Tuesday, November 22, 2016

The Rise in Civilian Protectdion Discourse

The Rise in Civilian Protection Discourse
The broader humanitarian community became increasingly concerned with the protection of civilians caught in the midst of armed conflict, particularly from the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War. This reflected changing perceptions of the relationship between humanitarian action and warfare, ‘prompting humanitarian actors to think more deeply about the extent of their responsibility to provide more than relief alone’ (O’Callaghan and Pantuliano 2007: 1). Conflict in the Balkans, Somalia and Africa more generally resulted both in a greater understanding of the impact of war on civilian populations as well as ‘the limitations and sometimes negative consequences of relief assistance’. These situations also led to a ‘greater emphasis in international policy spheres on a responsibility to protect’ and ‘closer linkages between humanitarian action and the wider policy agenda’. This also encouraged a reconsideration of the boundaries of humanitarian action and the role and meaning of protection within this space.

Increasingly ‘protection’ expanded from being the domain of the ICRC and UNHCR and took on a broader meaning which encompassed ‘issues of civilian safety.’ Its importance also expanded organisationally as new humanitarian actors, particularly Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), adopted protection policies as part of their operational programming and the UN cluster system established protection as one of the 11 core areas of humanitarian action (O’Callaghan and Pantuliano 2007: 1). In practical terms this led to protection policies continuing to be pursued not only in terms of national-level dialogues between the traditional protection actors and state/non-state armed actors but also to its operationalisation by a much broader array of NGO actors working within communities and ‘drawing on links with other political and military actors in their efforts to increase civilian safety’ (O’Callaghan and Pantuliano 2007: 2).

The widening of the definition of civilian ‘protection’ actors has undoubtedly complicated agreement operational priorities even amongst the humanitarian community. This has been complicated further by the increasing role of military forces in protection strategies. Nevertheless, there are large areas of agreement that must not be overlooked. There is a broad acceptance within both the humanitarian community and military doctrine that the protection of civilians in armed conflict relates both to violations of IHL and human rights law as well as encompassing a ‘broader spectrum of human security and human dignity’ (HPG 2011: 2) – and this is reflected in much of the military doctrine analysed later in this article.

Despite the differing tactics and priorities, as well as the cultural difficulty of some humanitarians in accepting a military role in protection strategies, both military and humanitarian actors recognise each other as having important contributions to make to a shared goal of reducing threats to civilians. Elsewhere, Metcalfe argues that there exists a broad consensus on the protection of civilians including three elements: ‘compliance by all parties to conflict with international humanitarian and human rights law; mitigating or reducing the threats and vulnerabilities of civilian populations; and, in the longer term, building a protective environment, including strengthening the capacities of the host state and local communities’ (HPG 2012: 1).
Nevertheless, profound differences in strategies and tactics have complicated relations not least of all because military support to the protection of civilians is not simply rooted in a humanitarian imperative (see Metcalfe, Haysom and Gordon 2012). Within the growing range of military doctrines on this subject protection is recognised both as a quasi-humanitarian obligation and, importantly, as an essentially pragmatic response to sustaining a viable peace and mission legitimacy. Holt et al. (2009: 14). stress the latter, arguing that protection is central to peacekeeping mandates because the ‘safety and security of civilians is critical to the legitimacy and credibility of peacekeeping missions. Missions rely upon their legitimacy with the local civilian population and external observers alike to help build peace and maintain political momentum behind the peace process. Moreover, wherever peacekeepers deploy they raise expectations amongst the local population - and among those who view missions from afar - that the reason for their presence is to support people at risk.


 As seen in Rwanda, the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Haiti, DRC and Darfur, among others, peacekeeping operations that are ill-prepared to address large-scale violence directed against civilians will falter and may even collapse’ (Holt, Taylor and Kelly 2009). Ariela Blatter (2011: 2) echoes these themes, arguing that ‘civilian protection is essential because it is critical to the perceived success of peacekeeping operations and therefore the UN’s ability to work credibly in the field of peace and security.’ Similarly she suggests that POC is a prerequisite for establishing an enduring peace settlement whilst ‘preventing attacks on civilians also pre-empts spoilers from creating instability and weakening fragile peace processes in post-war environments’. Furthermore, in its absence ‘humanitarian assistance cannot be provided by relief agencies, international and regional organisations, and NGOs when civilians and third party providers are at risk of being attacked. The security of civilians is also a key aspect of providing development assistance in post-conflict situations’ (Blatter 2011: 2).

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