NATO Military Doctrine Adaptation

Gaps also exist in NATO doctrine. Allied Joint Publication 9 (AJP-9), NATO Civilian-Military Cooperation and AJP-3.4(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations’ and lower level doctrine such as ATP-3.4.1.1 ‘Peace Support Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures’ are all pertinent to this discussion. Despite overt recognition of the importance of ‘human security’ (see AJP 3.4–4), much NATO doctrine tends to treat POC as an implicit product of the restraint of arms carriers rather than as a discrete approach in its own right - arguably reflecting NATO’s historical role in defending national territories rather than protecting foreign individuals, as well as national political cultures where the protection of civilian populations is primarily the responsibility of host governments and civilian police forces. In this approach the principles of distinction (particularly drawing distinctions between military targets and civilian persons or objects) and proportionality (limiting the collateral damage entailed by attacking military objectives) are rooted in an assumption that warfare is about compelling enemy combatants to submit and that targeting civilians provides little strategic value (Bruderlein 1999: 430). It is also based on a belief that states will hold to account their armed forces. In this sense current NATO doctrines are more appropriate a non-interventionist Cold War territorial alliance but have clearly been stretched by operations in Afghanistan and Libya. Arguably, this is surprising given NATO’s previous roles in using force to protect civilians in both Bosnia (1994–1995) and Kosovo (1999).

Whilst not treated as a distinct topic in any NATO doctrine, there are several components of a protection strategy including frequent mention of the restoration of law and order, the protection of humanitarian organisations, the creation of a safe and secure environment, freedom of movement, the preservation of basic human rights and support to investigations into abuses of human rights. NATO’s AJP-9 publication, clearly reflecting NATO’s experiences in the Balkans, specifically mentions the possibility of a NATO-led peace enforcement mission ending widespread human rights abuses and restoring the rule of law as a precursor to handing the operation over to a UN (or other) peacekeeping force or the host nation. It also goes somewhat further in identifying an operational POC doctrine than the US equivalent, drawing attention to a potential role in establishing a ‘secure environment’ which may be ‘extended to include the safeguarding of individuals, communities and institutions’ (AJP-9 2003: 6–7). However, it is clumsy in its explanation as to how this would be achieved, arguing that a peace support force ‘prepared for combat’ may be capable of ‘curtailing human rights abuses, and creat[ing] a secure environment in which civilian agencies can address the underlying causes of the conflict and address the requirements for peace building’ (Ibid: 6–13). Again, the military role is defined in terms of a capacity for ‘combat’ as opposed to the development of particular approaches for providing protection at anything less than an industrial scale.

This reluctance in operationalising tactical approaches to POC is reflected in AJP-3.4(A) ‘Allied Joint Doctrine For Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.’ This makes brief references to the necessity for rule of law, highlighting support to its restoration as a specific potential mission - although it sets clear limits in describing this as taking place in ‘exceptional circumstances’:

While civilian law enforcement is not a NATO function, the latter environment may require military involvement in support of local law and order tasks, including operations to maintain local law and order, during the initial stages of an operation until appropriate civil authorities can resume their tasks.

It also makes clear that these types of operation require joint planning with other organisations: ‘when appropriate, NATO should seek the support of other IOs (like the UN, the EU or the OSCE) that have a mandate, resources, and experience concerning involvement in public security’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the doctrinal contribution falls far short of providing an operational concept for POC.

Largely as a response to these and the broader challenges encountered in Afghanistan, NATO published its NATO Bi-SC Counter-Insurgency Joint Operational Guidelines (JOG) in 26 May 2010 (hereafter JOG 10/01). Again there is the traditional emphasis on securing the population from the insurgent and recognition that ‘early provision of basic protection is a key determinant for sustainable progress because political progress is unlikely to take place in the midst of chronic human insecurity’ (Beadle 2010). Similar to the UK JDP 3–40, it provides some detail on possible protection tasks, such as ‘protecting civilians from local bandits in refugee camps, escorting humanitarian convoys, patrolling in villages, and the importance of protecting civilians from attacks at night.’(JOG 10/01: 513–515)