Africa
Development, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos 1&2, 2013, pp. 25–50
© Council for the
Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2013
(ISSN 0850-3907)
Recontextualisation
of the Concept of Godfatherism: Reflections on Nigeria
Ifeanyi Onwuzuruigbo*
Abstract
Social
exchange relations have economic, religious, moral and political implications
for both dyadic and group relations. Consequently, some social scientists
deploy social exchange theory to explain human actions, behaviour and
institutions. The concept of godfatherism,
as a form of exchange and clientelist relation, has characterized social,
political, religious and commercial networks of indigenous Nigerian groups
since pre-colonial times. Recent commentaries and analysis of godfatherism,
however, erroneously portray the phenomenon as a new form of political
interaction, encouraging electoral fraud, promoting intra-party and political
conflicts, and consequently stifling the consolidation of Nigeria’s extant
democracy. This superficial treatment of godfatherism, which presents it in a
negative image, has proceeded without emphasizing the socio-cultural origin of
the concept and its contribution to the political and commercial growth of
precolonial societies. The paper re-contextualizes the concept of godfatherism.
It captures the positive contributions of godfatherism in entrenching
responsive and responsible leadership and promoting development. It also
considers the distortions the concept suffered as it evolved from a form of
social exchange to a form of political relationship, encouraging political
conflicts and corruption in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria.
Résumé
Les
relations d’échange social ont des implications économiques, religieuses,
morales et politiques aussi bien pour les relations dyadiques que pour les
relations de groupe. Par conséquent, certains chercheurs en sciences sociales
déploient la théorie de l’échange social pour expliquer les actions humaines,
les comportements et les institutions. Le concept de parrainage politique, en tant que forme de relation d’échange et de
clientélisme, caractérise les réseaux sociaux, politiques, religieux et
commerciaux de groupes nigérians indigènes depuis l’époque précoloniale.
Cependant, les récentes observations et analyses sur le parrainage politique
décrivent ce phénomène comme une nouvelle forme d’interaction politique, qui
encourage la fraude électorale, favorise les conflits au sein des partis et les
conflits politiques, et par conséquent entrave la consolidation de la
démocratie existante au Nigeria. Ce traitement superficiel du
* Department of Sociology,
Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ibadan,
Nigeria. Email:
maziify2@gmail.com
26
parrainage
politique, qui en fait un portrait négatif, a été entrepris sans mettre
l’accent sur l’origine socioculturelle du concept et sa contribution à la
croissance politique et commerciale des sociétés précoloniales. Cet article
recontextualise le concept de parrainage politique. Il souligne les
contributions positives du parrainage politique dans l’enracinement du
leadership réceptif et responsable et la promotion du développement. Il examine
également les distorsions subies par le concept au cours de son évolution d’une
forme d’échange social à une forme de relation politique, encourageant les
conflits politiques et la corruption au Nigeria à l’époque coloniale et
postcoloniale.
Introduction
Men who are anxious to win
the favour of a Prince nearly always follow the custom of presenting themselves
to him with possessions they value most, or with things they know especially
please him; so we often see princes given horses, weapons, cloths of gold,
precious stones, and similar ornaments worthy of their high position – Niccolo
Machiavelli (2003), The Prince.
Social exchange and clientelism are not
peculiar to Nigeria. The excerpt from Machiavelli’s letter to Lorenzo de Medici
quoted above makes a veiled reference to the existence of clientelistic
relations among social and political actors in Europe (Scott and Marshall,
2005). Elsewhere in Asia and Africa, studies of social and political issues
confirm underlying clientelistic networks among individuals and groups engaged
in social and political interaction. Scott (1972) elaborates on the
patron-client model of association and demonstrates its application to politics
in Southeast Asia. In similar manner, Lemarchand and Legg (1972) point to the
prevalence of clientelistic networks in West and Central Africa and how these
networks relate with ethnic politics in the process of nation-building in
Africa (Lemarchand 1972). More recent studies of Africa probe the intersection
of clientelism and bureaucracy, democracy, civil society (Lemarchand 1998;
Berman 1998 and 2004) and so on.
This paper focuses on a genre of social exchange and
clientelism in Nigeria referred to as godfatherism.
There is a sense in which godfatherism can be said to be the buzzword of
Nigerian politics since the nation returned to democratic governance in 1999
because very few concepts, if any, have gained greater currency and popularity
in contemporary discussions and studies of Nigerian politics and governance
(Nnamani 2006; Albert 2005 and 2006; Onwuzuruigbo 2006; Human Rights Watch
[HRW] 2007). Indeed, the activities of political godfathers and their godsons
have been implicated in several case studies of intra-party crises, fraudulent
electoral results, corruption and political conflicts in many states of the
Nigerian federation (Onwuzuruigbo 2006; HRW 2007). The failure of Nigeria to
conduct credible
27
elections since 1999, for instance, has
been frequently attributed to the menace of godfathers and their godsons while
the politics of godfatherism has remained responsible for the seemingly endemic
corrupt leadership and political tensions in states like Anambra, Oyo, Enugu,
and Rivers, just to mention a few (HRW 2007). These worrisome developments have
stirred up increasing scholarly attempts at defining, conceptualizing and
analyzing the phenomenon. The paper therefore identifies, in specific terms,
the weaknesses inherent in the treatment of the subject matter and seeks to
clarify and shed more light on the concept, its evolution and practice.
The gamut of recent scholarly discourse on godfatherism is
characterized by two major weaknesses. First, the discourse merely explores the
recent political expression of godfatherism; it focuses on the trajectory of
the politics of godfatherism on elections, political corruption and conflicts
in Nigeria – thus erroneously conceiving and implying that the politics of
godfatherism is, after all, a recent development associated with Nigeria’s
nascent democracy (Nnamani 2006; Albert 2006). Second, because of its emphasis
on the perverse manifestation of godfatherism in contemporary Nigerian
politics, the discourse, I submit, presents godfatherism only in negative terms
(Joseph 1991; Albert 2006; HRW 2007). Put differently, the treatment of the
sociocultural basis of godfatherism which would have complemented its political
dimension and provided a holistic and robust explanation capable of revealing
the positive aspects of the phenomenon has received very minimal attention. And
so, the contributions of godfatherism in promoting harmonious social relations,
achieving rapid and sustainable socio-economic development, entrenching good
governance and political tranquillity, especially in precolonial societies,
have been grossly de-emphasised.
These obvious flaws may have occurred because the
godfatherism discourse is to a large extent dominated by political scientists.
It is yet to benefit from the contributions of political sociologists and
anthropologists whose inputs are urgently required to provide the needed
socio-cultural perspective to understanding the concept and its context. If we
are to achieve a rigorous treatment and holistic understanding of the
phenomenon, then the socio-cultural component and historical evolution of the
concept must be interrogated. For it is in doing so that we see in sharp relief
not only the positive contributions of godfatherism in raising responsible
leaders, entrenching responsive leadership and promoting development, but also
the distortions the concept suffered in the process of evolving from a form of
social exchange and political interaction – facilitating development in
precolonial societies and dispensation – to a form of political relationships
that encouraged political conflicts and corruption in colonial and
post-colonial Nigeria.
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Generally, the paper elaborates on the concept of
godfatherism. It explores the different levels and stages of metamorphosis,
appropriation and incorporation of godfatherism into the political culture,
institutions and processes of colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. In addition,
it chronicles the alterations, abuses and distortions godfatherism underwent
and the potential for generating conflict it acquired in the process. To
achieve this task, the paper is divided into three sections. The first section highlights
the shortcomings observed in the extant treatment of the concept and the need
for a re-assessment. The second part provides a conceptual re-examination of
godfatherism. A major concern here is to present an all-encompassing definition
and conceptualization of godfatherism among major ethnic groups of Nigeria. In
doing so, the historical trajectory of the concept of godfatherism in the
social and political relations of individuals and groups in Nigeria is
sketched. The third part highlights the alterations that trailed the
transformation and incorporation of godfatherism in the politics and
administration of colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. Some conclusions are
drawn in the final section.
Conceptualizing Godfatherism
Godfatherism has been conceived and defined
in different ways. I shall start by considering the following excerpts from
previous and recent definitions and conceptions of godfather or godfatherism:
... in common parlance
‘godfatherism’ is the process by which an individual establishes links with a
given institutional hierarchy in the expectation of favoured treatment ... An
individual seeks the support and protection of an oga or a godfather while trying to acquire the basic social and
material goods – loans, scholarships, licenses, plots of urban land,
employment, promotion – and the main resource of the patron in meeting these
requests is quite literally a piece of the state (Joseph 1991: 207).
... an impervious guardian
figure who provided the lifeline and direction to the godson, perceived to live
a life of total submission, subservience and protection of the oracular
personality located in the large, material frame of opulence, affluence and
decisiveness, that is, if not ruthless ... strictly, the godfather is simply a
self seeking individual out there to use the government for his own purposes
(Nnamani 2006: 57, 61).
The ‘political godfathers’ in
Nigeria build an array of loyalists around them and use their influence, which
is often tied to monetary considerations, to manipulate the rest of the
society. Political godfathers use their influence to block the participation of
others in Nigerian politics. They are political gatekeepers: they dictate who
participates in politics and under what conditions ... Simply defined the word
‘godfather’ refers to a person who tries to play God (Albert 2005: 82).
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... godfathers are not mere
financiers of political campaigns. Rather they are individuals whose powers
stems not just from wealth but their ability to deploy violence and corruption
to manipulate national, state or local political systems in support of the
politicians they sponsor (HRW 2007: 33).
‘Godfathers’ are those who
have the security connections, extended local links, enormous financial weight,
and so on, to plot and determine the success or otherwise of a power seeker at
any level of a supposedly competitive politics. The complex process of doing
this ... is famously known as ‘godfatherism’ (Omotola 2007: 135).
As noted earlier, one common denominator in
each of these definitions is the emphasis on political expressions of
godfatherism.1 Regardless of the emphasis on the political
aspect of godfatherism, the fact that the concept has socio-cultural
foundations and relevance cannot be denied. Yet the sociocultural dimensions of
the concept have been often marginalized and trivialized in the various
attempts to define and conceptualise it. To this extent the definitions are, in
my opinion, superficial and incomplete. In order not to belabour the point, it
is my view that godfatherism should be situated in its proper perspective as
first and foremost an instrument of social exchange or relation rather than a
form of political interaction. Perceiving the concept as an instrument of
political interaction is not only reductionist but diminishes our knowledge of
the context in which it is situated and practised ab initio. Omotola (2007:
138) drew attention to this very important point when he stated that
godfatherism
... is a longstanding and
deeply rooted feature of the cultural values of Nigerian society, where it is
purely socio-economic in nature and mutually productive for both parties; its
politicization would appear to have contributed to the criminalisation of
politics.
This summarizes the arguments advanced in
this paper: to wit, unless we situate the concept in its socio-cultural and
historical context which makes the concept and problem clearer, the etymology
of the concept will remain elusive, the genesis of its perverse manifestations
in Nigeria’s political culture will remain vague, and its positive
contributions to the growth and development of pre-colonial communities will
not be fully appreciated. This is the contention and the perspective I adopt in
this paper.
How then do we redefine, re-conceptualise and reconstruct
the concept of godfatherism? Generally speaking, the godfather is one who
commands respect among his people either through his privileged position, knowledge,
skill, wisdom and wealth or on account of his popularity and public acceptance.
The godfather, in practical terms, is a father-figure, benefactor
30
and mentor who trains the godson, guides
the godson on the path of achieving success, skill and excellence in the
aspirations or professional calling of the godson. The godfather supports his
godson, not only with his skills, wealth, might and experience, but also his
network of connections. Be it in the realm of politics, business or any other
sphere of endeavour, the godfather is always committed to the success and
progress of his godson. He shields his godson from policies, plans and
emergencies likely to hurt or halt the career goals and life ambitions of the
godson. In fact, the greater desire of the godfather is that the godson
achieves much more than the godfather has been able to do.
Apart from benefiting from the benevolence, kind gestures
and good will of the godfather, the godson, on the other hand, reciprocates by
remaining loyal and offering general support and assistance to the godfather.
The godfather expects unalloyed loyalty from the godson which could be
symbolically expressed through gifts. The godson remains loyal to the godfather
by paying regular visits to the godfather, intimating the godfather his future
plans and course of action with the intention of benefiting from the
godfather’s wise counsel, relying on his often wide network of relationships
and practical help in achieving them. The godson makes himself and his services
available for use – though not abuse – by the godfather and gives gifts, which
may not necessarily be monetary in nature, to the godfather, particularly on
festive and memorable occasions. Exchange of gifts is fundamental in greasing
the relationship between godfathers and godsons. According to Komter (2007: 94)
‘mutual loyalty, often supported by gifts, connects those involved in
collective hostilities towards third parties as well as those who maintain
collective friendships’ – reciprocity in other words.
The godfather and godson relationships are both unequal and
reciprocal because the status of the godfather is higher than that of the
godson and the services or objects exchanged are not of the same order.
Similarly, they are not jural but personal and informal. Being personal, the
relationships usually evoke strong feelings of closeness between the partners
culminating in a wide variety of multiple exchanges between the two individuals
over time. All of these heighten the capacity of the ties to increase over long
periods with increasing levels of indebtedness and obligation (Barnes 1986)
that ultimately benefit the parties and their community.
Although the relationship between the godfather and his
godson may be strained when either of the parties falls short of fulfilling his
obligations, such situations hardly degenerate to recurring large-scale,
violent conflicts that threaten the peace and tranquility of the entire
society, or incapacitate the instruments and institutions of governance, or
impose the whims and
31
caprices of the godfather on the entire
society as is presently the case. More often than not, the godfather and his
godson operate a symbiotic relationship which advances the interests of both
parties. By raising knowledgeable and skilled individuals in commerce, religion
and politics, the godfather and his godson(s) become critical factors in the
development agenda and process of the society. Godfatherism can then be seen as
a social relationship involving reciprocal exchange between individuals of
unequal social status intended to promote their spiritual, political and
socio-economic wellbeing for the overall development initiatives of the society
as a whole. What this means is that in its original and unadulterated form,
godfatherism transcended the realm of politics to include other vital aspects
of societal life – commerce, religion, child rearing and training – and
consequently contributed positively to the growth and advancement of the
society.
Conceived this way, we are able to establish two important
facts vital to our understanding and analysis of the concept. One, godfatherism
can be located in a socio-cultural and historical context and cannot therefore
be seen as an entirely new phenomenon in Nigeria. Situating the phenomenon of
godfatherism in a historical perspective, as will be seen later, brings out
clearly not only its origin but also the contradictions, perversions and abuses
it suffered as it was transformed, appropriated and incorporated into the
colonial and subsequently post-colonial political institutions and culture. Two
and more importantly, godfatherism cannot also be seen primarily and only as an
instrument of political interaction fostered by the logic and dynamics of
politics in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria. It is possible to conceive of
godfatherism as a phenomenon practised in the realm of commerce, religion,
politics and other fields of endeavour among various ethnic groups in Nigeria
since pre-colonial times.
Godfatherism in Igbo apprenticeship, trade and
commerce
Godfatherism was, and has remained, central
in driving Igbo commerce and merchant apprenticeship. Quoting Eme Awa, Nnamani
(2006: 58) argues that ‘the normal Igbo family seeks out a guardian, a sort of
godfather for the sons who are expected to be inspired and motivated by the
streak of perfections, deftness, contact, courage, experiences and
accomplishments associated with the ... master’. Exploring the roles of Nnam ukwu or Ogaranya
(godfather) and Odibo (godson)2
in Igbo merchant apprenticeship, Nnamani further states:
To leave the child to fend
for himself or to let him live and grow with the dangers of his father’s
light-handed upbringing is akin to undue pampering which is like disaster at
the commencement of the journey of life for the youngster.
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... one was not left in doubt
about the utility of the master, may be a godfather sort of, who had a
challenge in bringing up the child but who must go to sleep in the wake of the
exhibition of the prowess he inculcated in the rising star as the kid is under
compulsion to bring to play, his own version of life.
The Igbo proverb, ekpere nna bu na nwa g’aka nwa ya, meaning that ‘the prayer of any
man is that the child ascends and surpasses the father or master’ best captures
the phenomenon of godfatherism in the Igbo worldview. The godfather also
exercises social, economic and political leadership which is ‘collective, never
dictatorial or oligarchic and sometimes almost outrageously democratic’
(Uzoigwe 2004: 146).
Glimpses of the practice of godfatherism in the sociology
of pre-colonial Igbo society are presented in Pita Nwanna’s little book.
Written in Igbo language and titled Omenuko,
the book narrates the story of Omenuko and his apprentices. Omenuko was a
wealthy and successful merchant who had many apprentices under his care and
training. In one of his business trips, Omenuko lost his entire goods in
overflowing river. In order to mitigate his losses, Omenuko sold his
apprentices as slaves to another trader and slave merchant in a foreign land.
This was a despicable and abominable act that violated the basic principles of
Igbo godfatherism and merchant apprenticeship. As such Omenuko’s actions were
strongly condemned by his kinsmen. Confronted with the severe implications of
his actions, Omenuko fled to another land in self-imposed exile (Nwanna 1976).
The relevant lesson from Omenuko is
clear. It is obligatory for the merchant or godfather to equip his apprentice
or godson with basic skills and expertise required to excel in his chosen
career just as he is expected to protect the life and advance the career of the
godson.
This form of godfatherism has continued until modern times
and partly accounts for the tremendous success of the Igbo in trade and
commerce in Nigeria. Recent research has revealed that many Igbo traders in the
city of Jos in Northern Nigeria for instance are in business, courtesy of their
‘oga (godfather) ... who mainly
brought them up as apprentice. The key element in this arrangement is trust
... that covers all aspect of life, from
politics to business’ (Adetula 2005: 225). Both the godfather and his godsons
are expected to operate a rewarding relationship that directly and indirectly
facilitates the process of development of the community. Neither of the parties
is expected to jeopardize the interest of the other. Most of the recent and
successful transportation and haulage companies in Nigeria, especially in Igbo-dominated
Southeastern Nigeria, are owned by personalities who started as apprentices of
the generation of Igbo road transportation merchants like late Augustine
Ilodibe, proprietor of Ekene Dili Chukwu Transport Company Limited.
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Godfatherism and Hausa/Fulani socio-political
structure
In analyzing the Hausa/Fulani culture of
‘given away’ children or child rearing and training, Feinstein (1987: 8) refers
to ‘a practice so widespread that it represents a deep-seated cultural
variation’ which points to the practice of godfatherism among the Hausa/Fulani
group. He states:
Custom has it that
immediately after weaning, at about two years of age, the first born (and
frequently other children as well) is given to substitute parents to bring up,
usually drawn from those respected in the community, who may be childless or
are in a better position to raise the child.
The notion of godfatherism was also well
entrenched in the political and social structure of pre-colonial Hausa/Fulani
society. The successful prosecution of the Fulani Jihad ensured the
establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria. Building on the
traditional rulership (saurata)
institution, the caliphate administration introduced more sophisticated
hierarchical levels of administration ranging from the Sokoto administration,
those of the emirate, the vassalage and the village to ward administration
bound by patron-client or godfather-godson ties. In any event, access to
political office was almost equally open to the Fulani and Hausa. However,
since the Fulani conquerors had the emirate administration under their
political grip, almost all important offices reverted to the Fulani while the
Hausa became client to the Fulani overlords. The Fulani mainly appointed kin
members and close associates to political offices. This practice almost became
the acceptable political norm. Overtime increasingly large number of offices
became the preserve of particular lineages (Tibenderana 1989; Shenton 1989: 5).
It then was the practice for those appointed to positions of authority to have
received some forms of training in politics and administration by serving as
clients or godsons of Fulani patrons and senior administrative officials
(O’Hear 1986). As Tibenderana (1989: 74) observes ‘when in office patrons were
expected to reward their most loyal clients with administrative positions’.
The practice of godfatherism was evident in Hausa/Fulani
trade and commerce. Apart from its literary meaning of landlord or the head of
a household, the term maigida in Hausa/Fulani
also refers to a godfather. In their separate works on Hausa traders and
trading activities, Abner Cohen, Polly Hill and Paul Lovejoy applied the term
to refer to those Hausa who provided brokerage services to fellow Hausa traders
involved in the cattle and kola trades. The maigida
helped in promoting Hausa trading activities by providing accommodation,
storage and brokerage services to Hausa traders at various trading ports where
Hausa traders were involved in business transactions in southern West Africa.
This practice had its origin in
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Hausaland from where the itinerant traders
and their maigida came. According to
Albert (2005: 86):
In Hausaland when a stranger
with kola is staying in the house of one man and a potential buyer is staying
in the house of another man they bargain over the kola and on each calabash
they set aside two kola nuts, yan k’ida,
as a gift: one goes to each of the landlords (Ferguson 1972 quoted in Albert
2005: 85).
Many maigida
became wealthy through the compensation they received from the services they rendered
to the traders.
Smith (1960), obviously relying on the workings of his
western political system, wrongly described this form of political and
commercial clientage among the Hausa/Fulani as institutionalized political
corruption. Although it is often difficult to determine the difference between
‘gifts given for services rendered’ and ‘gifts given to induce corruption’ or a
service in a society where gift-giving and ‘generosity is a highly prized
quality’ (Paden 1986: 61), nevertheless, the Hausa/Fulani has a clear-cut
definition and understanding of these two practices in the context of the moral
community established by the ideals of the Islamic jihad. Hence, the intention
of the gift is important in assessing the gift or any other transaction. In this
connection, Paden (1986) asserts that a gift is given to induce corruption, zalunci or ba a hanci, if it is a ‘compulsory gift’ given to influence
individuals in authority or people around them for the purpose of securing
certain favours, services or items, like portions of land. No doubt, these
distinctions were not very clear to Smith when he dismissed the Hausa/Fulani
commercial and political system as institutionalised corruption.
Godfatherism and Yoruba political institutions
Godfatherism was an integral aspect of
Yoruba pre-colonial political structure. The Baba-ogun (war patron) played a prominent part in the pre-colonial
government and politics of Ibadan. Baba-ogun was a warrior who had
distinguished himself in the numerous wars and battles that characterized
inter-group relations in Yorubaland, especially in the nineteenth century. He
exercised control over numerous peoples of several scattered compounds,
collected taxes, tributes and levies from them. In addition he settled disputes
in his domain and recruited eligible male members of compounds under his
control to be soldiers in his army during periods of war (Falola 1985: 100).
Individuals who wanted to become soldiers or pursue careers in the military
were usually apprentices (godsons) to a successful Baba-ogun who also served as
their patron while he (Baba-ogun) trained them in the art of warfare and
soldiering. The Baba-ogun exchange relation was anchored in the military and
socio-political structure of Ibadan.
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As a military camp, Ibadan attracted not only refugees of
the nineteenth century Yoruba wars but young men eager for military adventure
and distinction. Most of them settled with the Baba-ogun. Describing the
Babaogun, Awe (1964:119) states:
He had under him a host of
ambitious young men receiving military training in his army. To keep all these
men in trim, he was allowed to go on private expedition with the sanction and
approval of the town authorities and to keep part of the booty to feed his
soldiers and buy guns and ammunitions for them. During actual warfare, these
men knew their own positions on the battlefield and had always to stick as
closely as possible to their chiefs.
Beyond providing military training and
leadership, the Baba-ogun protected and advanced the interests of his
apprentices, soldiers, and members of his compound in the town council. They,
in turn, reciprocated by remaining loyal to the Baba-ogun, providing him with
military and farming service and gifts such as crops at festive seasons. According
to Awe (1964: 109), prominent Ibadan warriors and leaders like Ogunmola, Fijabi
and Aare Latosa began their military careers this way.
On the other hand, there was the Baba kekere (the small or little father), Baba isale (father of the courtyard/quarter or underground world)
or Baba nigbejo (a great help in
times of trouble) who played the role of godfathers in pre-colonial trade and
politics of Yorubaland (O’Hear 1986; Albert 2005: 86). Baba kekere was used to refer to local community leaders who provided
physical, social and political security for people of lesser social status who,
in turn, paid their respect, loyalty and tribute to the Baba-kekere. O’Hear’s
study of political and commercial clientage in the Yoruba town of Ilorin is an
insightful discussion of the relevance of the Baba kekere in the political
administration and commercial growth of Ilorin town. The Baba-kekere provided a
wide range of services which among other things included interceding on his
client’s behalf with a higher authority or government official and providing
access to land and justice to his clients. In all these, the Baba kekere
received no salaries but instead received gifts and accepted gratuities for the
services he rendered to his clients (O’Hear 1986). Similarly, Barnes’s (1986)
study of metropolitan Lagos captured the role of the Baba isale as godfather in local political administration of
Mushin, a suburb of Lagos.
Godfatherism and contemporary religions
In modern times, orthodox Catholics3
and Anglicans do make reference to their spiritual godfathers (Scott 1972: 94;
Scott and Marshall 2005: 484) just as members of the new generation Pentecostal
churches have ‘Fathersin-the Lord’. The spiritual godfather or
‘Father-in-the-Lord’ is a mature and
36
successful Christian who epitomizes high
moral standards such that he can and is expected to guide inexperienced
Christians to attain an equally successful Christian life through his conducts.
More often these men are instrumental to the ‘born-again’ experiences of the Pentecostal
faithful or adopted as godfathers by young and immature Christians as they pass
through baptismal, confirmation, marriage and other religious rites of orthodox
Catholic and Anglican denominations. Among Catholics, the child adopts a
godfather at baptism who is supposed to ensure his spiritual and economic
welfare. In return the godson supports the activities of the godfather when he
requires it. At a more inclusive level, the godfathergodson ties established
during baptism give the natural parents of the godson the right to look up to
the godfather for material assistance. The spiritual godfather thus occupies a
central position in the spiritual development and overall growth of the
Christian. In fact, most of Nigeria’s prominent Pentecostal preachers are
spiritual godsons of older generations of Pentecostal Christians.4
Godfatherism is not missing in Islam either. In a way, the mallams (Islamic scholars) and almajiris (Islamic pupils) in Northern
Nigeria can be construed as maintaining a godfather-godson relation. The system
operates on the Islamic injunction that enjoins the faithful to seek knowledge
as well as the philosophy that Islamic learning without rigour and stoic
discipline does not develop a wholesome personality. Having been separated from
their parents, the pupils are placed under the tutelage of Koranic teachers.
The almajiris receive Islamic training while seeking arms to meet their daily
needs and those of their mallam (Adewuyi 1998).
Although there may be variations, the concept and practice
of godfatherism was not strange among pre-colonial groups and communities.
While godfatherism was never really practised in pre-colonial Igbo politics,
partly because of its segmentary and non-centralised political structure which
stifled the development of large-scale political institutions on which
political godfatherism thrives, the same cannot be said of Igbo trade and
commerce. Godfatherism appeared to be the hub around which Igbo trade and
commerce revolved. However, local groups and communities with centralized or
monarchical political structures like Yoruba and Hausa evolved a blend of
commercial and political godfatherism in their religious, social and political
relations. What is clear in all the cases examined is the positive contributions
of godfatherism in promoting the welfare of both the godfather and godson as
well as the development, harmony and good governance in the community.
Regrettably, the adoption and application of godfatherism in the colonial
administrative processes and post-colonial political culture created major
flaws in the understanding and practice of godfatherism.
37
Abuses and Distortions of Godfatherism under
Colonialism
The concept of godfatherism espoused so far
presents a practice that focuses on stability, growth and development of the
community. It seeks to prepare individuals – godfathers and godsons – to be
active agents of development of the community. In a social relation
characterized by what Durkheim described as mechanical solidarity, the
godfather wields power not so much for personal interests and aggrandizement
but for the socio-economic wellbeing of individual members of the community and
the utmost sociopolitical development of the community. Benevolence and
altruism are basic norms and principles underlining the relationship between
godfathers and godsons. The godfather is expected to be a benevolent mentor and
patron in the same way the godson is expected to remain loyal and supportive of
the godfather. The interest of each of the parties involved in the relationship
– the godfather, godson and community – is accommodated and adequately
protected. Tibenderana (1989: 74) puts it somewhat differently when he states
that ‘political clientage (godfatherism) entailed mutually beneficial relations
and solidarity of interests of clients and patrons’.
But godfaththerism can be conceptualized in another sense.
In Democracy and Prebendal Politics in
Nigeria, Richard Joseph defines godfatherism as ‘the process by which an
individual establishes links with a given institutional hierarchy in the
expectation of favoured treatment’.5 In what appears to
be an explanation of the role of godfathers and expectations of godsons, Joseph
states that:
An individual seeks the
support and protection of an oga or a
godfather while trying to acquire the basic social and material goods – loans,
scholarships, licenses, plots of urban land, employment, promotion – and the
main resources of the patron in meeting these requests is quite literally a
piece of the state. Such an argument can easily be made in the case of
ministerial appointments or positions on government boards. It also applies
however, to individuals within the nominally private sector, since the business
world is hemmed in by bureaucratic regulations which derive from the
nationalistic and development concerns of post-independence governments (Joseph
1991: 56).
This conception of godfatherism is a
departure from the notion of godfatherism identified earlier. It suggests some
inherent attributes and motives that differentiate it from the previous notion.
First, Joseph’s definition of godfatherism suggests a
practice deeply rooted in individualism and selfishness that discounts and
subverts the interest of the community. The godfather is perceived as promoting
his interests and those of his godson over and above the collective interests
of the generality of the public. In other words, the primary aim is the
development of the self (godfather) or patron. To achieve this end, the
godfather maintains a selfish
38
and parasitic relationship with his godson
and the community. Not only are the interests of the godson and community
abandoned in the fulfilment of those of the godfather, but the godson and
community are coerced to work assiduously and make sacrifices toward the
realization of the supreme interest of the godfather. Hence godfatherism is
conceived essentially as a means of competing for, or capturing public
resources for the selfish use of the godfather.
Second, rather than the resources of the godfather, the
‘piece of the state’, community and electorate are mobilized to grease the
parasitic relationship the godfather maintains with the community and state. In
the words of Albert (2005: 83), ‘The relationship between the two of them – the
godfather and the godson – has little or nothing to do with the larger society
the two of them claim to lead’. This form of godfatherism is oppressive,
malevolent and has become the defining characteristics of relations between
political actors – political patrons and public office holders or seekers – in
Nigeria. It is the persistent demands the godfather makes on the state that
imbue godfatherism with conflict-generating attributes and qualities. While the
former notion of godfatherism depicts the traditional and conventional
conception of godfatherism, the latter constitutes the redefined and distorted
version of the concept. What phenomenon and changes initiated the redefinition
of the conventional notion of godfatherism? And what process completed the
distortion of the concept?
The process of redefining the conventional notion of
godfatherism was consummated towards the end of the nineteenth century, and
colonialism was responsible for this change. Colonial political engineering
fostered its own ‘ideas about government and society, superimposed on
indigenous political structures which were not allowed to crumble and
disintegrate’ (Ajayi 1985: 5). Colonial administrators were tolerant and even
receptive of the traditional forms of godfatherism. Instead of dismantling the old
system and creating a completely new one complementing the strange
administrative doctrines and principles propagated by the colonialists,
colonialism merely distorted and incorporated it into its repertoire of
administrative mechanisms. As a result aspects of indigenous political
structure were integrated into the hierarchy of colonial administrative
position and authority. In what became known as Indirect Rule, Native
Administration was introduced to involve community leaders and village chiefs
in the daily administration of the villages and towns in the districts and
provinces. This was done to reduce administrative costs of the colonies, spread
the burden of leadership among existing native rulers and extract loyalty from
the natives with minimal force.
Thus, in Yorubaland, it was needless for the Baba-ogun to
prove his military worth before he attracted the attention of the colonial
authorities. The Baba-ogun was simply incorporated into the Ibadan Native
Administration
39
and immediately became an adjunct officer
of the colonial administration in the maintenance of law and order and
production of goods needed for European industries. It became compulsory for
every resident of Ibadan to identify with a Baba-ogun through whom he paid his
tax to the colonial administration (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007). Like Ibadan,
in Ilorin the Baba kekere was used as an agent of tax-collection by the
colonial administration. According to O’Hear (1986: 71) ‘in 1912, for example,
a British official reported that money from compound tax was handed over to the
Baba kekere or patron of the ‘maiungua’ – some slave of the emir’. In Lagos,
the Baba isale, having lost their traditional political functions as chiefs,
nevertheless served as unofficial advisors to government figures and dispute
arbitrators in the new colonial regime (Barnes 1986).
Where traditional godfatherism was found incompatible with
the immediate political and economic considerations of the colonial
authorities, it was drastically restructured to suit the needs of the
colonizing power. Because they found a less centralized but more democratized
political structure and communities in Igboland whose administration would
require huge financial and material resources from the parsimonious colonial
administration, the colonialists proceeded to create Warrant Chiefs, a few
selected from the class of existing godfathers and many from personalities with
questionable character (Afigbo 1972). Isichei (1976: 142-143) notes that ‘the
patterns of traditional Igbo government were hopelessly unsuited to the needs
of the colonial state. Its system of checks and balances, its consensus by
protracted discussion, its use of religious sanctions and especially, its small
scale rendered it impracticable’. Corroborating Isichei, Ohadike (1994: 153)
stated that the British restructured the traditional Igbo administrative system
and by implication the concept of godfatherism ‘because they failed to
comprehend the workings of the Igbo political system. The Igbo political
systems were inconsistent with British notions of governance, and anything that
did not meet European standards had to be destroyed not developed’. As it
turned out not a few ogaranya and
other local leaders, including mean and dubious characters, lacking leadership
qualities, who collaborated with the foreign rulers,6
were made Warrant Chiefs and Native Authority officials and included in
administering the colonial state at the local level (Afigbo 1972).
In Northern Nigeria, the more stratified and centralized
political structure of the Sokoto emirate suited Indirect Rule. Although
British colonialism, in accordance with its racial thinking, reasoned that the
light-skinned Fulani rulers were a superior race who had allowed themselves to
be corrupted by mixing with the inferior Hausa race, it insisted that ‘nothing
must be done to undercut the position of the indigenous ruling class. Rather,
if British rule
40
was to survive, the position of the Sultan,
emirs and hakimai must be maintained’
(Shenton 1986: 28). Except in cases where a co-operative member of the ruling
class was empowered and installed as emir in place of a selfconfident figure
who resisted or frustrated colonial rule, very minimal changes were effected in
the political administration of Northern Nigeria (Shenton, 1986: 25). In the
words of Atanda (1985: 25), ‘what emerged was neither a total destruction of
the old society nor the emergence of a totally new one’. What emerged was a
coalition and collision of the ‘new and the old, an alliance of persons and
political groups; an amalgam or a synthesis of ideas’.
The marriage of convenience between the old and the new
went on without considering the degree to which European policies proved
compatible with the preservation of traditional principles of godfatherism.
Local godfathers – Ogaranya, Nnam-ukwu,
Obas, Baba-ogun, Baba-isale, Baba kekere, Maigida and Emirs – now became
godsons of the colonial administrators. European godfathers were sought after
‘not only because of their political “pull” but because they controlled the
technical resources and know-how through which the demands of their clients
could be met’ (Lemarchand 1972: 79). More especially for the local godfather,
dealing with the colonial state was a mixture of opportunity and danger – the
opportunity of gaining access to the diverse resources of the state and its
agents and the danger of running afoul of its arbitrary and capricious actions.
The need to shield himself from the dangerous and capricious actions of the
system compelled the local godfather to court the protection and support of his
European counterpart to whom he became a client (Berman 2004). Soon a hierarchy
of power and authority, establishing novel patron-client in the form of godfather-godson
relationships between the colonial state, its Resident and District Officers on
the one hand and the chiefs, emirs and local godfathers on the other hand was
installed. Yet the emirs, chiefs and godfathers, in the context of indigenous
political structure, were expected still to perform their traditional positions
as godfathers in the society. This contradiction inherent in the dynamics of
colonial administration altered and redefined the notion and practice of
godfatherism. Above all, it had profoundly destabilizing consequences for the
internal cohesion of the society.
In what ways did the distortions and destabilizations
express themselves? Emergent godfathers and public authority figures were no
longer persons with sterling leadership qualities and excellent character as
defined, identified and selected by the local people; rather godfathers were
mostly handpicked, based on the possession of qualities considered by the
colonialists to suit the colonial enterprise, and imposed on the people. Even
public officers drawn from the category of personalities perceived by the
locals as godfathers, in no time became more committed to themselves and the
colonial authorities
41
than their communities. For example,
encouraged and protected by colonial administrators, Warrant Chief R. A. Idigo
of Aguleri in Onitsha Province unilaterally leased communal lands to European
merchant companies without remitting the rents to his community (File No. O.P.
505).
The principles and workings of the new form of godfatherism
established by colonialism not only marginalized the interest of the local
people but in several ways totally discounted the people and further
bastardized existing principles of godfatherism. In Northern Nigeria, Paden
(1986: 60) notes that the Hausa indigenous culture of gift-giving required both
the godfather and the godson to exchange gifts. Thus, an emir gave gifts to the
district heads and village heads who were usually the emir’s biological sons
and political godsons. Paden, however, adds that gifts by persons of lower
status and rank (godson) to persons of higher rank (godfather) were essentially
‘to get blessing’ and not intended materially to enrich the latter. Things
changed drastically in the new arrangement, and these principles of godfatherism,
leadership and communalism inherited from the era of the Sokoto emirate, Paden
points out, were altered, transformed and adapted to the emerging culture of
irresponsible leadership of the colonial and post-independence era in which
political godfathers and elites became parasites of the commonwealth and
collective resources of the people. The result was a shift of emphasis away
from the symbolic or affective import of the rewards and gifts to expectations
of material benefits by the godfathers (Lemarchand 1972).
This was necessary because the logic of colonialism ensured
that the godfathers and local elites created by colonialism were rendered
materially weak even though the same class of individuals was required by
tradition to be dispensers of patronage. Prior to colonialism, wealth, measured
in terms of standard of living, was fairly equally distributed among the
people, with the local leaders only enjoying marginal advantage over the rest
of the people. Colonialism discouraged this pattern and in its place instituted
a structure that ensured the transfer of ownership and control of resources
from the people to the colonial state (Ake 1985). In doing so, colonialism
reversed the Marxist proposition that control of political institution derived
from control of major economic resources (Barnes 1986). The elite and
godfathers were therefore placed in a precarious economic situation which fired
their desperate quest for the economic resources of the state. Accessing the
state and its institutions – an opportunity available only to the leaders and
godfathers – became a point of entry to the resources of the state and a matter
of do-ordie for the leaders. Accordingly, the only way in which the chiefs, who
lacked traditional legitimacy, were able to keep themselves in power was to
extract resources from the state and the people for distribution among their
supporters (Tignor 1993).
42
The few who ventured to observe their traditional
obligations to the people immediately invited the wrath of the colonial
authorities. One instance was that of M. E. Amete, Umuleri member of Umuigwedo
Native Court of Appeal in the Onitsha District, who was among these few. In
1950 his community appointed him secretary of Umuleri Emergency Front that was
championing the struggles of the community to claim ownership of Otuocha land
in Onitsha District. The District Officer interpreted a letter of petition
Amete wrote on behalf of his community as unbecoming of a member of a Native
Court and threatened to strip him of his post. To retain his privileged
position, Amete quickly apologized to the authorities and thereafter isolated
himself from the struggles of the community (File No. 1181). At every point and
place ‘authority in the community began to move away from working for the
people to working for the interest of the colonial masters’, and their local
agents (Njoku 2005: 104). The new chiefs, local leaders and political
godfathers cared less about the interests of their communities. Increasingly,
they alienated themselves from the people. ‘As there were no popularly elected
Councils at the time’, lamented Awolowo (1982: 9-10), ‘the Obas and Chiefs,
instead of regarding themselves as being responsible to their people as before,
considered themselves responsible to the white man who in the view of the
people was unapproachable as well as unassailable and invincible’. Since they
were no longer accountable to the people, incidences of corruption and
financial malfeasance became rampant.
The process of redefining godfatherism was completed in
1960 when colonialism was terminated and power bequeathed to a new crop of
leaders, who were essentially products of the colonial political structure.
Apparently, the new but distorted form of godfatherism provided the basis for
modern parasitic clientelistic relations and political interactions among
political actors on the one hand and between actors and the post-colonial state
on the other hand. The benevolent, altruistic and development-oriented essence
of godfatherism gave way to egotism, greed, financial corruption and political
acrimony. The posture of a benevolent political godfather committed to raising
leaders and, in the case of the Igbo, building enduring democratic culture was
no longer attractive to the new-breed of leaders, elites and politicians.
Hence, the nascent notion of godfatherism in politics and elections portrayed
the political godfather as a mercenary politician who was willing to provide
mentorship to his godson only to the extent that the latter could be used to
expand and consolidate the power and resource base of the of the godfather, and
entrench the parasitic relationship the godfather often maintained with the
state. Bitter struggles for state power and economic resources by the elites,
godfathers and their godsons became rampant and often degenerated into
full-blown political crises. These struggles were worsened by the penchant
43
of the political elite to privatize the
public realm of the new but weak postcolonial state bequeathed to it by the
departing colonialists.
Despite these glaring weaknesses, Albert (2005: 88) argues
that from the First Republic (1960-1966) to the Second Republic (1978-1983),
the practice of godfatherism was guided by selfless service to the individual
and community. He contends that notable politicians of the periods like Nnamdi
Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo and Ahmadu Bello were benevolent and altruistic
godfathers and the community and electorate benefited from their benevolence.
Albert states further:
The only difference between
these early godfathers in Nigerian history and their contemporary peers is that
they supported and nurtured their godsons positively rather than negatively.
The emphasis of this generation of godfathers was on developmental issues and
not on money. They also did not demand figuratively, pounds of flesh from their
adopted sons as the present godfathers do. These godfathers of blessed memory
motivated their adopted sons to higher levels of political morality and made it
necessary for them to be accountable to those who voted them in office.
But Albert’s claims do not seem consistent
with historical facts. The godfathers of blessed memory may have motivated
their adopted political godsons to higher levels of political positions and
responsibilities but certainly not higher levels of political morality.
On the eve of Nigeria’s independence, the struggle for
state resources between Nnamdi Azikiwe and his godson Eyo Ita promoted
conflicts within the Eastern Regional Government, split the National Council of
Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), and gave birth to rival political party, the National
Independence Party (NIP) (Nnoli 1978: 168-169). Eyo Ita led the NCNC regional
government in Eastern Nigeria and was a director of several companies in the
Zik Group of Companies. The row between Azikiwe and Ita came to light when
Azikiwe tried unsuccessfully to get Ita to deposit some local government funds
in the African Continental Bank. Azikiwe and his family members had major
controlling shares in the bank. Ita’s allegation of financial malpractices against
Azikiwe led to the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of
the Eastern Regional Government. The Commission headed by Sir Stafford
Forster-Sutton, Chief Justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court, indicted Azikiwe
for mismanagement of government funds (Tignor 1993: 192). Expelled from the
NCNC, Ita along with his sympathizers, mostly members of his Efik ethnic group,
formed the NIP.
In the Western Region, Ladoke Akintola, estranged godson of
Obafemi Awolowo, led a faction of the Action Group (AG), a political party
headed by Awolowo. The submissions of Akintola’s faction to the G. B.A. Coker
Commission of Inquiry set up in 1962 to investigate the management of six
44
Western Nigeria public corporations,
revealed outrageous levels of corruption allowed by Awolowo and AG politicians
in running the government (Osoba 1996). As in other regions, the politics of
godfatherism within the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) controlled government
of the Northern Region promoted political and financial corruption (Tignor
1993). In doing so, NPC politicians in the region jettisoned the virtues of
leadership propagated by erstwhile Islamic leaders of the region. In their
case, apart from discouraging leaders from corruptly enriching themselves, it
was regarded as special blessing if a leader died without any estate.
Consequently, early Islamic leaders of the region earned their living by simple
tasks such as rope-making, even while presiding over authoritative positions
(Paden 1986: 63). These austere and puritanical principles of leadership
opposed and contradicted the corruption and venality engendered by the
phenomenon of political godfatherism within the NPC during the colonial and post-colonial
periods (Tignor 1993: 197199). However, British colonial administration
collaborated with the authorities of the Sokoto emirate to keep the issue of
corruption among political godfathers and their godsons in NPC from the public
(Tignor 1993; Osoba 1996).
On resumption of democratic governance in 1979, political
godfatherism became a critical factor in electoral and party politics. In the
Kwara State gubernatorial election, Olushola Saraki, then a chieftain of the
National Party of Nigeria (NPN), had helped his political godson, Adamu Attah,
to secure victory over Josiah Olawoyin of the Unity party of Nigeria (UPN).
Irreconcilable disagreements over sharing of political offices and state
resources between Attah and Saraki, whose political profile had grown
tremendously to include the Majority Leader of the Senate, strained their
relationship (Onwuzuruigbo 2006). In the 1983 gubernatorial elections, Saraki
moved his support to Cornelius Adebayo of the UPN against his estranged godson,
Adamu Attah. Cornelius won the election. In subsequent years, Saraki would
become a powerful godfather with the highest turnover of political godsons,
shifting his support from Attah to Adebayo, to Sabbah Lafiagi, then to Mohammed
Lawal, all governors of the state in different political dispensations before
settling for his biological son Bukola Saraki, the present governor of the
state. Political godfatherism has since remained a critical factor of electoral
politics, intra-party squabbles and political crises in Nigeria (Ayoade 2008).
Not even the emergence of military rule tampered with the
clientelistic character of political ties in the post-colonial state. Indeed,
military rule appears to have worsened the situation. As argued by Berman
(2004) the destruction of an open political process and effective elimination
of freedoms of speech, information and organization left the personalistic ties
of patronclient networks as the only available mode of access to the state for
ordinary people and the appropriation of the patronage resources of office as
the
45
only source of support and power for
politicians and state officials. Long years of military administration created
more political godfathers in Nigeria. In Anambra State, for instance, Arthur
Eze, a wealthy businessman and staunch supporter of military juntas, emerged as
the indisputable political godfather of the state during the military regime of
Abacha. His cordial relationship with the Abacha government placed him in a
position to influence decisions as to who obtained political appointments and
contracts from the state. Arthur also exploited his rapport with the regime to
acquire for himself several fat contracts from the state. Other prominent
godfathers who maintained strong contact with the military leaders in Abuja and
Awka, the capital of Anambra State, included Emeka Offor and Chris Uba (Makwuzi
and Aham 2003; Adebanjo 2003). Like Arthur, they too received continuous
allocations of contracts from the military government. The military
administration of Colonel Mike Attah in the state awarded Uba contracts to
build a housing complex, mast and transmitters for the Anambra State
Broadcasting Service (ABS), state judiciary complex and the new Government
House complex which was awarded for 400 million naira. The contract was later
reviewed upwards to the tune of one billion naira (Aiyetan 2003). It is not
surprising that both Offor and Uba became godfathers of Chinwoke Mbadinuju and
Chris Uba, two former governors of the state since the inception of civilian
rule in Nigeria in 1999.
Perhaps no other state in recent times has grappled with
the turbulence and instability generated by the politics of godfatherism more
than Anambra state. On resumption of democratic governance in 1999, the Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP) won the gubernatorial elections in Anambra State. To win
the elections, the elected state governor, Chinwoke Mbadinuju, received
financial support and relied on the political network of his political mentor
and godfather, Emeka Offor. Attempts by Offor to meddle in the administration
of the state, especially the award of contracts and appointment of political
officers of the state, led to a bitter quarrel between the two men. Relations
between Offor and Mbadinuju degenerated to open confrontation and conflict such
that engaged the governor for the better part of his four-year tenure and
diverted his attention away from the urgent need to develop the state (Albert
2005). On the eve of the 2003 elections, Mbadinuju’s performance rating by the
electorate and his party was discouraging. Yet Mbadinuju was relentless in
persuading the PDP to adopt him as the party’s flag-bearer in the next
gubernatorial election in the state. In the ensuing political intrigues and
manoeuvres between himself and his estranged godfather, who openly opposed
Mbadinuju’s ambition, the PDP declined to present Mbadinuju for a second term.
Mbadinuju finally decamped to Alliance for Democracy (AD) and contested the
election on the platform of the AD (Albert 2005; Onwuzuruigbo 2006).
46
Mbadinuju was defeated by Chris Ngige, the PDP
gubernatorial candidate. Once again Ngige’s electoral victory derived from the
political leverage and financial clout of his godfather, Chris Uba. Like
Mbadinuju, Chris Ngige refused to submit his government to the caprices of Uba,
particularly in awarding contracts, appointing political officers and sharing
state revenue. Uba’s hopes of controlling the government and recouping his
investment on Ngige’s election from the resources of the state were scuttled.
As a result, Uba felt deceived and disappointed in his godson. With the active
collaboration of the Presidency, Uba mobilized a team of policemen who arrested
the governor and attempted to force him out of office on 10 July 2003 (HRW
2007). The episode sparked a gale of legal actions and altercations between
Ngige and Uba. Not satisfied with the outcome of the legal tussle which did not
go in his favour, Uba, on November 2004, organized a group of thugs who
unleashed violence against government officials, suspected supporters of the
governor, government properties and people of the state (Onwuzuruigbo 2006;
Ayoade 2008).
All these occurrences suggest that unlike the pre-colonial
forms of godfatherism, the contemporary notion of political godfatherism is
propelled by the assumption that access to authoritative positions of the state
and the personalities occupying such positions translates to access and control
of vast public economic resources and power. No wonder post-independence
leaders and godfathers are greedy and corrupt.
On account of the politics of godfatherism and the
seemingly endemic confrontations between political godfathers and their
godsons, Anambra State has never experienced peace and meaningful economic
growth since the resumption of democratic governance in 1999. The task of
developing the state has been abandoned as administrative ineptitude,
infrastructural decay, political and financial corruption resulting from
struggles for power and resources overwhelm the entire machinery of governance
in the state. As days roll by, so the chances for expanding the democratic
space and enthroning democratic culture in the state are frittered away.
Anambra is not an exception; it is just a reflection of the political situation
in most of Nigeria’s thirty six states (HRW 2007).
Conclusion
Godfatherism is not a recent phenomenon as
existing literature erroneously suggests; it is rooted in the social and
political experiences of many communities and groups in Nigeria since
pre-colonial times. Secondly, godfatherism was hardly a source of political
crises and conflicts in precolonial societies as it is in contemporary Nigerian
politics. If anything, it played a prominent role in promoting political
stability as well as the
47
commercial growth of pre-colonial
communities. In any case, the virtues of godfatherism came under serious
manipulation and subversion in the context of the imposition of colonial rule
and subsequent emergence of the postcolonial state. If today political godfatherism
evinces evil and negative attributes, it is because of the abuses and
distortions it has suffered in the process of its appropriation by and
application to colonial administration and governance. These characteristics of
manipulative abuses have continued into the post-colonial dispensation,
becoming fully rooted in political processes, structures and institutions in
Nigeria.
Reducing or eliminating the disruptive influence of
godfatherism in Nigerian politics would therefore require entrenching
democratic ideals and strengthening democratic processes and institutions.
Political parties, for instance, are central to democratic governance. Party
management and administrative structures should be democratized in a way that
emphasizes the interest of the party over and above the political agenda of
individual members of the party. One of the many ways to achieve this is to
evolve a viable and sustainable approach to funding parties, particularly their
electioneering programmes that could ensure that the rich do not hijack the
party organs by way of their financial contributions. In this way the
suffocating grip and overarching influence of the godfathers over the parties
could be drastically minimized.
There is also the need to reposition the electoral
commission to be free from manipulation and interference from parties and
politicians. The chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC) in Nigeria is appointed by the President while the Commission relies on
the presidency for funding. As a result, the INEC has remained susceptible to
the caprices of the incumbent president and encumbrances of godfathers of the
ruling party. For INEC to be truly independent and empowered to conduct free
and fair elections, it must be extricated from the stranglehold of the
presidency and political godfathers of the ruling party. This can be realized
by evolving a framework that guarantees autonomous sources of funding for the
Commission as well as incorporating the opinions of political parties, civil societies
and pressure groups in the process of appointing members and chairman of the
Commission.
Notes
1. We find
this vividly displayed in a recent compilation of articles in The Constitution. All the authors –
political scientists by training and orientation – and their articles glossed
over the socio-cultural underpinnings of the concept of godfatherism. See The Constitution, Vol. 7 No. 2, June,
2007.
48
2. The word Nnam ukwu (my master or my big father)
is used by an Odibo (apprentice or
servant) to refer to his master. Most Nnam ukwu, especially in olden times were
also Ogaranya (wealthy, influential
or respected people).
3. Clientelismo (clientelism) originated from
feudal Europe. The European conquerors of Latin America imported patron-client
relationship into the political, social and religious life of Latin America.
The predominance of Catholicism in Latin America linked this to the system
known as Compadrazgo (god parenting)
which gradually permeated the practices of Catholics in other parts of the
world. See (Scott and Marshall 2005: 483-484).
4. Reverend
Josiah Akindayomi, founder of the Redeemed Christian Church ofGod, was believed
to be the spiritual godfather of the present spiritual leader of the church,
Pastor Enoch Adeboye. See Ukah, A., 2008, A
New Paradigm of Pentecostal power: A Study of the Redeemed Christian Church of
God in Nigeria, Trenton: Africa World Press.
5. See
explanatory notes of chapter five in the endnotes of Joseph (1991).
6. The
selection and appointment of Warrant Chiefs followed no formalprocedure and
none was stipulated by the colonial administration. Consequently, the decision
to appoint anyone as Warrant Chief depended totally on the whims and caprices
of the British colonial officials. Chapter 2 of Adiele Afigbo’s work highlights
the methods utilised by the officials in appointing Warrant Chiefs.
7. The
District Officer considered Paragraph 6 of the petition which stated ‘thatin
the event of unnecessary delay, continued mistake, or refusal to take
appropriate actions, we shall not be held responsible for any unpleasant action
we may be compelled to take’, as ‘irresponsible language’.
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Archival Material
Otuocha Land Dispute, File
No. 1181, Vol. 1, ONDIST 20/1/322, National Archives Enugu, Nigeria.
Land Dispute: Umuleri and
Aguleri Land Dispute, Vol. 1. File No. O. P. 505, ONDIST 12/1/319, National
Archives Enugu, Nigeria.
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