Friday, March 13, 2015

DEMOCRACY OF YESTERYEAR'S IN GHANA


DEMOCRACY OF YESTERYEAR'S IN GHANA 

 

In Ghana, a combination of both domestic political resistance by civic groups and organizations to authoritarian rule, and calls for the promotion of good political governance by external bilateral and multilateral agencies and donors, set the stage for the transition to democratic rule. Sandbrook (2000) notes that in January 1991, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government led by Jerry John Rawlings who had taken over the reins of power after a military coup on 31 December 1981, presented a transition timetable and in May 1991 confirmed that Ghana would return to a multiparty system. After a referendum in April 1992 approved a constitution, the ban on political activity was lifted. Opposition political parties that had been unbanned then rushed to establish them for an election that was scheduled to take place six months later. It is against this backdrop that the presidential election was held on 3 November 1992. The PNDC, which had metamorphosed into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and led by Jerry John Rawlings, was declared winner of the presidential elections with 58.4 per cent of the votes, followed by Professor Albert Adu Boahen of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) with 30.29 per cent while other contestants polled less than 11 per cent of the vote.

The main opposition party NPP boycotted the parliamentary elections held on 28 December 1992 on grounds that the presidential elections had been rigged by the NDC with the help of the PNDC. Thus, when the NDC government was inaugurated in January 1993, it was a parliament dominated by the NDC MPs, who basically rubber stamped everything that the executive brought before it. In the absence of an opposition party, the parliament was seen as very ineffective. With the NDC holding 189 out of the 200 seats, and the remaining 11 seats held by smaller political parties aligned with the NDC, it was obvious that Ghana was only a democracy in name, and that some of the authoritarian tendencies that characterized the PNDC era were still in force. For example, as Fobih points out, in 1993, the NDC government proposed a bill that required local and foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Ghana to register with the National Council on Non-Governmental Organizations. This body was also empowered to deregister any organization at its own discretion. However, as a result of the vehement protest from the CSOs that the law infringed on the freedom of association, the bill was later aborted (Fobih, 2008).

While there was political space for the opposition to operate, they basically did so from outside the parliament. They could not influence decision-making at the official levels of power, thereby limiting their ability to hold the NDC government in check. When elections were held again in 1996, with nearly 80 per cent of the 9.27 million registered voters actually casting ballots, J.J. Rawlings won 57.4 per cent of the votes, while his main challenger and new NPP Presidential candidate, John Agyekum Kufuor polled 39.6 per cent. The NDC captured 134 of the 200 parliamentary seats, while the NPP won 60 seats, the People’s Convention Party (PCP) won five seats and the People’s National Convention (PNC) captured one seat. However, the 2000 elections marked an unprecedented milestone in Ghana’s political history when the incumbent NDC government, the party of J.J. Rawlings, was defeated and power was peacefully transferred to John Kufuor and the NPP (Tettey et al.  2003).

 As Gyimah Boadi points out, the first round of the presidential elections on 7 December 2000 produced a remarkably close contest between John Agyekum Kufour of the opposition NPP and John Evans Atta Mills of Rawlings’ NDC. Kufour won 48 per cent of the vote to Mills’ 45 per cent, but with no candidate winning a majority, a runoff was scheduled for 28 December. Kufour then went on to win the runoff by a more comfortable margin, with 56.9 per cent of the vote. Moreover, the NPP captured 100 of the parliament’s 200 seats; the NDC total fell from 133 in the previous parliament to 92, while independent and minor parties that had backed the NPP candidate in the runoff gained the remaining eight seats (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). Notwithstanding the NPP’s majority, the existence of the NDC as the main opposition party ensured a much more effective parliament since the NDC members served as a check on the activities of the governing NPP.

 Similar developments occurred in the December 2004 election. With an overall voter turnout at 85.12 per cent, J.A. Kufuor was re-elected as President with 52.45 per cent of the votes, while Professor Atta Mills of the NDC received 44.64 per cent. In addition, the parliamentary seats that had been increased from 200 to 230 by the EC just before the elections saw the ruling NPP retain its majority with 128 parliamentary seats, while the NDC won 94 seats.

During general elections and campaign periods, the media’s ability to be an objective and disinterested party becomes an issue and challenge. This was evident in the 2008 elections where certain sections of the media created confusion by calling results for particular candidates based on projected as opposed to actual figures from the EC. In addition, the budget on which most of the private print media operate is believed to be rather meager and tight. Apart from the state-owned newspapers and a handful of the private press, which carry significant amounts of advertisements, the remaining newspapers survive almost entirely on subscription and news stand sales, with very limited circulation figures. In effect, the inability to independently generate adequate revenue for their businesses makes the private press in general susceptible to manipulation by political patrons. With the average Ghanaian earning roughly a dollar a day, it is quite difficult to imagine citizens spending their money to buy a newspaper or calling a radio or TV station to participate in the national political dialogue (Smith & Temin, 2001: 166). In other words, economic survival is of the utmost importance to many people rather than participation in the political space provided as a result of the democratic process.

Civil Society Organization experience has generated mixed reactions from the government of the day. Although the relationship between the government and CSOs in the policy process has improved in the last decade, there is limited knowledge of the ability of CSOs to effectively utilize the institutional spaces available to them. Currently, CSOs participation in the policy process is mostly determined by government on a less than formal basis as the institutional framework that provides well laid down rules of interaction and engagement between CSOs and government in the policy process is missing.

Not all civil societies are progressive and necessarily interested in democratic process. Some are willing to be co-opted into the value oligarchy, while remaining silent on questions of democracy. Others occupy the little political space created by the state thereby becoming obstacles to democratization. In fact, some CSOs in Ghana have in the past played a rather destabilizing role in the democratic process in Ghana. For example, for political and financial gains, some local NGOs such as the 31 December Women’s Movement (DWM) and the Ghana Private Transport Union (GPRTU) were, according to Fobih (2008: 72), used by or aligned with the authoritarian PNDC regime to suppress popular demands for democracy.

During the NDC period (1993–2000), it was believed that the government maintained a rather tight control of some CSOs and manipulated some of them for their ideological purposes. In addition, many of the local CSOs currently lack funding and are more dependent on external support to boost their resource base, reflecting a pattern of resource deficiency of civic organizations in Ghana. Moreover, the lack of adequate funding partly accounts for low staffing and poor conditions of work experienced by CSOs. The staffs of many CSOs are therefore over-burdened with responsibilities, which in turn affects their functioning and Performance.

Such a situation has not been helped by the fact that financial information relating to CSOs donations and investments is rarely made public and is only shared with senior management within the organizations themselves. The lack of transparency and unhealthy competition reinforces the impression that CSOs in Ghana are not really independent advocates over important issues, but rather act as agents of some elites and political organizations in the country.

Besides the constraints and challenges faced by the media and CSOs, another area that has received critical attention and concern throughout are democratic rights. Ghana has seen an improvement in the rule of law, as well as in the area of respect for the civil and political rights of citizens, leading to a reduction in the unlawful arrests and detention of citizens by members of the military. The improvements can be traced in part to the activities of the many human rights groups established in the country since the transition to democratic rule began in Ghana. Despite these, instances of vigilante justice, police corruption, police infringement on peoples’ privacy rights, and of harsh and life-threatening prison conditions are quite rife in the country (Fobih, 2008).

Indeed, the 2008 Report on the State of Human Rights in Ghana presented by CHRAJ in December 2008 noted that communal violence, police brutality, mob justice, child sexual exploitation and victimization of suspected ‘witches’ were some of the negative indicators affecting the country’s effort to promote respect for human rights, a crucial element of any democratic society.

Furthermore, as noted in the theoretical discussion above, one important aspect of democratic consolidation relates to the extent to which institutions such as the judiciary are seen as trustworthy and independent in the discharge of their duties and responsibilities. This is, however, one area where Ghana seems to be lagging. For example, in December 2004, the independent Berlin-based Transparency International reported that not only did the performance of key institutions in Ghana such as the judiciary leave much to be desired, but that, beyond delays in the administration of justice, there were instances of corruption in their operations. Nor is it only the judicial system’s reputation that is in question: allegations of corruption in the public services and among some politicians affiliated with the NPP, in charge of government between 2001 and 2008, were not adequately addressed.

It is this state of affairs that led to Ghana being ranked 69 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index, and which undermined the NPP government’s claim to be dealing with the problem of corruption (Transparency International, 2007). Moreover, the NPP government was seen as very slow to act on these issues. There was a perception that the judiciary under the NPP was easily influenced by prominent individuals in society. There was also a suggestion of the executive branch of government manipulating and interfering with the judiciary’s work, exercising increasing influence and dominance over the other organs of constitutional governance.

More significantly, the NDC accused the NPP government of the selective application of justice. The NDC charged that the NPP government used the country’s judicial and legal structures to engage in a political vendetta and ‘witch-hunt’ because it only targeted members of the opposition in its corruption investigations. For the NDC, politics had become a zero-sum game with opposition members and those perceived as government opponents suffering from judiciary persecution, while perceived malfeasance by government supporters is generally ignored.

For example, in December of 2007, the NDC MP for Keta constituency, Mr Dan Abodakpi, who happened to be a former Minister for Trade and Industry under the Rawlings regime, was convicted by an Accra High Court of defrauding and causing financial loss to the state in the amount of $400,000.00. The NDC contended that this conviction was part of the judiciary’s bias against leading NDC figures that was exhibited under the NPP administration. In protest, the NDC boycotted parliamentary proceedings for three weeks (Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, 2007). Similarly, Tsatsu Tsikata, former Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) and a leading member of the NDC, was convicted by an Accra Circuit Tribunal in June 2008 for causing financial loss to the state and sentenced to five years in prison.

While the NPP government justified such criminal convictions as part of its broad focus and mandate to deal with corruption as well as promoting good governance and accountability, critics charged that the judiciary was manipulated by the NPP government. Although President John Kuffuor on 6 January 2009, his last day in office, granted what the government described as ‘free, absolute and unconditional pardon’ to Tsatsu Tsikata, Dan Abodakpi and other former NDC officials convicted of willfully causing financial loss to the state, as well as commuted the sentences of over 500 other prisoners of Various categories.

The NPP administration was nonetheless seen as protecting its functionaries and prosecuting opponents during its term in office. These raised serious questions about the application of the law in Ghana, the impartiality of the country’s judicial system and its processes, the objectivity and integrity of the government’s zero tolerance on corruption policy and about the integrity of the country’s constitutional arrangements. Indeed, there is some credibility to this claim by the NDC since instances of blatant corruption by government officials as well as by NPP functionaries were rarely targeted, charged and prosecuted and they were seldom convicted of corruption and economic malfeasance (Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, 2007).

The judiciary is not the only institution to come under political criticism. Despite its independence, impartiality and laudable efforts in the conduct of elections, the EC has had to grapple with a number of challenges. First, the president’s power of appointment to the EC has been a source of controversy along partisan lines (Afrimap et al. , 2007). Moreover, there is increasing concern that the EC does not adequately facilitate the electoral process by ensuring all materials needed for elections are provided to enable every eligible voter.

For example, in the presidential runoff held on 28 December 2008, voters in the Tain constituency of the Brong Ahafo Region was unable to participate in the elections due to technical and logistical problems encountered by the EC in the distribution of ballot papers. While the electorate had their elections conducted by the EC five days later, this contributed to the tension and confusion that characterized the presidential runoff of 2008. Similarly,

CODEO expressed dissatisfaction with the irregularities that marred the 2008 voters’ registration exercise mounted by the EC. It was particularly worried about what it considered undue interferences of political party agents in the exercise and their failure to follow laid down procedures, particularly in raising challenges against registrants. There was also the concern expressed by CSOs regarding the high levels of illegal voter registration in the form of under-aged, alien and double registration. Such concerns and pressure from CSOs led the EC to announce in November 2008 that it had deleted from the voter register list a total of 349,000 names, made up of people who were foreigners, dead or minors.

Finally, pre- election environments in Ghana have generally been characterized by ill-feeling, deep mistrust and intense acrimony between the ruling party and the opposition (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). The campaign messages that were used by both the ruling party and the main opposition party in the 2008 elections were largely not issues-based, but rather characterized by personal attacks. At a courtesy call in November 2008 by former President J.J. Rawlings on the Asantehene, one of the most prominent traditional rulers in Ghana, the Asantehene pointed out that, regrettably, the country’s political system during elections is muddied with lies, dirty political machinations, threats and intimidation emanating from both the government and opposition parties. Reports of ruling party agents and organs of the state intimidating the opposition were often rife, and there is a pervading sense that violence might erupt (Gyimah- Boadi, 2001). 
For example, the voter registration process in 2008 was in certain instances marred by violence and irregularities. It was reported in the media that in the Northern Region of Ghana, supporters of the NPP and the NDC vandalized registration centers on 2 August 2008. In a similar vein, during the 2008 election period, at various campaign stops for the NDC, J.J. Rawlings, according to his critics, senselessly maligned the NPP government by accusing them of being behind recent high profile and unsolved murders, glorifying corruption and undermining the moral fabric of the nation, also calling for their removal from office.

Conversely, the high echelons of NPP, including its National Chairman, accused J.J. Rawlings of collecting kickbacks from prominent foreign companies. The NPP also contended that the John Evans Atta Mills-led NDC lacked the capacity and aptitude to prosecute sound economic policies that could help move the development agenda of Ghana forward. These accusations and counter-accusations are not helped by the attitude of the political elite, who see politics as a means to pursue private ends and therefore spend lavishly during elections to maintain their seats.

All these factors combine to create an unprecedented state of public anxiety, as many people fear that the transition would be disrupted and elections might degenerate into civil conflict (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001), and ultimately threaten the essential foundations of the democratic process, such as dialogue, tolerance, co-operation, consensus-building, compromise and goodwill.

Ghana is among the African countries that have made great efforts to consolidate democracy for the welfare of her people. Despite the challenges, the country has tried to entrench and maintain independent key democratic institution such as judiciary, media, civil society, electoral

commission, multiparty system of politics and human rights watch institutions. In any democratic state, these institutions are considered as the key pillars of democracy and without these, a country cannot be perceived as democratic. In regard to this one can therefore assert that there are democratic practices in Ghana and thus, the country has established a democratic system of government.

REFERENCE



1.       Africa, Open Society Initiative for West Africa & Institute for Democratic Governance (2007)

2.      Black, D. & Arthur, P. (2007). The benefits of an indirect approach: the case of Ghana, in: J. WeBratton, M. (2004) The ‘Alternation Effect’ in Africa, Journal of Democracy, 15(4),pp. 147–158.

3.      Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm, Journal of Democracy, 13(1),pp. 5–11.

4.      Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

5.      Dahl, R. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).



6.      Fobih, N. (2008). Political parties and democratic development in Ghana: from transition to consolidation and beyond, PhD thesis submitted to Department of Political Science, Queen’s University, Canada.

7.      Ghana: Governance in the Fourth Republic, pp. 195–214 (Accra, Ghana: Ghana Centre for Democratic Development).

8.      Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD) (2007) Democracy watch, Annals of Governance, 7(3), pp. 1–14.

9.      Government of Ghana (1992) 1992 Constitution of Ghana (Accra, Ghana: Ghana Printing Press). 224

10.  P. Arthur Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2001) A peaceful turnover in Ghana, Journal of Democracy 12(2), pp. 103–117.

11.  Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2009) another step forward for Ghana, Journal of Democracy, 20(2), pp. 138–152.

12.  Hammerstad, A. (2004) African Commitments to Democracy in Theory and Practice, a Review of Eight NEPAD Countries. Pretoria: African Human Security Initiative.

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