A Dreamer without Significance: Wilson in International Relations

A Dreamer without Significance: Wilson in International Relations

Today, Monday, July 28 2014, as we mark one hundred years since the onset of World War I, lets us assess the efficacy of Wilson diplomacy. Woodrow Wilson has been variously described as an idealist, out of touch with reality (Marks, 1976; Merriman, 2004). Wilson believed his fourteen points were the panacea of world peace and the great “war to end all wars” (Lansing, 1921). Wilson was, in all accounts and purposes, a tourist preacher in futile shuttle diplomacy in foreign Europe.

But it was the vested interests of the big three that made it difficult for all to agree. Given political negotiations is a matter of give a little to get a little, it would be utterly unfair to blame Wilson failing to bulldoze all his fourteen points to the final treaty. After all the treaty which came out was a compromise for the sake of progress in the bargaining table.

           
Wilson was definitely the most inept debater and diplomat of the big three. The French chancellor Georges Clemenceau, nicknamed “the tiger” mocked his fourteen points ridiculing why he formed fourteen when God made only ten. A confrontational egoist with personal vendetta was keen on extracting his pound of flesh from Germany although he realized the consequences of a punitive peace settlement (Merreiman, 2004). Eschewing French public opinion, he yearned for peace in aversion to persisting menace. This is why France insisted on Paris as the venue of the conference despite emotions running highest in this theater of war bearing the brunt of destruction. France was also heavily in debt hence pressed for reparations because its citizens opposed raising taxation. Public pressure here wanted Germany demilitarized to avert future threats.

          
Lloyd George on the other hand employed his diplomatic skill to secure Britain's interests in repossessing German colonies and maintaining British naval supremacy. Subsequently, he hoped to join Wilson as 'impartial' arbiters of world’s future (Marks, 1976). More often, he was at loggerheads with Clemenceau, with disagreements almost turning physical were it not for Wilson's intervention.

             
Wilson arrived in Europe loaded with ignorance about the Great War and Europe. His ethnocentrism compounded his judgment skills. This explains his half-hearted demeanor to challenge secret war time arrangements against his fourteen points (Marks, 1976).

            
Yet the German delegation was kept waiting in protective fencing at Versailles as the conference dragged for months on end. The treaty was eventually presented in the Hall of Mirrors in Paris the very same hall where German empire was proclaimed in 1971 after the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. This event manifested French desire for vengeance. Consequently, the 'death' of the German empire was announced where it was born. Furthermore, Germany was forced to return the French Flag taken in the 1971 loss in spirit of French Nationalism and Vendetta.

            
More importantly was the 'war guilt clause' which blamed Germany for Causing the war and damage. Germany was forced to accept full responsibility of the war (Merriman, 2004). Germans was given 72 hours to accept the terms or face renewed war. A bitter and disgruntled Germany emerged from the Versailles Treaty.  Keynes (1919) maintains the reparation clause would harm international relations in the post war reconstruction. In particular, the worst psychological impact was the imposition of bitter resentment which could serve as a potential powder keg for the outbreak of another war. Indeed right wing parties in Germany exploited these sentiments to grab power. In one verse fall, the new Germany was punished for the crimes of archival Wilhelm Empire (Marks, 1976). Yet this happened under Wilson's nose.

             
In America, just before he left, the republicans had gained majority in the congress. A team of German, Italian and Irish American opinion ganged up with conservative senators to refuse to participate in European affairs lest their interests were catered for. They cited the old Monroe doctrine for rejecting the league subscription. Therefore the USA never joined the League of Nations.

           
In this context the league was headed for failure. Its formation was in itself confusing more than illuminating mirage of international peace (Marks, 1976, p.15). The document was hurriedly conjoined to form supposedly comprehensive peace treaty. A resentful Germany was expected to thrive in a sea of tiny pulverized states with sizable German populations. Germany was not counter checked by great powers as before hoping Germany would accept and move on (Marks, 1976).

             
Due to the rising political social and economic tensions, the little harmony quickly vanished in thin air. Consequently, much of the treaty failed, peace of Versailles lost its relevance as most of it was never implemented. Many questions remained unsettled and remained to linger in the face of Europe.

            
It took a read from the allied Marshall Forch to exclaim, “This is not peace, and it’s a twenty year truce”. The accuracy of his predictions deserves admiration. Yet illusions clogged the big three to the extent they could not fathom this reality. (Merriman, 2004).

             
Soon after the Versailles settlement, Wilson collapsed from pressure of stroke and burdened by the elusive peace which he believed and championed. The thud of his fall resonated across the world. In the end the Paris peace settlement was largely written by European victors to their opportunistic advantage. Wilson's efforts bore little fruits as his vision of a new world order was never realized. In fact, his only achievement was the allied victory is credited wholesale to the contributions of resource-rich US. West Europe had lost their significance as world rulers yet they continued dictating their terms on the world stage (Marks, 1976).

             
To be fair I may be reading too much politics into Wilson's role in international relations. He was a human and human is to err. A balanced assessment would be that he did what he thought was right. Although his dreams were misleading more than illuminating, it was the circumstances in the USA and Europe which militated against his ideas. Therefore, Wilson's role was reduced to that of a flower girl in international shuttle diplomacy in Europe.

 

   

References

Keynes, J. M. (1919). The economic consequences of peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe.

Lansing, R. (1921). The big four and others of the peace conference. Boston: The Riverside Press.

Marks, S. (1976). The illusion of peace: International relations in Europe (1918-1933). Hong Kong:          Macmillan.

Mayer, A. (1967). Politics and diplomacy of peace making: Containment and counterrevolutions at           Versailles (1918-1919). New York: Knopf.

Merriman, J. (2004). A history of modern Europe (2nd edition). London: W W Morton.

Waite, R. G. (1954). (Review of the book The nemesis of power: The German army in politics 1918-        1919, by Wheeler-Bennet, J. W). The Western Political Quarterly, 7 (2), 272-274.