed in overcoming underdevelopment and
poverty by fundamentally restructuring the unequal exchange characterising the
North-South linkages through the promotion of South-South relations, new
evidence is beginning to suggest the emergence of neo-colonialism within the
broad South-South relations and, particularly, in the Sino-Africa relations.
Results of a survey conducted in Zambia in 2009, show that on aggregate, 41.8
per cent of the Zambian respondents ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that China
practices neo-colonialism in African countries (Hess and Aidoo cited in Bello
et al: 2014: 244-273).
Empirical Perspective
Since the end of the civil war, the
Chinese industrial sector has had increased appetite for raw materials.
Consequently, China’s role in international trade has been on the increase.
Notwithstanding the chequered growth experiences of the decades proceeding the
dawn of the new millennium, China’s share of world merchandise imports has
wheeled from a measly 0.6 per cent in 1948 to 10.6 per cent in 2013.
Sino-Africa trade has been rising throughout the last
decade. The period 1999-2009 recorded an average of 28 per cent growth in
Sino-Africa trade, measured by monetary value adjusted for inflation. This
period also saw the Sino-Africa trade value increase twelve-fold (Haugen
2011:157-176). Consequently, in 2009, Africa became China’s number one trade
partner (PRC, 2013:3). The 2010-2013 period has particularly seen an upswing in
Sino-Africa trade volume from US$157 billion in 2010 to US$160 billion in 2011
and US$200 billion in 2013 (Antony 2013:134-149). However, an examination of
what China exports to Africa and what Africa exports to China shows that, on
one hand, manufactured goods, machinery, textiles and clothing and chemicals
dominated China’s exports to Africa. Alden shows that in 2005, machinery and
transport equipment, and manufactures alone accounted for the greatest chunk of
China’s exports to Africa at US$8 billion and more than US$16 billion,
respectively.
In value terms, by 2013, China’s imports/exports
aggregate had swollen to US$4, 159 billion. This represented US$1,950 billion
imports value and US$2,209 billion exports value. In the same year, China
became the world’s biggest merchandise trader followed by the United States
whose imports and exports totalled US$3,909 billion (WTO 2014:15-25). Table 1
shows the world’s leading exporters and importers of merchandise in 2013.
Table
1: Leading Exporters and Importers in World Merchandise Trade in
2013
Exporters
|
Value (In
Billion
US$)
|
Importers
|
Value (In
Billion
US$)
|
China
|
2209
|
United States
|
2329
|
United
States
|
1580
|
China
|
1950
|
Germany
|
1453
|
Germany
|
1189
|
Japan
|
715
|
Japan
|
833
|
Netherlands
|
672
|
France
|
681
|
France
|
580
|
United Kingdom
|
655
|
Republic of Korea
|
560
|
Hong Kong
|
622
|
United
Kingdom
|
542
|
Netherlands
|
590
|
Source:
Based on WTO, International Trade Statistics, 2014
As shown in Table 1, China is not
only the world’s top exporter of merchandise but also the second biggest
importer after the United States. With respect to Africa, Sino-Africa trade
totalled US$222 billion in 2014, an upsurge of 6 per cent from 2013. This
represented US$117 billion and US$105 billion worth of imports and exports,
respectively (Standard Bank 2015). In the same year (2014), China recorded a
US$12.5 billion trade deficit in its trade with Africa.
Although some scholars, such as Ayodele and Sotola
(2014), have correctly argued that China’s trade deficit with Africa is not due
to its oil imports from the continent on account of the fact that only 9 per
cent of China’s oil imports come from the continent, it is important to note
also that China’s resource imports from Africa are not restricted to oil. Trade
data show that although China’s export value to Africa has risen geometrically
from below US$10 billion in 2000 to over US$60 billion in 2010, Africa’s export
volume to China in non-oil and mining products, on the other hand, has only
grown numerically during the same period. This means that although Africa
exports more than it imports from China, its exports are generally raw
materials (Hanusch 2012: 492-516). For instance, in 2010, mineral commodities
accounted for about 64 per cent of Africa’s exports to China (Alves, 2013:
207-226).This means that commodities dominate Africa’s exports to China while
finished goods dominate China’s exports to Africa. Table 2 shows the
distribution of China’s direct investment in Africa, by sector, at the end of
2011.
Table
2: Distribution of China’s Direct Investment in Africa by the End of 2011
Agriculture-related
|
2.5%
|
Wholesale
and Retail
|
2.7%
|
Science,
Technology and Geological Prospecting
|
4.1%
|
Leasing
and Business Services
|
5.0%
|
Manufacturing
|
15.3%
|
Construction
|
16.4%
|
Mining
|
30.6%
|
Finance
|
19.5%
|
Real
Estate
|
1.1%
|
Others
|
2.8%
|
*Source: Based on Figures by PRC, Information Office of the State
Council White Paper, 2013.
When the data in Table 2 is
aggregated, the resource sector dominates China’s direct investment in Africa.
For example, mining (30.6 per cent), construction (16.4 per cent) and science,
technology and geological prospecting (4.1 per cent), which are all resource-related
investments, account for 51.1 per cent of China’s direct investment to the
continent. Even the remaining sectors are in many ways connected to resources.
It is also important to note that resource-rich African countries play a major
role in China’s trade deficit. For instance, although Sub-Saharan Africa has
maintained a trade deficit with China, fewer than a half of the countries
(notably Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Equatorial
Guinea) have a trade surplus with China (IMF 2013: 5). Precisely, 17 out of 53
African countries enjoy mounting surpluses owing to their rich oil and mineral
endowments, while the majority face widening deficits due to their enormous
importation of Chinese goods (Muyakwa 2009: 7).
Although there have been some policy initiatives,
such as China’s preferential tariff scheme, aimed at promoting the export of
finished goods from Africa to China, very little has been achieved owing to a
number of factors. Firstly, although the number of African product lines
granted zero-tariff status had increased from 454 in 2007 to 478 in 2009,
resource products such as copper, cobalt and marble constituted the bulk of the
tariff-free import value (Eisenman 2012: 793-810 and Van Beek 2012: 389-408).
And, secondly, African countries’ non-resource exports to China such as
textiles, cotton, salt and sulphur, raw hides and skins, coffee and tea, and
fish and crustaceans could not compete on the Chinese market (Ibid).Thirdly,
China’s carnivorous appetite for Africa’s commodities has not given the
continent a chance to diversify into manufacturing. Currently, most
resource-rich countries on the continent can easily be diagnosed with ‘Dutch
Disease’, a term coined by The Economist magazine
in the 1970s to describe the appreciation of the Dutch currency and a reduction
in its non-oil exports after it discovered oil and gas deposits in the North
Sea in the 1960s. Therefore, the current Sino-Africa trade pattern is perfectly
orienting the continent towards long-term dependency on China on both sides of
the trade equation.
Another important interesting pattern in Sino-Africa
relations is that whereas China’s exports to Africa are distributed widely, its
imports from the continent are highly concentrated in a few resource-rich countries.
In 2009, data showed that while China obtained $ 100 million from exports of
goods to 38 African countries, it spent the same amount on imports from only 23
African countries (Haugen 2011: 157-176). On the one hand, about 60 per cent of
China’s exports are destined for six African countries and are distributed as
follows: South Africa (21 per cent), Egypt (12 per cent), Nigeria (10 per
cent), Algeria (7 per cent), Morocco (6 per cent) and Benin (5 per cent) (AfDB
2011: 14 and Van de Looy cited in Biggeri and Sanfilippo 2009: 31-54). On the
other hand, an enormous 70 per cent of China’s imports from Africa come from
only four countries, namely: Angola (34 per cent), South Africa (20 per cent),
Sudan (11 per cent) and Republic of Congo (8 per cent). Whereas manufactures
dominate the exports to populous African countries, fuels and mining products,
and agricultural products constituted the lion’s share of China’s imports from
resource-rich African countries. These data indicate that the search for markets
and raw materials are the two foremost factors in China’s relations with
Africa. Therefore, although African countries could benefit from the
intensification of relations with China, their fortunes are restricted by their
low no-commodity exports to China. Meanwhile, since Africa provides the raw
materials and the market for Chinese manufactures, China’s benefits from this
relationship is two-fold (Grauwe et al 2012: 15-45), and, therefore, superior.
A continent struggling with escalating unemployment
rate and abject poverty, Africa’s efforts towards value-addition and
diversification, which have in the past been blamed on the colonial past, may
equally be blamed on this emerging neo-colonialist economic order in
Sino-Africa relations. This argument is echoed by Henning Melber, who contends
that SinoAfrica relations were a reproduction of the classical skewed pattern:
raw materials on the one side (Africa) and (value-added) manufactured goods on
the other (China). From this perspective, it is clear that the coming of new
players, like China, has not brought about any significant transformation to
the traditional global relations (Melber 2013:437-450) anchored on
exploitation, territorial inequality and injustice.
However, the continent’s infrastructural development
has particularly benefited from Chinese aid and the
resources-for-infrastructure (RFI), also called infrastructure-for-resources
(IFR) or the ‘Angola Mode’ agreements. Economic data show that by 2010, about
2,180 Chinese companies had spread their commercial interests across Africa
while nearly 8,000 development projects, financed by China, were underway.
These projects were mainly in areas of investment that have long gestation
periods such as electricity power stations, ports, airports, freeways (Li et al
2012, cited in Melber 2013:437-450), among others. From the year 2000, the RFI
deals, have been on the rise. In this arrangement, resource-rich African
countries need not worry about their lack of creditworthiness as China is
willing to construct the infrastructure in exchange for natural resources.
Using the Export and Import (ExIm) Bank of China, China has applied this mode
to finance infrastructure development in some African countries: US$4.5 billion
to Angola in 2004 in exchange for oil supplies; US$3 billion to Gabon in 2006
in exchange for manganese exploration rights and US$9 billion to the DRC in
2007/08 in exchange for cobalt mining development (Alden and Alves 2009: 9).
Other deals were the US$4 billion oil-drilling license signed between China and
Nigeria in 2006. In return, Beijing was to construct a rail system and some
power stations for Nigeria (BBC 2006 cited in Alden and Alves 2009: 9).
Although some Chinese sources of official trade and investment data, such as
the Information Office of the Sate Council and Xinhua, have tended to show how
much Africa was benefiting from these Chinese infrastructure deals and foreign
direct investment (FDI), they have not adequately presented the other side of
the coin. By the same token, most of the sources in the North have been unable
to adequately appreciate the benefits accruing to African countries from
Chinese investments.
An analysis of China’s resources-based infrastructure
projects in Africa should, as a starting point, acknowledge the fact that the
‘Angola Mode’ provides African countries with a no-traditional method of
infrastructure development financing. Unlike the North’s traditional
development financing mode in which African countries borrow hard cash to be
repaid in monetary form over a period of time, in the ‘Angola Mode’, Chinese
multinationals construct the needed infrastructure using the African country’s
resources as security. Once a deal has been signed, China is allowed to import
particular resources while helping the exporting country to develop its key
infrastructure, usually power plants, transport and telecommunications, which
they would have problems to finance with their own means or the highly tied
traditional multilateral loans. It is also important to recall that China
itself utilised this mode of development financing to acquire industrial
technology after its civil war. For instance, in 1977, China agreed a deal with
Japan in which the latter was to supply high technology to be repaid using coal and oil (Arase cited
in Norfund 2011:5). The following year, China acquired a US$10 billion credit
line from Japan to finance the importation of heavy industrial equipment. China
was to pay by exporting US$10 billion worth of coal and oil to Japan (Takamine
2006:7 cited in Norfund 2011:5). China’s reformist leader, Deng Xiaoping, one
of the protagonists of this mode of financing once remarked:
In order to
hasten the exploration of our coal and petroleum, it is possible that on the
condition of equality and mutual benefit, and in accordance with accepted
practices of international trade such as deferred and instalment payments, we
may sign long-term contracts with foreign countries and fix several production
sites where they will supply complete sets of modern equipment required by us,
and we will pay for them with the coal and oil we produce (Norfund 2011:4-5).
Many African countries, especially
those coming out of decades of internal turmoil such as Angola and Democratic
Republic of Congo have found this mode of financing suited for accelerating
their post-war reconstruction. Table 3 is a summary of some of the African
countries that have benefited from China’s RFI deals in recent years.
Table
3: Some Major Resource-based Infrastructure Projects in Africa Financed by
China, 2001-2007
Country
|
Year of
Commitment
|
Resources
Involved
|
Construction
Project
|
Congo Rep.
|
2001
|
Oil
|
Congo
River Dam
|
Sudan
|
2001
|
Oil
|
El-Gaili
Power Station
|
Angola
|
2004
|
Oil
|
Power,
Transport, ICT and Water Portions
|
Nigeria
|
2005
|
Oil
|
Power
Turbine Plant at Papalanto
|
Guinea
|
2006
|
Bauxite
|
Souapiti
Dam Project
|
Gabon
|
2006
|
Iron
|
Belinga
Oil Reserve
|
Zimbabwe
|
2006
|
Chromium
|
New Coal Mines and Power
Stations
|
Ghana
|
2007
|
Cocoa
|
Bui
Dam Hydro-Power Project
|
Source:
Extract from C. Cassel et al, Building African Infrastructure with Chinese
Money, 2010
However, although Africa has become
China’s second largest overseas construction project contract market and the
fourth largest investment destination (PRC 2013:3), most of these engagements
are seemingly designed in a way that does not yield African countries long-term
economic advantages.
Firstly, the RFI mode that China and African
countries have gone into is not adequately anchored on technological transfer
to the latter. Although China used this mode of financing to transfer
industrial technology from Japan and other countries, most African countries
seem more interested in seeing the erection of the actual physical
infrastructure than in acquiring appropriate Chinese technologies for their own
sustained economic development.
At the same time, there is very little China is doing
to help African countries develop appropriate technology that can be used by
the micro, small and medium enterprises, and by small-scale farmers involved in
productive activities. Despite African governments signing infrastructure and
investment deals with China, most African entrepreneurs still lack basic
financial capacity, and small-scale and intermediate technologies to enable
them participate meaningfully in adding value to their own countries’
resources. Instead, it is the Chinese multinationals that have dominated
infrastructure development and the extractive industry. As Alves (2013:
207-226) puts it, the expansion of the RFI loans to Africa enables Beijing to
promote the expansion of its construction companies abroad while accessing
strategic resources. Although Chinese-financed projects in Africa employ
Chinese machinery, this does not necessarily amount to technological transfer
because no local capacities are being developed to enable Africans acquire
skills and technologies. The peripheral role played by Africans in Chinese
projects adds to the problem. Most of the technical jobs in these projects are
performed by Chinese workers while African workers perform mainly those
functions that do not enable them acquire critical skills such as loading and
offloading, pushing of wheelbarrows and preparation of food at project sites.
Consequently, Africa is bound to remain dependent on China in the long-term.
This scenario suits China in both the short term and the long term as it is
assured of a sustained dominant economic position on the continent.
Secondly, the degree of involvement of Chinese firms
in Africa’s infrastructure projects also signals the revolving nature of the
Chinese project finances. The bidding process for the resource-backed
infrastructure projects is devoid of transparency and competitiveness, with
Chinese firms deliberately favoured. For example, in 2006, when the ExIm Bank
extended a US$4 billion loan to Angola for its post-war reconstruction in
exchange for 10,000 barrels of oil per day, only 30 per cent of Angolan firms
could be allowed to tender for the works because of a condition in the deal
which required that 70 per cent of the works be set aside for Chinese firms
(Naidu et al 2009:87-115). This is not only a technological transfer barrier,
but an effective method of curtailing African enterprises from growing to a
level where they could one day challenge the positions held by the Chinese
multinationals on the continent. This view is shared by the famous
international scholar and author on Sino-Africa relations, Chris Alden, who, inter alia, writes:
As an
‘economic competitor’, China is engaged in a short-term ‘resource grab’ which,
like some Western counterparts, takes little account of local needs and
concerns, whether developmental, environmental or with respect to issues of
human rights. Coupled with Chinese manufacturing and trade wherewithal, this
approach suggests that African development gains are being challenged, if not
undermined by Chinese competitiveness (Alden 2007: 6).
Since most of the development
projects are signed confidentially between the Chinese government officials and
African leaders, Melber (2013: 437450) is correct in suggesting that in most
cases, resource deals between China and African countries tend to benefit China
and its business accomplices at the expense of the ordinary people in the
resource-rich countries, who continue to live under abject poverty and
deprivation despite their proximity to precious resources. In Zambia,
government security wings announced in mid-May 2015 that they were
investigating the leakage of a state security document following a revelation
by the country’s leading independent newspaper, The Post, on 9 May, that the Zambian government had concealed a US$
192 million loan it secretly contracted from China to improve state security (The Post, 2015). Zambia’s President,
Edgar Lungu, reacted by stating that government could not reveal how many guns
it intended to buy. However, while the elite in the country’s power structures
could benefit from such secretive deals, the poor masses are left to endure the
resulting socioeconomic deprivation.
Alden (2007) suggests that China in Africa could also
be categorised as a ‘coloniser’. The interpretation of China as a ‘coloniser’
is based on the view that China’s new engagement with Africa is a part of a
long-term strategy aimed at displacing the traditional northern orientation of
the continent by forging partnerships with African elites under the rubric of
South-South solidarity (Ibid). Alden further argues that once China has
successfully dominated the continent, it could use its position to put African
countries under Chinese control. In its new foreign policy, China has placed
the need for raw materials to feed its buoyant industrial sector while
searching for international markets. This particular set-up, could rightly
qualify some African states as China’s client states, thereby justifying the
neo-colonial howls in the beleaguered current Sino-Africa economic relations.
This is in spite of China not having operated any colony.
Notwithstanding the above descriptions of China,
Alden (2007) argues that, China could also be understood as Africa’s
‘development partner’. Alden explains ‘China as a development partner’ in terms
of the various efforts by China itself, driven by its economic needs, to share
with Africa and other developing countries its development experiences. In this
respect, China has used bilateral aid to support Africa’s social and economic
sectors. A continent whose underdevelopment has been blamed on its century-long
exploitative interaction with Europe, Africa has found solace in Chinese
investments and development aid. As at 2013, over 2,000 Chinese enterprises of
varying sizes and economic persuasions were doing business in 50 African
countries and regions (PRC 2013:5). They are mostly involved in mining, oil and
gas exploration, construction, agriculture, manufacturing, resource processing,
finance, commercial logistics and real estate (Ibid). Recent years have
particularly seen an expansion of Sino-Africa educational and cultural
exchanges, the emergence of new business areas like financial services,
increased investments in agriculture and recalibrated long-term supply
agreements for infrastructure to cover new social offsets not seen in deals
hitherto (Alden and Large 2011: 21-38).
Knotty Questions in Sino-Africa Relations
In a nutshell, the question of
whether the new Sino-Africa relations are ‘win-win’ or ‘win-lose’ can be summed
up by a condensed reflection on the following issues, some of which have
already been introduced in the preceding text.
Twenty-first century Scramble for Africa
Parallel to the eighteenth century
scramble for Africa by Europe, there is a widely-held view that China is
seeking relations with African countries purely to exploit the abundant
resources of the continent and feed its firms back home with the raw materials
they need, with little or no interest in Africa’s development. With this demand
for raw materials in the home industry engaging into overdrive, China needs
swift methods of material acquisition. Consequently, while the North will expect
hard currency from its investments or loans, China is happy to accept
alternative methods of payment (Teunissen 2005, cited in Gasser 2010: 5-6) such
as the Angola Mode. China is extending RFI loans to African countries in order
to expand its overseas construction companies and connect them to key resources
(Alves 2013: 207-226).
A notable difference between the twenty-first century
Scramble for Africa and the earlier version is said to be the former’s adoption
of a ‘soft power’ strategy. The term ‘soft power’ was coined by Joseph Nye in
1990 when explaining the reducing importance of the use of ‘hard (coercive)
power’ in the post-Cold War global order and the rising importance of
nocoercive tools of foreign policy ... to get others to want what you want (Nye
2009: 160, cited in Fijalkowski 2011: 223-232). In Joseph Nye’s view, the
attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies are
important non-coercive (or soft power) instruments that it can use to obtain
what it wants from the new international political and economic order (Zaharna
et al 2014:9). Through the use of ‘soft power’, it is possible for a country to
exploit another through attraction. China has been accused of using this
strategy to sign resource deals with African countries. Its foreign policy
principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual
non-aggression, non-interference in another country’s internal affairs,
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, which appeal to most
African countries may be considered as ‘soft power’ crafts. The rapid
establishment of Confucius institutions across Africa by the Chinese Government
has also been viewed as a ‘soft power’ strategy by some commentators. Zaharna
et al (2014:9) see the rapid spread of the Confucius institutes, whose mission
is the spreading of Chinese language and culture, as parallel to the cultural
diplomacy of the North whose institutions such as the British Council, and the
American Centre have, for decades, been used in promoting their countries’
cultures and languages overseas.At the end of 2013, there were 440 Confucius
institutes in 115 countries and regions in the world (Ibid).
As noted earlier, while the Angola Mode has helped
some African countries in developing their infrastructure and in creating
employment, concern has arisen because not only is the true value of such
resources not well known, but the continent is also losing the opportunity for
value addition. This is making it difficult for the African countries to attain
the far-fetched dream of economic diversification, leaving them as enclaves for
raw materials, facing limited opportunities for sustained development (Kamwanga
and Koyi 2009:7), leading to deindustrialisation, rising unemployment and
poverty while sustaining Africa’s dependency on China. With regard to the new
scramble for Africa, it has been observed that:
Africa is
still paramountly an uncharted continent economically, and the withdrawal of
the colonial rulers from political control is interpreted as a signal for the
descent of the international monopolies upon the continent’s natural resources.
This is the new scramble for Africa, under the guise of aid and with the
consent and even welcome of young, inexperienced States. It can be even more
deadly for Africa than the first carve-up, as it is supported by more
concentrated interests, wielding vastly greater power and influence over
governments and international organisations (Nkrumah 1965:109).
As observed by Geda et al
(2013:118-138), another problem with the boom in Africa’s commodity exports to
China is that of the ‘Dutch Disease’. With the economic rent from commodity
exports, driven by the Chinese demand, the manufacturing sector in Africa faces
stagnation. Ironically, African countries have resorted to importing from
China, what they should be producing locally. The slowdown in China’s growth
rate in the last couple of months, has already began to reduce the export
earnings and causing currency depreciation in many resource-rich African
countries.
Unfair Trade Practices
Some Chinese nationals stand accused
of taking over certain economic lines preserved for the capital-starved and
self-employment seeking locals in market stands. The selling of cheap Chinese
goods has exacerbated the situation, thereby pushing out of business even those
locals who had been allocated stands. Local producers of basic goods such as
handicrafts, fruits and vegetables are facing stiff completion from Chinese
nationals selling low-quality-low-price goods. Zambia’s former Trade, Commerce
and Industry Minister, Dipak Patel once pointed out this dilemma: ‘Does Zambia
need Chinese investors who sell shoes, clothes, food, chickens, eggs in our
markets when the indigenous people can (several, cited in Alden 2009: 49).
However, this problem has not only been reported in Zambia. Elsewhere, it has
been reported that China’s competition on the African market is having some
harmful effects on certain sectors. For example, in countries such as Lesotho,
Madagascar, Kenya and South Africa, sectors like clothing have faced very stiff
competition from cheap Chinese products to the extent that some local firms
have had to scale-down their operations and lay off some workers (Warmerdam and
Van Dijk 2013: 271-295).
Another emerging problem is that of reported dumping
effects by China. Surely, as China continues in its economic top gear, and as
the African countries continue to rely heavily on commodity exports, the new
problem of South-South dumping is likely to take a more serious toll on the continent’s
industrial sector. Already, the cheap Chinese goods could be killing the
nascent industry on the continent. This problem is not limited to consumer
goods alone because Africa has also become an end user of both simple and
sophisticated Chinese technology. Although, one of the most deeply-rooted
attitudes towards technology in industrial countries is the belief that
technologies are value-free and transferable [and that] they are associated
with values only in the ways they are utilised (Turok 1979: 88), one does not
need to sleep over it. Clearly, some of the practices in Sino-Africa relations
expose the weaker African economies to technological dumping effects and the
nurturing of a Sino-dependency syndrome among African countries and peoples.
In countries like Zambia, Chinese investments have
been accused of lacking transparency and fair-play. As an opposition leader at
the time, Zambia’s Michael Sata (now late), accused the Chinese of having used
corruption to acquire the Chambeshi Copper Mine and the Sinazeze Coal Mine. He
also accused the Zambian government of dubiously giving Chinese investors in
the mining sector a generous 15-year tax exemption, and of excusing
Chinese-owned mines from performing any corporate social responsibility activities
(Sata 2007: 6-7) when no similar incentives were extended to local and other
investors.
Labour Exploitation
China’s economic
operations in Africa have come into conflict with the labour movement on the
continent on many frontiers. These range from poor remuneration coupled with
long working hours, to hazardous work environment, and blatant abuse of
workers’ rights. With the increase in construction activities in Africa by
Chinese firms, Alden reports the failure to substitute African workers for
Chinese workers in the recent flurry of Chinese infrastructure projects across
the continent, be they technicians, or un/semi-skilled labourers, is an
important oversight with economic as well as political implications (2009: 45).
The quest for low production costs seems to be the main motivation for this
practice. The Chinese investors have, perhaps discovered that it is cheaper to
pay a Chinese worker in Africa than an African worker. According to one study,
Chinese labourers are paid US$1 a day in Angola (as well as receiving food and
housing) versus the
US$3-4 that non-Chinese companies are
obliged to pay Angolan labourers (cited in Alden 2009:45). China has responded
to this concern by increasing the number of Africans employed by its business
firms and construction projects while complaints about low wages remain largely
unattended to. In some cases, strange episodes of accidents and abuse of
workers have been reported in Chinese-owned firms and projects.
Workers in Chinese-owned firms around Africa have
complained of hazardous work environment and lack of occupational safety. In
the DRC, Chinese mining companies have been found to violate both labour and
environmental standards. In the mining region of Katanga, Chinese mines were
cited for using child labour and for substandard health and safety conditions,
forcing the DRC government to deport 600 Chinese nationals involved in the
mining activities (Alden and Alves 2009: 18). In Zambia, similarly, Chinese-owned
mines have been found culpable of endangering Zambian workers. An explosion at
the munitions factory serving Chambishi (mine) in April 2005, which killed 46
Zambian workers (Alden 2009:74) is just one example.
Non-Interference
Through its non-interference policy
in the affairs of other sovereign nations, China is accused of protecting
totalitarian regimes and hurting human rights in Africa. In fact, some
scholarly commentators hold the view that, due to this policy, China is willing
to establish cordial relations with any African country regardless of its
governance record. For this reason, China’s presence in countries such as
Sudan, Niger Delta, and its support to Zimbabwe seems to give solidarity to bad
governance on the continent. Some human rights activists have cited China’s
relations with Sudan and Zimbabwe as examples of how far Beijing can go in
propping up unpopular leaders (Campbell 2008). Posing questioning on China’s
commitment to the principle of noninterference, in some war-torn resource-rich
parts of Africa such as South Sudan, Chinese multinationals have been accused
of financing the purchase of military weapons, helicopters, vehicles and war
jets for the government forces, which have been used in committing crimes
against humanity (Large 2007 and Taylor 2007 cited in Obi 2013). In 2007, Zhang
Guoha, an executive director at the China Nuclear International Uranium
Corporation (Sino-U), was kidnapped and later released, allegedly, by the armed
group, Niger Movement for Justice (MNS), on suspicion that the multinational
was financing the government’s military weapons used to suppress the Tuareg
uprising (The China Monitor 2007:19
cited in Obi, 2000: 93-109). A car bomb explosion by the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) on 29 April 2006, which coincided with
Chinese President, Hu Jintao’s visit to Nigeria and the granting of four oil
drilling licenses to Chinese oil companies by the Nigerian government valued at
US$4 billion, was followed by a statement to media houses by the rebel group
demanding the immediate departure of the Chinese companies from the Niger Delta
(Obi 2009:93-109). These and other similar events in other parts of Africa have
cemented an opinion among some Africans that China will balk at nothing in trying
to promote and protect its economic
interests in Africa.
On their part, African leaders pledged to uphold
peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights, and sound economic
management as conditions for sustainable development when they adopted the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001 (NEPAD cited in Hodzi et
al 2012:79-103). In view of China’s reported activities on the continent, this
may remain a pipe-dream.
Conclusion
Any fair comparison between
North-South and Sino-Africa relations should show that, in both cases,
resources have played a key role. This article argues that Sino-Africa
relations have faced both good and challenging times. The period from the
mid-1950s to the late 1970s, during which China actively supported the
liberation struggle on the continent, reflects the very best days of ‘win-win’
relations between China and Africa. During this time, Africa got the support it
required in its struggle for independence, while China got the continent’s
support on the frontier of ‘One China’ policy. Africa also elevated China’s
significance on the global stage as a spokesperson for the developing
world.
However, as the article argues, the period from
2000 to date, during which Sino-Africa relations have been re-established with
a refocus on a business-like contact, has endured running commentaries of a
decade of divided opinion. During this period, Africa has derived economic
benefits from the relationship, mostly in the form of export opportunities for
its commodities, infrastructure development and foreign investment. However,
Sino-Africa relations have also seen the emergence of certain neo-colonial
questions requiring answers. These emanate from the unfolding social, economic
and political order that points to a new pattern of exploitation in which
Beijing, as a southern metropolis, is competing with the North for the
resources of the African countries and for the marketing of its manufactures.
On account of the evidence and arguments presented and the theories employed in
this article, a conclusion is reached that the new Sino-Africa economic
relations, although still largely ‘win-win’ at the moment, could soon plunge
into ‘win-lose’ relations in favour of China.
CODE: 66
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