UK Military Doctrinal Adaptation

In 2009, the UK military produced its equivalent to FM 3–24, the Joint Doctrine Publication 3–40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (hereafter JDP 3–40). It borrowed heavily from US approaches but also sought to infuse the UK’s broader lessons from its more civilian-oriented approach to stabilisation. Whilst both the US’s FM 3–24 and the UK’s JDP 3–40 stressed the need to develop the support of the population, JDP 3–40 perhaps went further in its emphasis on human security as being one of the keys to the consolidation of tactical military success whilst also being a prerequisite for economic and political progress. It argued that ‘winning the contest for human security [against the insurgents]’ is ‘fundamental to the development of host nation government authority and, ultimately, security of the state’ (FM 3–07: 513). It suggested that the provision of protection to the population ‘stimulates economic activity and supports longer-term development and governance reform.

Importantly POC generates confidence in local people about their own security satiation – their collective human security – and an economic interest in ongoing stability. It also denies adversarial groups one of the principal strategies for expanding their support base’ (FM 3–07: 514). Unlike many of the other doctrinal developments of the early part of the decade, JDP 3–40 provides a range of suggested techniques for implementing such a strategy, including the: (i) static protection of key sites, e.g. market places and refugee camps; (ii) persistent security in areas secured and held, e.g. intensive patrolling and checkpoints; (iii) targeted action against adversaries, e.g. search or strike operations; and (iv) population control, e.g. curfews and vehicle restrictions (FM 3–07: 515).

Despite the emergence of a more coherent civilian protection framework, JDP 3–40 places more emphasis on working with civilians from other branches of the UK government than it does on civilian protection per se. POC is largely absent from other British doctrinal submissions. Joint Warfare Publication JWP 3–50, The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations (Second Edition) makes brief mention of the need for rule of law and the protection of human rights, but again provides no systematic treatment of the concept of POC. The Army Field Manual ‘Counter Insurgency’ only goes as far as referring to ‘operations to secure key centers of population allow the host government to demonstrate its capability, and allow it to start to instill confidence among the people in its competence and long-term intentions’ (UK MoD 2009: 3–8). Similarly the Joint Medical Doctrine FM 4–03 makes scant mention of the Army medical services’ potential contribution except in so far as it is an obligation under IHL. The UK Stabilisation Unit’s 2008 publication ‘The UK Approach to Stabilisation: Stabilisation Unit Guidance Notes’, whilst claiming to enshrine emerging the UK’s experience and best practice, provides very little on the importance of civilian protection and its role in delivering stabilisation.

The most coherent treatment of the subject is found in the UK MOD’s ‘Peacekeeping: An Evolving Role For Military Forces’ Joint Doctrine Note 5/11 (JDN 5/11). This document provides a holding position pending a more thoroughgoing review of JWP 3–50 (The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations) and is also intended to inform the ongoing review of NATO doctrine on peace support operations.

Whilst offering less on the operationalisation of civilian protection than JWP 3–404 and falling short on providing a viable concept of operations for civilian protection, it does make several valuable contributions, stressing both the multidimensional nature of civilian protection in peacekeeping operations and the probability and importance of a civilian lead and integrated approaches to planning (JDN 5/11: 406–7) a civilian protection strategy

It also picks up a number of traditional themes: the importance of understanding the political context, the challenge of ‘positioning’ in relation to potential and actual spoilers and difficulties in maintaining impartiality in the use of force. It also identifies that the civilian protection tasks are ‘particularly resource-intensive and inevitably require more resources than are available to the mission’ (JDN 5/11: 409). Its solution is to enhance planning in order to recognise early the impact and address the problem ‘collectively among the peacekeeping community either through corralling resources with other actors or prioritizing the most vulnerable population centres’.

Highlighting the traditional challenge of implementing civilian protection it argues that the ‘mission must accept risk elsewhere. Risk should be mitigated where possible through contingency planning, including the management of local expectations.’ Whilst the doctrine effectively identifies the challenges in establishing a civilian protection concept of operations, it provides little advice on what approaches might prove useful in resolving these issues.

Whilst JDN 5/11 is the latest offering from the MoD, it should be read in conjunction with the ‘UK Government Strategy on The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.’ With the United Kingdom, as the chair of the informal Security Council Expert Group on the Protection of Civilians (established in 2009), it is unsurprising that the British government has developed a cross-departmental approach.

Understandably the document is more strategic in nature than the JDN and establishes four policy areas for joint action principally between MOD, FCO and DFID: (i) political engagement, (ii) protection by peace support operations, (iii) humanitarian action and (iv) state capacity.

Within the second policy area it commits to a greater ‘emphasis on protection issues, where appropriate, in Security Council peace operation mandates, and for better implementation of mandates by DPKO and troop contributing countries.’ It also discusses the use of ‘better and more consistent language on protection in peace support operation mandates; better reporting on protection issues by peace operations; better execution of protection tasks within a peace operation and more capable troop and police contributing nations on protection issues.’ In particular it commits to supporting the ‘UN to further develop the necessary doctrine, guidance and training to ensure that the protection of civilians elements of peace operation mandates can be implemented consistently and coherently by the UN system to make operations more effective (FCO 2010: 11).